nvmet-tcp: reject unsolicited H2CData PDUs
nvmet_tcp_handle_h2c_data_pdu() accepts an H2CData PDU after only checking
that its TTAG is a valid in-range command index and that the command's
data buffers are mapped. It never checks that the target has actually
solicited that data by sending an R2T for the command.
A remote host can abuse this. It submits a write command that takes the
R2T path and, before the target transmits the R2T, sends an H2CData PDU
for that command's tag. The data completes the command early, and when
the command then fails synchronously (e.g. a length mismatch caught by
nvmet_check_transfer_len()), it is completed a second time. Each
completion calls nvmet_tcp_queue_response(), so the same command is added
to queue->resp_list twice while it is still linked; the second llist_add()
makes the node point to itself (lentry->next == lentry).
nvmet_tcp_process_resp_list() then walks that self-referential node and
adds the command to resp_send_list twice. With CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST this
trips the "list_add double add" check (kernel BUG); without it the loop
never terminates and the nvmet_tcp workqueue wedges (soft-lockup). It is
remotely triggerable and needs no authentication on an allow_any_host
subsystem.
Track whether an R2T has been transmitted for a command and reject an
H2CData PDU that arrives before it. The flag is cleared on command reuse
(nvmet_tcp_get_cmd() zeroes cmd->flags) and stays set across the multiple
H2CData PDUs of a single solicited transfer.
Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.
No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.
Additional remediation guidance may be available on OpenCVE Cloud.
Tracking
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Wed, 16 Sep 2026 14:45:00 +0000
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cvssV3_1
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Wed, 16 Sep 2026 10:45:00 +0000
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| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvmet-tcp: reject unsolicited H2CData PDUs nvmet_tcp_handle_h2c_data_pdu() accepts an H2CData PDU after only checking that its TTAG is a valid in-range command index and that the command's data buffers are mapped. It never checks that the target has actually solicited that data by sending an R2T for the command. A remote host can abuse this. It submits a write command that takes the R2T path and, before the target transmits the R2T, sends an H2CData PDU for that command's tag. The data completes the command early, and when the command then fails synchronously (e.g. a length mismatch caught by nvmet_check_transfer_len()), it is completed a second time. Each completion calls nvmet_tcp_queue_response(), so the same command is added to queue->resp_list twice while it is still linked; the second llist_add() makes the node point to itself (lentry->next == lentry). nvmet_tcp_process_resp_list() then walks that self-referential node and adds the command to resp_send_list twice. With CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST this trips the "list_add double add" check (kernel BUG); without it the loop never terminates and the nvmet_tcp workqueue wedges (soft-lockup). It is remotely triggerable and needs no authentication on an allow_any_host subsystem. Track whether an R2T has been transmitted for a command and reject an H2CData PDU that arrives before it. The flag is cleared on command reuse (nvmet_tcp_get_cmd() zeroes cmd->flags) and stays set across the multiple H2CData PDUs of a single solicited transfer. | |
| Title | nvmet-tcp: reject unsolicited H2CData PDUs | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-09-16T14:40:46.581Z
Reserved: 2026-09-11T19:38:34.778Z
Link: CVE-2026-89968
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-09-16T11:17:07.387
Modified: 2026-09-16T15:18:21.090
Link: CVE-2026-89968
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
No weakness.
