This nilling was applied to attributes but not to calculations or aggregates. A user-supplied filter reference to a calculation or aggregate carries an Ash.Query.Calculation / Ash.Query.Aggregate struct, which the authorizer's reference replacement did not match (it only matched the Ash.Resource.* structs), so the filter ran against the real value.
As a result, an actor whose field policies forbid a calculation or aggregate can still filter by it (for example filter(secret_calc == "x") or filter(comment_count == n)) and learn the value from whether rows match — an oracle that recovers field-policy-protected values one probe at a time. Filtering is commonly exposed to lower-privileged actors (for example via AshGraphql or AshJsonApi filter arguments), which is exactly the surface field policies are meant to protect.
The fix routes filter references to calculations and aggregates through the same field-policy nilling as attributes.
This issue affects ash: from 2.11.0-rc.0 before 3.33.4.
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Wed, 16 Sep 2026 15:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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Wed, 16 Sep 2026 08:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| Description | Ash field_policies are documented to protect against filter-based information disclosure: when a field the actor may not see is referenced in a filter, it is replaced with an expression that evaluates to nil, so a filter cannot be used as a yes/no oracle to read a value the actor cannot see. This nilling was applied to attributes but not to calculations or aggregates. A user-supplied filter reference to a calculation or aggregate carries an Ash.Query.Calculation / Ash.Query.Aggregate struct, which the authorizer's reference replacement did not match (it only matched the Ash.Resource.* structs), so the filter ran against the real value. As a result, an actor whose field policies forbid a calculation or aggregate can still filter by it (for example filter(secret_calc == "x") or filter(comment_count == n)) and learn the value from whether rows match — an oracle that recovers field-policy-protected values one probe at a time. Filtering is commonly exposed to lower-privileged actors (for example via AshGraphql or AshJsonApi filter arguments), which is exactly the surface field policies are meant to protect. The fix routes filter references to calculations and aggregates through the same field-policy nilling as attributes. This issue affects ash: from 2.11.0-rc.0 before 3.33.4. | |
| Title | Ash field policies do not filter-nil forbidden calculations and aggregates, enabling an information-disclosure oracle | |
| First Time appeared |
Ash-project
Ash-project ash |
|
| Weaknesses | CWE-1220 | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:ash-project:ash:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Ash-project
Ash-project ash |
|
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: EEF
Published:
Updated: 2026-09-16T14:49:17.203Z
Reserved: 2026-09-15T15:30:01.895Z
Link: CVE-2026-86338
Updated: 2026-09-16T14:49:13.519Z
Status : Received
Published: 2026-09-16T09:17:06.897
Modified: 2026-09-16T15:18:02.030
Link: CVE-2026-86338
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-09-16T14:15:09Z
