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Wed, 23 Sep 2026 21:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Rabbitmq
Rabbitmq rabbitmq-server |
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| Vendors & Products |
Rabbitmq
Rabbitmq rabbitmq-server |
Wed, 23 Sep 2026 20:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 4.3.0, 4.2.6, 4.1.11, 4.0.20, and 3.13.15, The content-header BodySize (a uint64) was stored without validation against max_message_size. The size check ran only when assembly completed. By declaring body_size = 2^63-1 and then streaming fragments, a client ensured that check_msg_size never fired, so the accumulated body size went unbounded. A reader process accumulates memory until the memory alarm fires, degrading all publishers cluster-wide, or until the node runs out of memory. The memory alarm provides only partial mitigation, since it is reactive rather than preventive. AMQP 0-9-1 is the most widely used protocol, and any publisher can trigger this condition. Preconditions include Any authenticated AMQP 0-9-1 client with publish permission can exploit this.. This issue is fixed in versions 4.3.0, 4.2.6, 4.1.11, 4.0.20, and 3.13.15. | |
| Title | RabbitMQ: AMQP 0-9-1 body assembly never validates accumulated size | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-770 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
|
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-09-23T20:36:37.508Z
Reserved: 2026-07-28T19:50:39.438Z
Link: CVE-2026-67235
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-09-23T21:17:01.227
Modified: 2026-09-23T21:17:01.227
Link: CVE-2026-67235
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-09-23T21:30:07Z
