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Search Results (10602 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-63920 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-26 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: validate extension header length before copying to cmsg ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl() builds IPV6_{HOPOPTS,DSTOPTS,RTHDR} cmsgs (and their IPV6_2292* legacy counterparts) by trusting the on-wire hdrlen byte (ptr[1]) when computing the put_cmsg() length. The length was validated only at parse time (ipv6_parse_hopopts(), etc.). An nftables payload-write expression can rewrite hdrlen after parsing and before the skb reaches recvmsg; the write itself is in-bounds but put_cmsg() then reads up to ((hdrlen+1) << 3) = 2040 bytes from an 8-byte header. nftables is reachable from an unprivileged user namespace, so this is an unprivileged slab-out-of-bounds read: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in put_cmsg+0x3ac/0x540 put_cmsg+0x3ac/0x540 udpv6_recvmsg+0xca0/0x1250 sock_recvmsg+0xdf/0x190 ____sys_recvmsg+0x1b1/0x620 Add ipv6_get_exthdr_len() which validates that at least two bytes are accessible before reading the hdrlen field, then checks the computed length against skb_tail_pointer(skb), returning 0 on failure. Extension headers are kept in the linear skb area by pskb_may_pull() during input, so skb_tail_pointer() is the correct bound. Use ipv6_get_exthdr_len() at all non-AH call sites: the five standalone cmsg blocks (HbH, 2292HbH, 2292DSTOPTS x2, 2292RTHDR) and the three standard cases in the extension-header walk loop (DSTOPTS, ROUTING, default). AH retains an inline bounds check because its length formula differs ((ptr[1]+2)<<2). The walk loop also gets a pre-read bounds check at the top to validate ptr before any case accesses ptr[0] or ptr[1]. When the walk loop detects a corrupted header, return from the function instead of continuing to process later socket options. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63818 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-24 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: validate orphan inode entry count f2fs_recover_orphan_inodes() trusts the orphan block entry_count when replaying orphan inodes from the checkpoint pack. A corrupted entry_count larger than F2FS_ORPHANS_PER_BLOCK makes the recovery loop read past the ino[] array and interpret footer or following data as inode numbers. On a crafted image, mounting an unpatched kernel can drive orphan recovery into f2fs_bug_on() and panic the kernel. Validate entry_count before consuming entries so corrupted checkpoint data fails the mount with -EFSCORRUPTED and requests fsck instead. Set ERROR_INCONSISTENT_ORPHAN as well, so the corruption reason can be recorded in the superblock s_errors[] field. This gives fsck a persistent hint even though mount-time orphan recovery failure may leave no chance to persist SBI_NEED_FSCK through a checkpoint. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63815 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-24 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: bound i_inline_xattr_size for non-inline-xattr inodes When the flexible_inline_xattr feature is enabled, do_read_inode() loads the on-disk i_inline_xattr_size unconditionally: if (f2fs_sb_has_flexible_inline_xattr(sbi)) fi->i_inline_xattr_size = le16_to_cpu(ri->i_inline_xattr_size); but sanity_check_inode() only range-checks it when the inode also has the FI_INLINE_XATTR flag set. An inode that carries an inline dentry or inline data but not FI_INLINE_XATTR -- the normal layout for an inline directory -- therefore keeps a fully attacker-controlled i_inline_xattr_size from a crafted image. get_inline_xattr_addrs() returns that value with no flag gating, so it feeds the inode geometry: MAX_INLINE_DATA() = 4 * (CUR_ADDRS_PER_INODE - i_inline_xattr_size - 1) NR_INLINE_DENTRY() = MAX_INLINE_DATA() * BITS_PER_BYTE / (...) addrs_per_page() = CUR_ADDRS_PER_INODE - i_inline_xattr_size A large i_inline_xattr_size drives MAX_INLINE_DATA() and NR_INLINE_DENTRY() negative, so make_dentry_ptr_inline() sets d->max (int) to a negative value. The inline directory walk then compares an unsigned long bit_pos against that negative d->max, which is promoted to a huge unsigned bound, and reads far past the inline area: while (bit_pos < d->max) /* fs/f2fs/dir.c */ ... test_bit_le(bit_pos, d->bitmap) / d->dentry[bit_pos] ... Mounting a crafted image and reading such a directory triggers an out-of-bounds read in f2fs_fill_dentries(); the same underflow also corrupts ADDRS_PER_INODE for regular files. Validate i_inline_xattr_size against MAX_INLINE_XATTR_SIZE whenever the flexible_inline_xattr feature is enabled -- i.e. whenever the value is loaded from disk and consumed -- and keep the lower MIN_INLINE_XATTR_SIZE bound gated on inodes that actually carry an inline xattr, so legitimate inodes with i_inline_xattr_size == 0 are still accepted. | ||||
| CVE-2026-53402 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-24 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbdev: fbcon: fix out-of-bounds read in err_out of fbcon_do_set_font() When fbcon_do_set_font() fails (e.g., due to a memory allocation failure inside vc_resize() under heavy memory pressure), it jumps to the `err_out` label to roll back the console state. However, the current rollback logic forgets to restore the `hi_font` state, leading to a severe state machine corruption. Earlier in the function, `set_vc_hi_font()` might be called to change `vc->vc_hi_font_mask` and mutate the screen buffer. If `vc_resize()` subsequently fails, the `err_out` path restores `vc_font.charcount` but entirely skips rolling back the `vc_hi_font_mask` and the screen buffer. This mismatch leaves the terminal in a desynchronized state. Because `vc_hi_font_mask` remains set, the VT subsystem will still accept character indices greater than 255 from userspace and write them to the screen buffer. Subsequent rendering calls (e.g., `fbcon_putcs()`) will then use these inflated indices to access the reverted, 256-character font array, leading to a deterministic out-of-bounds read and potential kernel memory disclosure. Fix this by adding the missing rollback logic for the `hi_font` mask and screen buffer in the error path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-53390 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-24 | 8.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix out-of-bounds read in smb_check_perm_dacl() The permission-check ACE walk in smb_check_perm_dacl() validates the ACE header size and caps sid.num_subauth at SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES, but it never checks that ace->size is actually large enough to contain num_subauth sub-authorities before compare_sids() dereferences them. CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE covers the SID header up to but excluding the sub_auth[] array, and offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) is the ACE header, so the existing guards only guarantee the 8-byte SID base, i.e. zero sub-authorities. compare_sids() then reads ace->sid.sub_auth[i] for i < min(local_sid->num_subauth, ace->sid.num_subauth). The local comparison SIDs (sid_everyone, sid_unix_NFS_mode, and the id_to_sid() result) always have at least one sub-authority, and an attacker controls the ACE revision and authority bytes (which lie within the in-bounds SID base), so they can match one of those SIDs and force the sub_auth read. A crafted ACE with size == 16 and num_subauth >= 1 placed at the tail of the security descriptor therefore causes a heap out-of-bounds read of up to SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES * sizeof(__le32) bytes past the pntsd allocation. The security descriptor is loaded by ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr() into a buffer sized exactly to the on-disk data (kzalloc(sd_size) in ndr_decode_v4_ntacl()), so the read lands past the allocation. The malformed descriptor can be stored verbatim via SMB2_SET_INFO (the DACL is not normalised before being written to the security.NTACL xattr) and the read fires on a subsequent SMB2_CREATE access check, making this reachable by an authenticated client on a share that uses ACL xattrs. Add the missing num_subauth-versus-ace_size check, mirroring the identical guards already present in the sibling parsers parse_dacl() and smb_inherit_dacl(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-16002 | 1 Mz-automation | 1 Lib60870 | 2026-07-24 | 8.2 High |
| The affected product is vulnerable to an Out-of-bounds read, which may allow an attacker to crash the parsing process and cause a denial of service. | ||||
| CVE-2026-59139 | 1 Egor | 1 Data::reqrep::shared | 2026-07-24 | 9.1 Critical |
| Data::ReqRep::Shared versions before 0.05 for Perl allow an out-of-bounds read via an unvalidated arena offset and length in reqrep_recv_locked. The attach-time validator reqrep_validate_header checks the header scalars and region layout against the file size, but does not validate the array contents it then trusts. reqrep_recv_locked does memcpy(copy_buf, req_arena + arena_off, len) with arena_off and len read raw from the mmap'd segment and never bounded against the arena capacity (req_arena_cap). A local peer that can write the backing file can leave the header valid while poisoning a request slot's offset and length, so receiving the request copies a file-controlled offset and length out of the arena, reading adjacent memory or crashing the process. | ||||
| CVE-2026-57073 | 1 Codechild | 1 Html::bare | 2026-07-23 | 9.1 Critical |
| HTML::Bare versions through 0.04 for Perl have an unbounded character lookahead. The parserc_parse function attempts to check for multicharacter strings such as "<![CDATA" or element terminators such as ">" without checking that the offsets are within the buffer. Truncated strings such as "<a/" can trigger an out-of-bounds read. Note that the latest version available on CPAN is version 0.02. Newer versions are available on the git repository. | ||||
| CVE-2026-57074 | 1 Codechild | 1 Xml::bare | 2026-07-23 | 9.1 Critical |
| XML::Bare versions through 0.53 for Perl have an unbounded character lookahead. The parserc_parse function attempts to check for multicharacter strings such as "<![CDATA" or element terminators such as ">" without checking that the offsets are within the buffer. Truncated strings such as "<a/" can trigger an out-of-bounds read. | ||||
| CVE-2026-45612 | 1 Rizinorg | 1 Rz-libdemangle | 2026-07-23 | 5.5 Medium |
| rz-libdemangle is a Rizin library for demangling symbols. Prior to 6bf56d3, the Rust demangler in src/rust/rust_v0.c can perform an out-of-bounds read when the demangler structure is not yet initialized. This issue is fixed in commit 6bf56d3. | ||||
| CVE-2026-59140 | 1 Egor | 1 Data::sortedset::shared | 2026-07-23 | 9.1 Critical |
| Data::SortedSet::Shared versions before 0.03 for Perl allow an out-of-bounds read via unvalidated node indices in the rank and min/max query paths. The attach-time validator ss_validate_header bounds only the root index against the node pool (node_capacity). The order-statistics and min/max queries then follow children[], leftmost and rightmost node indices read raw from the mmap'd segment without bounding them against node_capacity. A full structural check (ss_validate_tree) exists but runs only via an explicit validate method, not on attach. A local peer that can write the backing file can leave the header valid while poisoning the tree links, so the next rank, min or max query dereferences an out-of-bounds node index, reading adjacent memory or crashing the process. | ||||
| CVE-2026-59141 | 1 Egor | 1 Data::radixtree::shared | 2026-07-23 | 9.1 Critical |
| Data::RadixTree::Shared versions before 0.02 for Perl allow an out-of-bounds read via unvalidated node and arena indices in rdx_find_locked. The attach-time validator rdx_validate_header checks the header scalars and region layout against the file size, but does not validate the node records it then trusts. rdx_find_locked indexes nodes[cur].children[k] and reads each node's label_off and label_len raw from the mmap'd segment, none bounded against the node count or the arena size. A local peer that can write the backing file can leave the header valid while poisoning the node records, so a lookup dereferences an out-of-bounds node or arena index, reading adjacent memory or crashing the process. | ||||
| CVE-2026-59142 | 1 Egor | 1 Data::hashmap::shared | 2026-07-23 | 9.1 Critical |
| Data::HashMap::Shared versions before 0.14 for Perl allow an out-of-bounds read via an unvalidated arena offset and length in shm_str_copy. The attach-time validator shm_validate_header checks the header scalars and region layout against the file size, but does not validate the array contents it then trusts. shm_str_copy does memcpy(dst, arena + off, len) with off and len read raw from the mmap'd segment and unbounded, on the each, keys, values, pop, shift, take, swap, drain and cursor paths. The get path bounds off and len separately and is not affected. A local peer that can write the backing file can leave the header valid while poisoning a record's offset and length, so iterating or draining the map copies a file-controlled offset and length out of the arena, reading adjacent memory or crashing the process. | ||||
| CVE-2026-59143 | 1 Egor | 1 Data::roaringbitmap::shared | 2026-07-23 | 6.3 Medium |
| Data::RoaringBitmap::Shared versions before 0.02 for Perl allow an out-of-bounds read via an unvalidated container offset and cardinality in rb_contains_locked. The attach-time validator rb_validate_header checks the header scalars and region layout against the file size, but does not validate the bucket contents it then trusts. rb_contains_locked forms a container pointer as pool + container_off * 8192 from a raw file-stored offset and then searches over a file-stored cardinality, neither bounded against the container pool capacity or the fixed 8192-byte slot size. A local peer that can write the backing file can leave the header valid while poisoning a bucket, so the next membership query dereferences a file-controlled wild pointer and scans a file-controlled count, reading adjacent memory or crashing the process. | ||||
| CVE-2026-59145 | 1 Egor | 1 Data::intern::shared | 2026-07-23 | 9.1 Critical |
| Data::Intern::Shared versions before 0.02 for Perl allow an out-of-bounds read via unvalidated slot, reverse and arena indices in si_idx_find. The attach-time validator si_validate_header is thorough about the header and layout (magic, version, section offsets, total_size, count and arena_used) but does not validate the three arrays it then trusts. Every lookup in si_idx_find walks a triple indirection read straight from the mmap'd segment, arena[reverse[slots[i].id]], with no bound on slots[i].id against count, on the reverse[id] arena offset against arena_used, or on the arena record's length prefix. A local peer that can write the backing file can leave the header valid while poisoning a slot id, a reverse offset or an arena length prefix, so an id_of, intern or string lookup dereferences the chain out of bounds; because string() returns a file-controlled length of bytes from the arena, adjacent process memory can be disclosed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-59146 | 1 Egor | 1 Data::spatialhash::shared | 2026-07-23 | 7.8 High |
| Data::SpatialHash::Shared versions before 0.02 for Perl allow out-of-bounds reads and writes via unvalidated bucket, link and free-list indices in sph_walk_cell and sph_alloc_slot. The attach-time validator sph_validate_header checks the header scalars and region layout against the file size, but does not validate the array contents it then trusts. sph_walk_cell reads entries[buckets[b]] and follows each entry's next link raw, and sph_alloc_slot writes through a file-stored free_head index, none bounded against the entry count (max_entries). A local peer that can write the backing file can leave the header valid while poisoning the bucket chain and free list, so a query reads through an out-of-bounds bucket and next index and an insert writes through an out-of-bounds free-list head, corrupting memory or crashing the process. | ||||
| CVE-2026-59147 | 1 Egor | 1 Data::disjointset::shared | 2026-07-23 | 9.8 Critical |
| Data::DisjointSet::Shared versions before 0.02 for Perl allow out-of-bounds reads and writes via an unvalidated parent index in dsu_find. The attach-time validator dsu_validate_header checks the header scalars and region layout against the file size, but does not validate the array contents it then trusts. dsu_find walks and path-compresses parent[x] with x a raw file-stored index never bounded against the node count, so both the read and the compression write-back land out of bounds. A local peer that can write the backing file can leave the header valid while poisoning the parent array, so the next find or union both reads and writes through an out-of-bounds parent index, corrupting memory or crashing the process. | ||||
| CVE-2026-16768 | 1 Redhat | 1 Enterprise Linux | 2026-07-23 | 5.3 Medium |
| A flaw was found in gdk-pixbuf. When parsing a specially crafted ICO file with pixel values that exceed the defined palette range, an out-of-bounds read can occur due to improper bounds checking against the actual palette size. This vulnerability causes heap bytes to be interpreted as valid palette indices and rendered as RGB pixel values in the output image, allowing an attacker to extract heap content via the generated output, such as a thumbnail. | ||||
| CVE-2026-52968 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-23 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: s390: pci: fix GAIT table indexing due to double-scaling pointer arithmetic kvm_s390_pci_aif_enable(), kvm_s390_pci_aif_disable(), and aen_host_forward() index the GAIT by manually multiplying the index with sizeof(struct zpci_gaite). Since aift->gait is already a struct zpci_gaite pointer, this double-scales the offset, accessing element aisb*16 instead of aisb. This causes out-of-bounds accesses when aisb >= 32 (with ZPCI_NR_DEVICES=512) Fix by removing the erroneous sizeof multiplication. | ||||
| CVE-2026-10680 | 1 Zephyrproject | 1 Zephyr | 2026-07-22 | 7.6 High |
| The Classic (BR/EDR) L2CAP signaling handlers l2cap_br_conf_req() and l2cap_br_conf_rsp() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/l2cap_br.c validated the minimum command size against buf->len (the bytes remaining in the whole received PDU) instead of len (the per-command data length from the L2CAP signaling header). Because multiple signaling commands can be packed into one PDU, buf->len may exceed a command's len. An attacker can send a CONF_REQ command with a header length smaller than the configuration-request structure (e.g. 0), followed by another command so that buf->len still satisfies the check. The check then passes incorrectly and opt_len = len - sizeof(*req) underflows the uint16_t to a near-0xFFFF value. The configuration-option loop, which lacks an opt_len-versus-buf->len guard, then walks far past the end of the pooled ACL receive buffer using net_buf pull primitives that perform no runtime bounds check, producing an out-of-bounds read of host memory and, when the out-of-bounds option bytes encode an MTU or flush-timeout option, an out-of-bounds write. The BR/EDR signaling channel is processed before pairing/encryption and an L2CAP channel to an L0 service such as SDP can be opened without pairing, so an unauthenticated peer within radio range that can establish an ACL connection can trigger the flaw, leading to memory corruption and denial of service (host/device crash). The defect is present in released versions including v4.4.0. The fix validates against len instead of buf->len in both handlers. | ||||