AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.SignInWithTokenPreparation.extract_primary_keys_from_subject/2 parses the JWT sub claim (for example user?id=1) with URI.parse/1 and keeps only its query string, discarding the path segment that names the subject the token was issued for. Nothing else restores that binding: AshAuthentication.Jwt.verify/3 checks the signature, exp, nbf, jti and the library-version claims, the purpose check only requires sign_in, and the remaining comparison is over primary-key field names, which are identical across resources. The WebAuthn sign-in and remember-me preparations carry copies of the same helper and drop the path in the same way. The magic link sign-in path pins the subject name against the resource and is not affected.
This issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.10.5 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
Analysis
Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| team-alembic | ash_authentication | unaffected |
|
|||||||||
| team-alembic | ash_authentication | unaffected |
|
No data.
No data.
No data available yet.
No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.
Additional remediation guidance may be available on OpenCVE Cloud.
Tracking
Sign in to view the affected projects.
No advisories yet.
Thu, 17 Sep 2026 19:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
Thu, 17 Sep 2026 13:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Improper Authentication vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker holding a sign-in token for one authenticated resource to be signed in as a user of a different resource. AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.SignInWithTokenPreparation.extract_primary_keys_from_subject/2 parses the JWT sub claim (for example user?id=1) with URI.parse/1 and keeps only its query string, discarding the path segment that names the subject the token was issued for. Nothing else restores that binding: AshAuthentication.Jwt.verify/3 checks the signature, exp, nbf, jti and the library-version claims, the purpose check only requires sign_in, and the remaining comparison is over primary-key field names, which are identical across resources. The WebAuthn sign-in and remember-me preparations carry copies of the same helper and drop the path in the same way. The magic link sign-in path pins the subject name against the resource and is not affected. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.10.5 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14. | |
| Title | Sign-in token minted for one resource accepted by another in AshAuthentication | |
| First Time appeared |
Team-alembic
Team-alembic ash Authentication |
|
| Weaknesses | CWE-287 | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Team-alembic
Team-alembic ash Authentication |
|
| References |
|
|
| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
|
MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: EEF
Published:
Updated: 2026-09-17T18:28:47.571Z
Reserved: 2026-09-11T18:30:01.333Z
Link: CVE-2026-80218
Vulnrichment
Updated: 2026-09-17T18:28:45.145Z
NVD
Status : Received
Published: 2026-09-17T14:17:30.743
Modified: 2026-09-17T19:17:03.287
Link: CVE-2026-80218
Redhat
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.