| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Integer overflow in the message buffer growth logic (mbuf_make_room) in PgBouncer 1.21.0 through 1.26.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service when max_packet_size is configured above 2147483648. A packet header declaring a length above 2^31 makes the buffer size computation overflow, leaving the growth loop unable to terminate. Because PgBouncer serves all clients from a single process, this saturates a CPU core and stalls every pooled connection until the process is restarted. Since 1.23.0 the overflow is reachable before authentication with a five-byte packet header. |
| An infinite loop in PgBouncer 1.20.0 through 1.26.0 allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a denial of service. A StartupMessage whose options parameter contains an empty parameter name, such as "-c=", makes the ignore_startup_parameters list lookup loop forever. Because PgBouncer serves all clients from a single process, this saturates a CPU core and makes PgBouncer unresponsive to all clients until the process is restarted. |
| tinytag is a Python library for reading audio file metadata. From 2.0.0 until 2.3.0, an M4A file containing a sub-atom with a size of zero inside a ---- atom can cause the metadata parser to stop advancing through the input. The custom-field atom traversal repeatedly processes the malformed location, causing an infinite loop and denying service to a program that reads the crafted file. This issue is fixed in version 2.3.0. |
| A Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in the routing protocol daemon (rpd) of Juniper Networks Junos OS and Junos OS Evolved allows a remote network attacker to cause a denial of service via EVPN multihoming with preference-based designated-forwarder election. |
| A Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in netsctp.ko of Juniper Networks Junos OS on MX Series allows an unauthenticated network attacker to cause a denial of service via crafted SCTP network traffic. |
| Angular is a development platform for building mobile and desktop web applications using TypeScript/JavaScript and other languages. Prior to 20.3.31, 21.2.23, and 22.1.6, the @angular/platform-server DOM emulation parser can enter an infinite synchronous loop when Angular server-side rendering processes attacker-controlled HTML containing an incomplete DOCTYPE that ends with whitespace at end of input. In Domino lib/HTMLParser.js, after_doctype_name_state emits doctype and EOF tokens without advancing nextchar or leaving the fixed-lookahead state, so the scanner repeatedly handles the same EOF marker. A remote unauthenticated attacker can use this condition through server-side HTML parsing paths such as innerHTML binding to consume a Node.js SSR worker at full CPU, starve the event loop, and stop concurrent and subsequent requests. This issue is fixed in versions 20.3.31, 21.2.23, and 22.1.6. |
| Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in Erlang OTP stdlib (erl_tar module), hexpm hex_core (hex_erl_tar module), hexpm hex (mix_hex_erl_tar module) and erlang rebar3 (r3_hex_erl_tar module) allows an attacker who supplies a tar archive to cause a denial of service via a crafted GNU sparse member.
When erl_tar:extract/1,2 writes a member to disk, erl_tar:stream_to_file_loop/3 reads it in chunks of 65536 bytes by default. For a GNU sparse member whose sparse map ends before its real size, erl_tar:do_sparse_read/3 matches its trailing-hole clause before its zero-length clause. After the chunk is used up, the trailing-hole clause reads zero bytes, does not advance the position, and recurses forever. A 2048-byte archive keeps the extracting process and one scheduler busy until the process is killed. The {max_size, N} option prevents this only when N is below the real size of the member. Extraction with the memory option is not affected.
hex_core ships its own copy of erl_tar as hex_erl_tar, and Hex and rebar3 ship hex_core with prefixed module names (mix_hex_erl_tar and r3_hex_erl_tar). These copies contain the same code and do not call stdlib's erl_tar, so they are affected on any OTP version. OTP 28 is not affected, but an application running on OTP 28 is affected if it extracts archives through an affected version of hex_core, Hex or rebar3.
This issue affects OTP from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.1.2, corresponding to stdlib from 8.0 before 8.1.1, and rebar3 from 3.27.1 onward, and hex from 2.4.2 before 2.5.3; hex_core: from 0.14.0 before 0.20.1. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: do not repeat ceph_trim_dentries() if no progress possible
ceph_cap_reclaim_work() re-queues itself for as long as
ceph_trim_dentries() returns -EAGAIN, which happens whenever a lease
walk exhausts its `nr_to_scan` budget. This creates a busy loop that
consumes CPU without making any progress when there is nothing to
reclaim: with no cap pressure (`count==0`) and every scanned lease
still valid, each pass runs the full scan budget down to zero and
returns `-EAGAIN`, only to be queued again immediately.
The dir-lease walk made this worse. When `expire_dir_lease` is
`false` (i.e. we have no intention of reclaiming dir leases),
__dir_lease_check() returned `TOUCH` for every valid lease. `TOUCH`
moves the dentry to the tail of the list and resets `di->time` via
__dentry_dir_lease_touch(), so a walk over N valid leases pointlessly
rewrote the list, refreshed the timestamps (preventing them from ever
aging out) and always drained `nr_to_scan`, guaranteeing the `-EAGAIN`
requeue.
Fix this in three steps:
- Return `KEEP` instead of `TOUCH` when `expire_dir_lease` is
`false`. If we are not going to reclaim the lease, leave it in
place instead of churning the list and resetting its timestamp; the
walk then terminates naturally (or via `STOP` at the first fresh
lease).
- Only return `-EAGAIN` from the first (dentry-lease) walk when something
was actually freed. A full batch that frees nothing means retrying
the same list immediately is futile; fall through to the dir-lease
walk instead.
- After both walks, bail out with success (0) when nothing was freed
and there is no cap pressure (`count==0`). There is no reason to
keep retrying when we are not over the cap limit and made no
progress.
Under real cap pressure (`count>0`) the reclaim path is unchanged and
still retries via `-EAGAIN`.
Without this patch, I saw 500 ceph_trim_dentries() calls per second on
our web servers. This is very visible in `/proc/lock_stat` (5 minute
capture):
class name con-bounces contentions waittime-min waittime-max waittime-total waittime-avg acq-bounces acquisitions holdtime-min holdtime-max holdtime-total holdtime-avg
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock: 126180 128218 0.04 8063.44 15986965.20 124.69 1573354 5296812 0.04 8291.28 74164526.48 14.00
-----------------------
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 111736 [<000000007b11e319>] __ceph_dentry_dir_lease_touch+0x7c/0xa8
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 2631 [<0000000050597999>] __dentry_leases_walk+0x64/0x2c8
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 3878 [<00000000c0022f62>] __ceph_dentry_lease_touch+0x5c/0xa8
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 9973 [<000000002f27cb6f>] __dentry_lease_unlist+0x50/0xa0
-----------------------
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 123621 [<0000000050597999>] __dentry_leases_walk+0x64/0x2c8
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 1822 [<000000007b11e319>] __ceph_dentry_dir_lease_touch+0x7c/0xa8
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 2720 [<000000002f27cb6f>] __dentry_lease_unlist+0x50/0xa0
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 55 [<00000000c0022f62>] __ceph_dentry_lease_touch+0x5c/0xa8
With this patch:
class name con-bounces contentions waittime-min waittime-max waittime-total waittime-avg acq-bounces acquisitions holdtime-min holdtime-max holdtime-total holdtime-avg
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock: 1203 1215 0.16 408.88 33082.88 27.23 4320501 7357389 0.04 500.64 1961578.00 0.27
-----------------------
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 1029 [<000000003c9aea8a>] __ceph_dentry_dir_lease_touch+0x7c/0xa8
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 1
---truncated--- |
| kin-openapi is a Go project for handling OpenAPI files. Prior to 0.149.0, runtime request, response, and direct schema validation lacks cycle detection when an allOf, anyOf, or oneOf chain refers back to an ancestor schema, even though loading and document validation accept the circular reference. A request or response that reaches the affected schema causes unbounded recursion in Schema.visitJSON or openapi3filter.decodeValue and exhausts the Go goroutine stack. The resulting fatal stack overflow cannot be caught with recover and terminates the entire process, including unrelated requests. This issue is fixed in version 0.149.0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/tls: Consume empty data records in tls_sw_read_sock()
A peer may send a zero-length TLS application_data record; TLS 1.3
explicitly permits these as a traffic-analysis countermeasure (RFC
8446, Section 5.1). After decryption such a record has full_len ==
0. tls_sw_read_sock() hands it to the read_actor, which has no
payload to consume and returns zero. The loop treats a zero return
as backpressure (used <= 0), requeues the skb at the head of
rx_list, and stops. rx_list is serviced head-first on the next
call, so the empty record is dequeued, fails the same way, and is
requeued again; every later record on the connection is blocked
behind it.
tls_sw_recvmsg() does not stall on this: a zero-length data record
copies nothing and falls through to consume_skb(). Mirror that in
the read_sock() path by recognizing an empty data record before
the actor runs, consuming it, and continuing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: add depth limit to indx_find_buffer to prevent stack overflow
indx_find_buffer() recursively descends the B+ tree index with no depth
limit. A crafted NTFS image with circular index node references causes
unbounded recursion, overflowing the kernel stack and panicking the
system.
This is reachable by mounting a malicious NTFS filesystem (e.g. from a
USB drive via desktop automount) and deleting a file whose index entry
triggers the rebalancing fallback path in indx_delete_entry().
Add a depth parameter and bail out with -EINVAL when it reaches the
fnd->nodes array bound, matching the constraint already enforced by
fnd_push() in indx_find().
The related function indx_find() was previously patched for a similar
infinite-loop issue (commit 1732053c8a6b), but indx_find_buffer() was
missed. |
| Junrar is an open source Java RAR archive library. Prior to 7.6.1, RarVM.ExecuteCode in src/main/java/com/github/junrar/unpack/vm/RarVM.java can repeatedly execute a VM_JMP instruction whose target is greater than or equal to the prepared program's codeSize. The setIP() function returns success without changing the instruction pointer or decrementing maxOpCount, and the jump handler continues before loop-end accounting, leaving both values unchanged. A crafted RAR4 archive can therefore keep an extraction thread in an infinite CPU loop and exhaust archive-processing worker capacity. The RAR virtual machine does not expose native process execution, so the supported impact is availability loss rather than code execution. This issue is fixed in version 7.6.1. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mld: stop TX during firmware restart
When iwlwifi firmware crashes (e.g., NMI_INTERRUPT_UNKNOWN on Intel
BE201/Wi-Fi 7), iwl_mld_nic_error() sets mld->fw_status.in_hw_restart
to true. However, iwl_mld_tx_from_txq() does not check this flag before
dequeuing frames from mac80211 and pushing them to the transport layer.
Since the firmware is dead, iwl_trans_tx() returns -EIO for each frame,
which then gets freed immediately. Under high-throughput conditions
(e.g., Tailscale UDP traffic or active SSH sessions), this creates a
tight dequeue-send-fail-free loop that wastes CPU cycles and generates
rapid skb allocation churn, leading to memory pressure from slab
fragmentation.
The RX path already has this guard (iwl_mld_rx_mpdu checks
in_hw_restart at rx.c:1906), and so does the TXQ allocation worker
(iwl_mld_add_txqs_wk at tx.c:156). Add the same guard to
iwl_mld_tx_from_txq() to stop all TX during firmware restart.
Frames left in mac80211's TXQs are naturally drained after restart
completes, when queue reallocation triggers iwl_mld_tx_from_txq()
via iwl_mld_add_txq_list(), or when new upper-layer traffic invokes
wake_tx_queue.
Tested on ASUS Zenbook 14 UX3405CA with Intel BE201 (Wi-Fi 7) on
kernel 6.19.5 where the firmware crashes approximately every 10-15
minutes under Tailscale traffic. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: fix possible infinite loop in fib6_select_path()
Found while auditing the same pattern Sashiko reported in
rt6_fill_node() [1]. Apply the same fix as
commit f8d8ce1b515a ("ipv6: fix possible infinite loop in fib6_info_uses_dev()").
Writers holding tb6_lock can list_del_rcu(&first->fib6_siblings)
without waiting for RCU readers; first->fib6_siblings.next then
still points into the old ring and this softirq-side walker never
reaches &first->fib6_siblings as its terminator. fib6_purge_rt()
always WRITE_ONCE()s first->fib6_nsiblings to 0 before
list_del_rcu(), so an inside-loop check is a reliable detach signal.
[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260526020227.4857-1-jiayuan.chen%40linux.dev |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/poll: fix signed comparison in io_poll_get_ownership()
io_poll_get_ownership() uses a signed comparison to check whether
poll_refs has reached the threshold for the slowpath:
if (unlikely(atomic_read(&req->poll_refs) >= IO_POLL_REF_BIAS))
atomic_read() returns int (signed). When IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG
(BIT(31)) is set in poll_refs, the value becomes negative in
signed arithmetic, so the >= 128 comparison always evaluates to
false and the slowpath is never taken.
Fix this by casting the atomic_read() result to unsigned int
before the comparison, so that the cancel flag is treated as a
large positive value and correctly triggers the slowpath. |
| JPEGParser can enter an infinite loop while parsing a specially crafted or truncated stream. |
| MP4Parser does not adequately validate MP4 box sizes. A malformed box can cause parsing to make no forward progress and repeatedly process the same input. |
| libIEC61850 is an open-source implementation of IEC 61850 client and server protocols including MMS, GOOSE, Sampled Values, and R-Session. Prior to 1.6.2, parseUserInformation in src/mms/iso_acse/acse.c checks len for zero before validating the negative bufPos returned by BerDecoder_decodeLength for a truncated long-form length. The continue path therefore swallows the error, reads buffer[-1], resets parsing to the beginning, and repeats the same malformed state. An unauthenticated remote peer can send a malformed AARE PDU during association to cause an infinite CPU loop under a normal allocator or a one-byte out-of-bounds read and process abort when the preceding byte is inaccessible. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.2. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: avoid infinite loops caused by residual data
On the mkdir/mknod path, when mapping logical blocks to physical blocks,
if inserting a new extent into the extent tree fails (in this example,
because the file system disabled the huge file feature when marking the
inode as dirty), ext4_ext_map_blocks() only calls ext4_free_blocks() to
reclaim the physical block without deleting the corresponding data in
the extent tree. This causes subsequent mkdir operations to reference
the previously reclaimed physical block number again, even though this
physical block is already being used by the xattr block. Therefore, a
situation arises where both the directory and xattr are using the same
buffer head block in memory simultaneously.
The above causes ext4_xattr_block_set() to enter an infinite loop about
"inserted" and cannot release the inode lock, ultimately leading to the
143s blocking problem mentioned in [1].
If the metadata is corrupted, then trying to remove some extent space
can do even more harm. Also in case EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_DELALLOC_RESERVE
was passed, remove space wrongly update quota information.
Jan Kara suggests distinguishing between two cases:
1) The error is ENOSPC or EDQUOT - in this case the filesystem is fully
consistent and we must maintain its consistency including all the
accounting. However these errors can happen only early before we've
inserted the extent into the extent tree. So current code works correctly
for this case.
2) Some other error - this means metadata is corrupted. We should strive to
do as few modifications as possible to limit damage. So I'd just skip
freeing of allocated blocks.
[1]
INFO: task syz.0.17:5995 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
Call Trace:
inode_lock_nested include/linux/fs.h:1073 [inline]
__start_dirop fs/namei.c:2923 [inline]
start_dirop fs/namei.c:2934 [inline] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_unix: Return immediately when manage_oob() returns NULL for 0-length buffer.
Fahad Alharbi reported that recv(0, MSG_PEEK) triggers busy-wait
in unix_stream_read_generic() if recv() is blocking and the last
skb in the queue is MSG_OOB skb.
In such a situation, TCP returns 0 immediately regardless of
blocking or non-blocking.
Let's follow the behaviour. |
