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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-89638 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: clear setuid/setgid bit on write with cifsacl/modefromsid/posix extensions When a file has the setuid or setgid bit set and is written to, the VFS strips those bits and issues a setattr with ATTR_KILL_SUID/ATTR_KILL_SGID together with an ATTR_MODE carrying the already-cleared mode. Both cifs_setattr_unix() and cifs_setattr_nounix() unconditionally dropped ATTR_MODE in that case: /* skip mode change if it's just for clearing setuid/setgid */ if (attrs->ia_valid & (ATTR_KILL_SUID|ATTR_KILL_SGID)) attrs->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_MODE; This is fine for the default mount, where the mode is only emulated via the DOS read-only attribute and cannot represent the setuid/setgid bits anyway. However, with the "cifsacl" or "modefromsid" mount options the mode is stored on the server through an ACL (id_mode_to_cifs_acl()), with the SMB3.1.1 POSIX extensions the mode is sent to the server directly, and with the SMB1 Unix extensions (cifs_setattr_unix) the mode is sent via CIFSSMBUnixSetPathInfo(). In all those cases dropping ATTR_MODE means the cleared mode is never pushed to the server, so the setuid/setgid bit survives the write. This is a security issue: on local filesystems the setuid bit is stripped when a file is written, but over these cifs.ko mounts the bit persists on the server, potentially allowing an unexpected privilege escalation on subsequent execution. Fix this in two places: 1. cifs_setattr_nounix(): only take the "skip mode change" shortcut when the mode is emulated via the DOS read-only attribute (i.e. neither cifsacl/modefromsid nor the SMB3.1.1 POSIX extensions are in effect), so that the cleared mode is propagated to the server in the ACL / POSIX cases. 2. cifs_setattr_unix(): this function is only called when Unix extensions are in effect, so the mode is always stored on the server. Remove the shortcut entirely so that the cleared mode is always pushed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89632 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 8.2 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix use-before-check of ReparseDataLength in reparse_buf_ptr() reparse_buf_ptr() reads buf->ReparseDataLength before checking that count covers the full fixed header: buf = (struct reparse_data_buffer *)((u8 *)io + off); len = sizeof(*buf); /* 8 bytes */ rdlen = le16_to_cpu(buf->ReparseDataLength); /* offset 4, 2 bytes */ if (count < len || count < rdlen + len) /* check comes after */ struct reparse_data_buffer has ReparseDataLength at offset 4. If a server returns OutputCount < 6, the read at offset 4-5 reaches past the end of the received data. The off+count bounds against iov_len were already validated, but that does not protect against count being smaller than sizeof(*buf). Split the check: verify count >= sizeof(*buf) before reading ReparseDataLength, then verify count covers the data region. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89620 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: intel-thc-hid: intel-quickspi: validate report size before copy write_cmd_to_txdma() builds an output report in qsdev->report_buf, a heap buffer allocated in quickspi_alloc_report_buf() to the device-descriptor derived max_report_len (a few hundred bytes for a touch controller). It copies the caller-supplied report into that buffer: memcpy(write_buf->content, report_buf, report_buf_len); The HID core caps a report at HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE (16384) by default, and quickspi_hid_ll_driver does not set max_buffer_size, so the length reaches the driver unbounded. A hidraw SET_REPORT/SET_FEATURE ioctl carrying a report larger than max_report_len therefore overflows report_buf with attacker-controlled length and content. Record the report_buf allocation size and reject reports that do not fit before copying, matching the equivalent guard in the intel-quicki2c sibling (quicki2c_init_write_buf()) and the hid-goodix-spi fix. write_cmd_to_txdma() writes the output report header ahead of the content in the same buffer, so size the allocation to cover the header as well. That keeps the added bound from rejecting a maximum-sized report. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89619 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: intel-thc-hid: intel-quickspi: bound GET_REPORT response to the caller buffer quickspi_hid_raw_request() receives the caller's buffer length in len, but quickspi_get_report() never sees it and copies the whole device-supplied response into buf regardless: memcpy(buf, qsdev->report_buf, qsdev->report_len); qsdev->report_len comes from the input report the touch controller returns, while buf is sized to whatever the caller asked hidraw for through HIDIOCGFEATURE or HIDIOCGINPUT. A response larger than that overflows buf with device-controlled content. The intel-quicki2c sibling already passes the caller length down to quicki2c_get_report() and validates the response against it before the copy. Do the same here. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89601 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext2: Fix lost inode updates for IS_SYNC inodes ext2_setsize() and ext2_xattr_set2() had a construct like: if (IS_SYNC(inode)) { sync_inode_metadata(inode, 1); } else { mark_inode_dirty(inode); } which leads to lost inode updates for IS_SYNC inodes because sync_inode_metadata() does anything only if the inode is already dirty and hence inode updates may be simply lost. Fix the problem by unconditionally marking the inode dirty and *then* call sync_inode_metadata(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-89600 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fanotify: fix use-after-free of file range info fsnotify_pre_content() builds its file_range on the triggering task's stack. fanotify_alloc_perm_event() saves a pointer to range.pos in the heap-allocated permission event so copy_range_info_to_user() can report the offset later. The event reader can set the event state to FAN_EVENT_REPORTED and then sleep while preparing the file descriptor. If a signal interrupts the triggering task at that point, fanotify_get_response() changes the state to FAN_EVENT_CANCELED and returns. This unwinds the file_range stack frame while the reader still owns the event. The reader then dereferences pevent->ppos and copies the stale stack value to userspace. KASAN reported: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in fanotify_read+0x293e/0x2970 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88811434fc50 by task fanotify_inotif/95 Call Trace: fanotify_read+0x293e/0x2970 vfs_read+0x177/0xa20 ksys_read+0xf7/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Store the range position directly in the permission event and use FANOTIFY_NO_RANGE when range information is unavailable. The event remains alive until the reader finishes, so the reported offset no longer depends on the triggering task's stack. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89588 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ACPI: APEI: GHES: fix ARM section length accounting after header In ghes_handle_arm_hw_error(), after skipping the cper_sec_proc_arm header with (err + 1), the remaining length was reduced by sizeof(err) (pointer size) instead of sizeof(*err) (structure size). That overestimates the bytes left for cper_arm_err_info records and can let the parser read past the CPER section when err_info_num is large enough relative to error_data_length. Use sizeof(*err) so the length accounting matches the pointer advance and the earlier sizeof(*err) size check. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89584 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block: validate user space vectors during extraction The bio-based drivers don't necessarily check the alignment split, and stacking block drivers don't always handle a misalignment detected after submitting the bio. Validate user vectors against the device's dma_alignment as the bio is built from the iov_iter, rejecting misaligned early with -EINVAL. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89581 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, x86: Fix per-CPU address resolution into an extended register The destination of the per-CPU address MOV is encoded in ModRM.reg, which is extended by REX.R, but the REX prefix is built with add_1mod(), which sets REX.B. REX.B extends ModRM.rm and SIB.base, and this instruction addresses memory as disp32 with no base, so the bit has no effect at all and the high register bit is simply lost. Every is_ereg() destination therefore resolves to the wrong register, picking whichever one shares the low three bits: R5 -> RAX R7 -> RBP R8 -> RSI R9 -> RDI With BPF_REG_5, whose reg2hex is 0, the emitted 65 49 03 04 25 <off> add %gs:<off>,%rax adds the per-CPU offset to RAX rather than R8. The destination keeps the unadjusted address and RAX is clobbered, so the program goes on to dereference a pointer that was never made per-CPU: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000607e386a8894 RIP: bpf_prog_707837aafd2aa9ae_update_percpu_data+0x93/0xc9 Call Trace: __bpf_prog_test_run_raw_tp+0x2dc/0x7d0 __flush_smp_call_function_queue+0x1e9/0xc80 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt R5 is the mildest of the four, aliasing a scratch register and faulting at the store. R7 aliases RBP and would corrupt the frame pointer, R8 and R9 alias the argument registers. Use add_2mod() so the register goes through REX.R, matching how add_2reg() places it in ModRM.reg and how emit_priv_frame_ptr() hardcodes 0x4c for the same instruction with R9. Encodings for the non-extended registers are unchanged. Problem showed up when trying to resurrect BPF_GCC CI (selftests built with BPF_GCC). This has gone unnoticed because clang reloads the address into R1 before each per-CPU access, so the destination is never an extended register. GCC keeps several per-CPU addresses live at once, and test_progs-bpf_gcc panics the kernel in global_percpu_data/init, where the address of a .percpu variable ends up in R5. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89580 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Disable preemption in __bpf_get_stack get_perf_callchain() returns a per-CPU perf_callchain_entry buffer and releases its recursion slot via put_callchain_entry() before returning, so nothing keeps the entry reserved while __bpf_get_stack() consumes it below. A preemptible BPF program (e.g. a non-sleepable raw tracepoint program on a PREEMPT kernel, which runs under migrate_disable() but not preempt_disable()) can be scheduled out between obtaining the entry and the copy. Another task scheduled on the same CPU then reuses the same per-CPU buffer and overwrites trace->nr with a larger value. copy_len is then computed from the inflated trace->nr and can exceed the caller's buffer, causing an out-of-bounds write in the memcpy() and in the build_id path. The rcu_read_lock() taken here alone does not prevent this. It is only taken on the may_fault path, and under CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU it does not disable preemption; it merely keeps perf's callchain buffer array alive (freed via call_rcu()) and does nothing to stop another task from reusing the entry. Disable preemption around obtaining the callchain entry and copying it into the caller's buffer, so the entry cannot be reused underneath us and trace->nr stays bounded by max_depth. Build ID resolution may fault and is therefore deferred until after preemption is re-enabled; by then the instruction pointers have already been copied into buf, so it operates only on that private copy. Note, preempt_disable() also subsumes the buffer-lifetime guarantee the rcu_read_lock() provided, since a preempt-disabled section is an RCU read-side critical section for the callchain buffers' call_rcu() reclaim. [ changed Fixes: commit ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-89574 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm array: validate array block headers on read array_block_check() validates blocknr and csum and nothing else, while node_check(), next to it, has bounded the structural fields since both were written. dm_array_cursor_next() takes its loop bound from the on-disk nr_entries and element_at() is unguarded pointer arithmetic, so a count larger than the block holds keeps the cursor in one block while the index grows past it and the read walks off the dm-bufio buffer -- dm_cache_load_mappings() drives it once per cache block at activation. Check the header against itself: reject a zero value_size, require max_entries to equal calc_max_entries() for that value_size and block size, and require nr_entries to fit. Equality rather than an upper bound, since a count below the real capacity trips BUG_ON() in fill_ablock() and trim_ablock(). Metadata dm-array writes satisfies all three. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89571 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cxl/features: bound fwctl command payload to the input buffer fwctl_cmd_rpc() copies cmd->in_len bytes into inbuf = kvzalloc(cmd->in_len) and passes inbuf and in_len to ->fw_rpc(). The CXL callback cxlctl_fw_rpc() ignores in_len and never checks the user-controlled op_size against it. cxlctl_set_feature() bounds op_size only from below (op_size <= sizeof(feat_in->hdr)) and then reads op_size - sizeof(hdr) bytes from feat_in->feat_data via cxl_set_feature(). With a small in_len and a large op_size the first memcpy() already reads past the kvzalloc(in_len) buffer; the out-of-bounds bytes are placed in the mailbox payload and sent to the device, and a large enough op_size can walk into unmapped memory and oops the kernel. The Get paths pin op_size to a fixed size but likewise read the input struct without checking in_len. Reject, at the single dispatch point, any request whose fixed header plus op_size does not fit in the copied-in buffer. The lower-bound test guards the subtraction and ensures op_size was copied in before it is read. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89570 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cxl/mce: Make the MCE notifier per-region Flavien Solt reported lifetime issues with the CXL MCE notifier, which can lead to NULL dereferences and use-after-free in the MCE handler. The notifier was registered per memory device and stored in 'struct cxl_memdev_state', even though it only needs the region state (the region's SPA range and its extended linear cache size). Instead of keeping the memory device and endpoint alive, the correct fix is to move the notifier into 'struct cxl_region' and register it from cxl_region_probe() as it should be a per-region notifier. Setup the registration to only happen for regions that have an extended linear cache as that is the only current usage. Remove cxl_port_get_spa_cache_alias() as it is now dead code. [ dj: Update dev_warn() when notifier fails due to kconfig. (Ben) ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-89534 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: svcrdma: Clear sc_cm_id when ADDR_CHANGE replacement fails When svc_rdma_listen_handler() handles RDMA_CM_EVENT_ADDR_CHANGE, it creates a replacement listener cm_id and returns 1, telling the CM core to destroy the old one. If the replacement allocation fails, sc_cm_id still points at the old cm_id that the CM core is about to destroy. Any subsequent dereference of sc_cm_id -- such as svc_rdma_detach()'s rdma_disconnect() call -- is a use-after-free. NULL sc_cm_id on the failure path and guard svc_rdma_detach()'s rdma_disconnect() call against NULL so that the listener can be torn down safely when the server shuts down. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89528 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: svcrdma: Reject Read lists that exceed the page budget Individual Read segment lengths are validated at decode time, but nothing prevents a requester from sending multiple segments whose cumulative length exceeds the rq_pages array budget. When one segment fills the page array exactly, the runtime guard in svc_rdma_build_read_segment() is bypassed because len reaches zero. A subsequent segment then accesses the NULL sentinel slot at rq_pages[rq_maxpages], resulting in a NULL pointer dereference during DMA mapping. Accumulate pages across all Read segments and reject the message at decode time when the total would overflow the page budget. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89523 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7925: cancel pending mlo_pm_work If the device is reset, suspended or unregistered within that window, the pending work can still run and access vif/bss data that may already be freed, or send MCU commands while the firmware is not available. Add cancel_delayed_work_sync(&dev->mlo_pm_work) in all relevant teardown and suspend paths: - mt7925_mac_reset_work() (chip reset recovery) - mt7925e_unregister_device() (PCIe unbind) - mt7925_pci_suspend() (PCIe bus suspend) - mt7925_suspend() (mac80211 suspend) - mt7925u_suspend() (USB bus / runtime suspend) This ensures the work is stopped before the device state becomes invalid. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89522 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: staging/ipu7: fix async notifier UAF on probe error path isys_register_devices() registers the V4L2 async notifier via isys_notifier_init(). If a subsequent probe step such as isys_fw_log_init() fails, isys_probe() jumps to the out_cleanup label which only calls isys_unregister_devices(). That helper tears down the video devices, subdevices, V4L2 device and media device, but never unregisters or cleans up the async notifier. As a result the notifier stays chained in the global notifier_list while the enclosing struct ipu7_isys is freed by devres, leading to list corruption and a use-after-free the next time the list is walked. The remove path already does the right thing by calling isys_notifier_cleanup() before isys_unregister_devices(). Mirror that on the probe error path so the notifier is unregistered and cleaned up before the device is torn down. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89521 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 7.3 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/core: Handle pick_task() releasing the rq lock Core scheduling's pick_next_task() breaks when a ->pick_task() implementation can release the rq lock. The selection state derived on entry is only valid while the lock is held continuously. Once a pick can drop the lock, an interleaving selection can invalidate all of it: the single-CPU fast path can commit an uncookied pick although the core went cookied during the release, and forceidle committed by the interleaving selection skews the restarted pass's accounting. Fix it by restarting the whole selection when a pick returns RETRY_TASK after releasing the lock: a single restart point above the state derivation replaces the per-loop restart labels, so a retry picks up state committed by interleaving selections and accounts and resets forceidle like a fresh selection would. need_sync and fi_before latch across retries. Clock validity can't be re-derived - there is no program-ordered way to tell whether the own and core rq clocks are still updated after the lock was released, as other lockers' pin cycles may or may not have invalidated them. When restarting, clear core_clock_updated so that the sibling loop re-updates the core rq, and update the own rq clock if invalidated. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89520 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/core: Make core-sched flips wait for in-flight selections Core scheduling's pick_next_task() operates on all sibling rqs under one acquisition of the shared core-wide lock. A ->pick_task() that releases the rq lock leaves every sibling __lock momentarily free, letting __sched_core_flip(false) complete mid-selection and rebind rq_lockp() under it. The selection resumes on the split locks, touching sibling state it no longer protects, and __schedule() finally releases a lock that was never taken while leaking the one that was. Count in-flight core-wide selections in the leader's rq->core_pick_in_flight and make __sched_core_flip() wait for the count to drain. The count only changes under the shared lock, which the flip holds while sampling, so no other ordering is needed. The wait can repeat while selections overlap, but the flip backs off between samples and flips are rare cookie-lifetime events. sched_core_cpu_deactivate() moves the count to the new leader - a stale copy left behind would bias it forever if that CPU later returns as its own leader. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89513 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RISC-V: KVM: Fix PMU event info array size overflow SBI PMU EVENT_GET_INFO stores guest-controlled num_events * sizeof(*einfo) in a 32-bit integer. On RV64, num_events = 0x10000001 makes 0x100000010 truncate to 16. KVM then allocates one entry but loops over the original num_events, causing out-of-bounds reads and writes. A nested guest triggered: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kvm_riscv_vcpu_pmu_event_info+0xa4/0x142 Read of size 4 at addr ff600000074d46b0 by task init/1 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8006471c>] kvm_riscv_vcpu_pmu_event_info+0xa4/0x142 [<ffffffff800690c0>] kvm_sbi_ext_pmu_handler+0xca/0x268 [<ffffffff8006779e>] kvm_riscv_vcpu_sbi_ecall+0xec/0x1e6 [<ffffffff8006008c>] kvm_riscv_vcpu_exit+0x48c/0x540 [<ffffffff8005ea0a>] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x37e/0xc80 Allocated by task 1: __kmalloc_noprof+0x19e/0x4b0 kvm_riscv_vcpu_pmu_event_info+0x72/0x142 kvm_sbi_ext_pmu_handler+0xca/0x268 kvm_riscv_vcpu_sbi_ecall+0xec/0x1e6 kvm_riscv_vcpu_exit+0x48c/0x540 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x37e/0xc80 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 16-byte region [ff600000074d46a0, ff600000074d46b0) Store the shared-memory size in size_t and reject multiplication overflow. Allocate the guest-driven array with GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT so it is charged to kmemcg, and use __GFP_NOWARN to suppress allocation failure warnings. Use kvcalloc() to allow vmalloc fallback and an unsigned long loop index to match num_events. | ||||