Description
SigNoz versions from v0.98.0 up to (but not including) v0.143.0, when configured to use the opaque session tokenizer (which was not the default before v0.143.0), do not revoke a user's existing login sessions when the user's password is reset with a reset token (UpdatePasswordByResetPasswordToken, reachable via POST /api/v2/factor_password/reset) or when the user is deleted (DeleteUser, reachable via DELETE /api/v2/users/{id}). Neither code path calls the tokenizer's DeleteTokensByUserID, so cached tokens and identities are left in place. An attacker who already holds a session token for the account — for example from a stolen browser session or from a user being offboarded — retains the account's full access, up to administrator, after a password reset until the token reaches its configured maximum lifetime (30 days by default), and after user deletion until the token next rotates (30 minutes by default). This defeats password reset and user deletion as a means of terminating access. The issue is fixed in v0.143.0.
Published: 2026-09-24
Score: 7.6 High
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

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Remediation

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History

Thu, 24 Sep 2026 03:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Signoz
Signoz signoz
Vendors & Products Signoz
Signoz signoz

Thu, 24 Sep 2026 02:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description SigNoz versions from v0.98.0 up to (but not including) v0.143.0, when configured to use the opaque session tokenizer (which was not the default before v0.143.0), do not revoke a user's existing login sessions when the user's password is reset with a reset token (UpdatePasswordByResetPasswordToken, reachable via POST /api/v2/factor_password/reset) or when the user is deleted (DeleteUser, reachable via DELETE /api/v2/users/{id}). Neither code path calls the tokenizer's DeleteTokensByUserID, so cached tokens and identities are left in place. An attacker who already holds a session token for the account — for example from a stolen browser session or from a user being offboarded — retains the account's full access, up to administrator, after a password reset until the token reaches its configured maximum lifetime (30 days by default), and after user deletion until the token next rotates (30 minutes by default). This defeats password reset and user deletion as a means of terminating access. The issue is fixed in v0.143.0.
Title SigNoz before 0.143.0 Insufficient Session Expiration Authentication Bypass
Weaknesses CWE-613
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 6.8, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N'}

cvssV4_0

{'score': 7.6, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}


cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: VulnCheck

Published:

Updated: 2026-09-24T01:53:04.486Z

Reserved: 2026-09-23T23:51:32.670Z

Link: CVE-2026-97056

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-09-24T02:16:54.500

Modified: 2026-09-24T02:16:54.500

Link: CVE-2026-97056

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-09-24T04:00:13Z

Weaknesses