{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-19184", "assignerOrgId": "e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "zephyr", "dateReserved": "2026-08-06T18:36:10.589Z", "datePublished": "2026-10-05T08:06:22.681Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-10-05T13:23:31.086Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"providerMetadata": {"orgId": "e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad", "shortName": "zephyr", "dateUpdated": "2026-10-05T08:06:22.681Z"}, "title": "Out-of-bounds write in the NXP GAU ADC driver due to byte-versus-sample buffer size validation mismatch", "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "The NXP GAU ADC driver (drivers/adc/adc_mcux_gau_adc.c) validated the caller-supplied sequence->buffer_size, which is expressed in bytes, against the number of active channels, which is a sample count. It then stored that byte count directly in data->results_length and used it in mcux_gau_adc_read_samples() as the number of uint16_t slots available. Because each conversion result occupies sizeof(uint16_t) bytes, a buffer that was accepted as \"large enough\" could be written with up to twice its size in bytes, so every sample past the buffer's midpoint was written out of bounds.\n\nadc_read() and adc_read_async() are Zephyr system calls. The syscall verifier in drivers/adc/adc_handlers.c only confirms that the caller owns buffer_size writable bytes (K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE); deciding whether that size is sufficient for the requested channels and extra_samplings is delegated entirely to the driver. On a build with CONFIG_USERSPACE=y, a user-mode thread that has been granted the ADC device object could therefore submit a deliberately half-sized buffer and cause the driver's work-queue handler \u2014 which runs in supervisor mode, outside the caller's MPU restrictions \u2014 to write ADC conversion results past the end of that buffer, at an address and for a length of the caller's choosing.\n\nThe overrun is bounded by the requested sequence: with sequence->options->extra_samplings set, the sampling loop walks the buffer pointer forward across every sampling, so the total overrun can reach the full size of the supplied buffer (kilobytes for a large extra_samplings). The written words are 16-bit ADC conversion results, so the content is only partially attacker-influenced (via the selected analog input, gain and resolution), but the destination and length are fully controlled \u2014 sufficient for kernel memory corruption, a crash, or a userspace-to-kernel privilege escalation. Builds without CONFIG_USERSPACE, or on SoCs other than NXP RW61x with the GAU ADC node enabled, are not exposed to the privilege boundary; there the same defect only causes a silent overflow when the application itself passes an undersized buffer.\n\nThe fix replaces the ad-hoc check with the shared adc_sequence_validate_buffer() helper (validating against num_channels * sizeof(uint16_t)), stores buffer_size / sizeof(uint16_t) in results_length, and corrects the loop bound to a post-decrement so exactly the available number of slots may be written."}], "affected": [{"vendor": "zephyrproject", "product": "zephyr", "collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr", "packageName": "zephyr", "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "programFiles": ["drivers/adc/adc_mcux_gau_adc.c"], "programRoutines": [{"name": "mcux_gau_adc_do_read"}, {"name": "mcux_gau_adc_read_samples"}], "versions": [{"version": "3.7.0", "status": "affected", "lessThan": "4.5.0", "versionType": "semver"}]}], "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/82b11958065aa85f8644ddc318ff4a328d1443c8", "name": "Fix commit", "tags": ["patch"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-j86w-mfgw-fxj9", "name": "GHSA-j86w-mfgw-fxj9"}], "metrics": [{"format": "CVSS", "cvssV3_1": {"version": "3.1", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H", "baseScore": 8.4, "baseSeverity": "HIGH"}}], "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "description": "bounds", "cweId": "CWE-787", "type": "CWE"}]}], "x_generator": {"engine": "cvelib 1.8.0"}}, "adp": [{"metrics": [{"other": {"type": "ssvc", "content": {"timestamp": "2026-10-05T13:23:22.615234Z", "id": "CVE-2026-19184", "options": [{"Exploitation": "none"}, {"Automatable": "no"}, {"Technical Impact": "partial"}], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "version": "2.0.3"}}}], "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2026-10-05T13:23:31.086Z"}}]}}

{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "containers": {"adp": [{"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "metrics": [{"other": {"type": "ssvc", "content": {"id": "CVE-2026-19184", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "options": [{"Exploitation": "none"}, {"Automatable": "no"}, {"Technical Impact": "partial"}], "version": "2.0.3", "timestamp": "2026-10-05T13:23:22.615234Z"}}}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2026-10-05T13:23:27.306Z"}}], "cna": {"title": "Out-of-bounds write in the NXP GAU ADC driver due to byte-versus-sample buffer size validation mismatch", "metrics": [{"format": "CVSS", "cvssV3_1": {"version": "3.1", "baseScore": 8.4, "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H"}}], "affected": [{"vendor": "zephyrproject", "product": "zephyr", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "3.7.0", "lessThan": "4.5.0", "versionType": "semver"}], "packageName": "zephyr", "programFiles": ["drivers/adc/adc_mcux_gau_adc.c"], "collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr", "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "programRoutines": [{"name": "mcux_gau_adc_do_read"}, {"name": "mcux_gau_adc_read_samples"}]}], "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/82b11958065aa85f8644ddc318ff4a328d1443c8", "name": "Fix commit", "tags": ["patch"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-j86w-mfgw-fxj9", "name": "GHSA-j86w-mfgw-fxj9"}], "x_generator": {"engine": "cvelib 1.8.0"}, "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "The NXP GAU ADC driver (drivers/adc/adc_mcux_gau_adc.c) validated the caller-supplied sequence->buffer_size, which is expressed in bytes, against the number of active channels, which is a sample count. It then stored that byte count directly in data->results_length and used it in mcux_gau_adc_read_samples() as the number of uint16_t slots available. Because each conversion result occupies sizeof(uint16_t) bytes, a buffer that was accepted as \"large enough\" could be written with up to twice its size in bytes, so every sample past the buffer's midpoint was written out of bounds.\n\nadc_read() and adc_read_async() are Zephyr system calls. The syscall verifier in drivers/adc/adc_handlers.c only confirms that the caller owns buffer_size writable bytes (K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE); deciding whether that size is sufficient for the requested channels and extra_samplings is delegated entirely to the driver. On a build with CONFIG_USERSPACE=y, a user-mode thread that has been granted the ADC device object could therefore submit a deliberately half-sized buffer and cause the driver's work-queue handler \u2014 which runs in supervisor mode, outside the caller's MPU restrictions \u2014 to write ADC conversion results past the end of that buffer, at an address and for a length of the caller's choosing.\n\nThe overrun is bounded by the requested sequence: with sequence->options->extra_samplings set, the sampling loop walks the buffer pointer forward across every sampling, so the total overrun can reach the full size of the supplied buffer (kilobytes for a large extra_samplings). The written words are 16-bit ADC conversion results, so the content is only partially attacker-influenced (via the selected analog input, gain and resolution), but the destination and length are fully controlled \u2014 sufficient for kernel memory corruption, a crash, or a userspace-to-kernel privilege escalation. Builds without CONFIG_USERSPACE, or on SoCs other than NXP RW61x with the GAU ADC node enabled, are not exposed to the privilege boundary; there the same defect only causes a silent overflow when the application itself passes an undersized buffer.\n\nThe fix replaces the ad-hoc check with the shared adc_sequence_validate_buffer() helper (validating against num_channels * sizeof(uint16_t)), stores buffer_size / sizeof(uint16_t) in results_length, and corrects the loop bound to a post-decrement so exactly the available number of slots may be written."}], "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "type": "CWE", "cweId": "CWE-787", "description": "bounds"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad", "shortName": "zephyr", "dateUpdated": "2026-10-05T08:06:22.681Z"}}}, "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-19184", "state": "PUBLISHED", "dateUpdated": "2026-10-05T13:23:31.086Z", "dateReserved": "2026-08-06T18:36:10.589Z", "assignerOrgId": "e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad", "datePublished": "2026-10-05T08:06:22.681Z", "assignerShortName": "zephyr"}, "dataVersion": "5.2"}

{"affected": [{"affectedData": [{"collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr", "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "packageName": "zephyr", "product": "zephyr", "programFiles": ["drivers/adc/adc_mcux_gau_adc.c"], "programRoutines": [{"name": "mcux_gau_adc_do_read"}, {"name": "mcux_gau_adc_read_samples"}], "vendor": "zephyrproject", "versions": [{"lessThan": "4.5.0", "status": "affected", "version": "3.7.0", "versionType": "semver"}]}], "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"}], "cveTags": [], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "The NXP GAU ADC driver (drivers/adc/adc_mcux_gau_adc.c) validated the caller-supplied sequence->buffer_size, which is expressed in bytes, against the number of active channels, which is a sample count. It then stored that byte count directly in data->results_length and used it in mcux_gau_adc_read_samples() as the number of uint16_t slots available. Because each conversion result occupies sizeof(uint16_t) bytes, a buffer that was accepted as \"large enough\" could be written with up to twice its size in bytes, so every sample past the buffer's midpoint was written out of bounds.\n\nadc_read() and adc_read_async() are Zephyr system calls. The syscall verifier in drivers/adc/adc_handlers.c only confirms that the caller owns buffer_size writable bytes (K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE); deciding whether that size is sufficient for the requested channels and extra_samplings is delegated entirely to the driver. On a build with CONFIG_USERSPACE=y, a user-mode thread that has been granted the ADC device object could therefore submit a deliberately half-sized buffer and cause the driver's work-queue handler \u2014 which runs in supervisor mode, outside the caller's MPU restrictions \u2014 to write ADC conversion results past the end of that buffer, at an address and for a length of the caller's choosing.\n\nThe overrun is bounded by the requested sequence: with sequence->options->extra_samplings set, the sampling loop walks the buffer pointer forward across every sampling, so the total overrun can reach the full size of the supplied buffer (kilobytes for a large extra_samplings). The written words are 16-bit ADC conversion results, so the content is only partially attacker-influenced (via the selected analog input, gain and resolution), but the destination and length are fully controlled \u2014 sufficient for kernel memory corruption, a crash, or a userspace-to-kernel privilege escalation. Builds without CONFIG_USERSPACE, or on SoCs other than NXP RW61x with the GAU ADC node enabled, are not exposed to the privilege boundary; there the same defect only causes a silent overflow when the application itself passes an undersized buffer.\n\nThe fix replaces the ad-hoc check with the shared adc_sequence_validate_buffer() helper (validating against num_channels * sizeof(uint16_t)), stores buffer_size / sizeof(uint16_t) in results_length, and corrects the loop bound to a post-decrement so exactly the available number of slots may be written."}], "id": "CVE-2026-19184", "lastModified": "2026-10-05T14:17:20.933", "metrics": {"cvssMetricV31": [{"cvssData": {"attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.4, "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "NONE", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1"}, "exploitabilityScore": 2.0, "impactScore": 5.8, "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org", "type": "Secondary"}], "ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2026-19184", "options": [{"exploitation": "none"}, {"automatable": "no"}, {"technicalImpact": "partial"}], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "timestamp": "2026-10-05T13:23:22.615234Z", "version": "2.0.3"}}]}, "published": "2026-10-05T09:17:12.907", "references": [{"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org", "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/82b11958065aa85f8644ddc318ff4a328d1443c8"}, {"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org", "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-j86w-mfgw-fxj9"}], "sourceIdentifier": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org", "vulnStatus": "Received", "weaknesses": [{"description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-787"}], "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org", "type": "Secondary"}]}

{}

{"affected": [{"configurations": [{"platform": null, "status": "affected", "versions": {"scheme": "semver", "value": "[3.7.0,4.5.0)"}}], "enrichment": {"confidence": 100.0, "confidence_source": "matching", "scores": [{"score": 100.0, "source": "matching"}]}, "original": {"product": "zephyr", "source": "cna", "vendor": "zephyrproject"}, "product": "zephyr", "vendor": "zephyrproject"}], "created": "2026-10-05T09:30:09.905759+00:00", "updated": "2026-10-05T09:30:10.640966+00:00", "vendors": ["zephyrproject", "zephyrproject$PRODUCT$zephyr"]}