Description
The pure-Erlang AES-GCM fallback in jose_jwa_aes derives the number of verified authentication tag bits from the attacker-supplied tag itself. In the {aes_gcm, Bits} clause of block_decrypt/4, the incoming tag is guarded only by is_binary/1, with no check on its length. Verification in gcm_block_decrypt/6 then computes TBits = bit_size(T) and compares only those bits of the real 128-bit tag. An attacker who controls a JWE token can truncate the authentication tag to as little as 8 bits, so only 8 bits are ever checked. This reduces forgery resistance from 2^-128 to 2^-8, and a forged ciphertext is reliably accepted as authentic within 256 attempts without knowledge of the key (an authentication tag forgery and integrity bypass). Supplying a tag longer than 128 bits instead causes a badmatch that crashes the decrypting process. The fallback is reached through the public JWE decryption path whenever AES-GCM is not provided by a native crypto NIF, for example on FIPS or stripped or older OTP builds.

This issue affects jose: from 1.2.0 before 1.11.13.
Published: 2026-10-26
Score: 5.9 Medium
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

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Remediation

Vendor Workaround

Ensure the runtime provides a crypto provider with native AES-GCM support (a standard Erlang/OTP build linked against OpenSSL) so that JOSE dispatches AES-GCM to the native crypto NIF instead of the jose_jwa_aes fallback.

Tracking

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Advisories

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History

Mon, 26 Oct 2026 20:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description The pure-Erlang AES-GCM fallback in jose_jwa_aes derives the number of verified authentication tag bits from the attacker-supplied tag itself. In the {aes_gcm, Bits} clause of block_decrypt/4, the incoming tag is guarded only by is_binary/1, with no check on its length. Verification in gcm_block_decrypt/6 then computes TBits = bit_size(T) and compares only those bits of the real 128-bit tag. An attacker who controls a JWE token can truncate the authentication tag to as little as 8 bits, so only 8 bits are ever checked. This reduces forgery resistance from 2^-128 to 2^-8, and a forged ciphertext is reliably accepted as authentic within 256 attempts without knowledge of the key (an authentication tag forgery and integrity bypass). Supplying a tag longer than 128 bits instead causes a badmatch that crashes the decrypting process. The fallback is reached through the public JWE decryption path whenever AES-GCM is not provided by a native crypto NIF, for example on FIPS or stripped or older OTP builds. This issue affects jose: from 1.2.0 before 1.11.13.
Title Attacker-controlled AES-GCM authentication tag length allows tag forgery in jose
First Time appeared Potatosalad
Potatosalad jose
Weaknesses CWE-354
CPEs cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Potatosalad
Potatosalad jose
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 5.9, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}


Subscriptions

Potatosalad Jose
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: EEF

Published:

Updated: 2026-10-26T19:52:54.987Z

Reserved: 2026-07-22T13:55:59.401Z

Link: CVE-2026-65625

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-10-26T20:17:57.910

Modified: 2026-10-26T20:17:57.910

Link: CVE-2026-65625

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

No data.

Weaknesses