| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| An Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size vulnerability in the routing protocol daemon (rpd) of Juniper Networks Junos OS and Junos OS Evolved allows a configured eBGP neighbor to cause an rpd crash via BGP labeled-unicast UPDATEs when the affected multipath features are enabled. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: Reject krb5 v2 wrap tokens with oversized ec field
gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() sets buf->len to a logical
length, which can be much smaller than head[0].iov_len
(the allocated receive-page capacity). It then calls
xdr_buf_trim() with a trim length derived from the 16-bit
"extra count" (ec) field in the Kerberos v2 token header.
The ec field is authenticated by the post-decrypt memcmp()
against the encrypted header copy, so a randomly-mutated
value is rejected. However, any peer holding a valid GSS
context can legitimately encrypt a token whose ec exceeds
the plaintext length. Per RFC 4121, such a token is
structurally malformed.
Although xdr_buf_trim() now clamps the buf->len subtraction
to avoid unsigned underflow, the buffer is still left in a
semantically invalid state (zero length, inconsistent iov
lengths) when ec is oversized.
Reject these tokens before calling xdr_buf_trim(), giving
callers a well-defined GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN error and
keeping the xdr_buf internally consistent. The wrapped blob
begins at a nonzero offset -- both callers pass len as
offset + opaque_len -- so buf->len still counts the offset
bytes that precede the blob. Compare the trim length
against the remaining wrapped segment, buf->len - offset,
rather than the whole buffer; comparing against buf->len
alone leaves an offset-wide window in which an oversized ec
passes the test and xdr_buf_trim() cuts into the bytes ahead
of the blob. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
packet: use consistent hard_header_len in TX_RING send path
tpacket_snd() reads dev->hard_header_len independently for skb
allocation and header construction in tpacket_fill_skb(). Concurrent
netdevice reconfiguration can therefore make the reserved headroom
smaller than the amount later pushed, or make copylen - hard_header_len
negative.
Snapshot hard_header_len once before processing ring frames and use it
for the frame limit, headroom allocation, copy length, and skb
construction. Pass the snapshot to tpacket_fill_skb().
The separate SOCK_DGRAM consistency problem between hard_header_len and
header_ops->create is not addressed here. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Fix TOCTOU heap overflow in get_srq_wqe
get_srq_wqe() reads wqe->dma.num_sge from the shared receive queue
buffer, which is mapped into userspace. It validates num_sge against
max_sge, but then re-reads the same field to calculate the memcpy
size. A concurrent userspace thread can modify num_sge between
validation and use, causing a heap buffer overflow when copying the
WQE into qp->resp.srq_wqe.
Read num_sge into a local variable and use it for both the bounds
check and the size calculation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb/client: handle overlapping allocated ranges in fallocate
smb3_simple_fallocate_range() can skip holes when an allocated range
returned by the server starts before the current fallocate offset. The
skipped hole is not zero-filled, but fallocate still returns success. A
later write to that hole may therefore fail with ENOSPC.
The function queries allocated ranges so that it can preserve existing
contents and write zeroes only into holes. However, the server may return
a range that starts before the current fallocate offset.
For example, assume the fallocate request is [100, 400) and the only
allocated range returned by the server is [0, 200):
Request: [100, 400)
Server range: [ 0, 200) allocated
Correct:
[100, 200) allocated data, skip
[200, 400) hole, zero-fill
Current:
[100, 300) skipped
[300, 400) zero-filled afterwards
The current code adds the full server range length, 200, to the current
offset 100 and moves to 300. As a result, the hole in [200, 300) is
skipped without being zero-filled.
Fix this by advancing only over the part of the allocated range that
overlaps the current fallocate offset. Ignore ranges that end before the
current offset and reject ranges whose end offset overflows.
This also prevents a malformed range length from causing an out-of-bounds
zero-buffer read. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: account for fraggap on the paged allocation path
In __ip_append_data(), when the paged-allocation branch is taken,
alloclen and pagedlen are computed as
alloclen = fragheaderlen + transhdrlen;
pagedlen = datalen - transhdrlen;
datalen already includes fraggap, but the fraggap bytes carried over
from the previous skb are copied into the new skb's linear area at
offset transhdrlen by the subsequent skb_copy_and_csum_bits(). The
linear area is therefore undersized by fraggap bytes while pagedlen is
overstated by the same amount.
The non-paged branch sets alloclen to fraglen, which already accounts
for fraggap because datalen does. Bring the paged branch in line by
adding fraggap to alloclen and subtracting it from pagedlen.
After this adjustment, copy no longer collapses to -fraggap on the
paged path, so remove the stale comment describing that old arithmetic. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sync: reject oversized Broadcast Announcement prepend
Existing advertising instances can already hold the maximum extended
advertising payload. When hci_adv_bcast_annoucement() prepends the
Broadcast Announcement service data to that payload, the combined data
may no longer fit in the temporary buffer used to rebuild the
advertising data.
Reject that case before copying the existing payload and report the
failure through the device log. This keeps the existing advertising
data intact and avoids overrunning the temporary buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: allow subflow rcv wnd to shrink
In MPTCP connection, the `window` field in the TCP header refers to the
MPTCP-level rcv_nxt and it's right edge should not move backward. Such
constraint is enforced at DSS option generation time.
At the same time, the TCP stack ensures independently that the TCP-level
rcv wnd right's edge does not move backward. That in turn causes artificial
inflating of the MPTCP rcv window when the incoming data is acked at the
TCP level and is OoO in the MPTCP sequence space (or lands in the backlog).
As a consequence, the incoming traffic can exceed the receiver rcvbuf size
even when the sender is not misbehaving.
Prevent such scenario forcibly allowing the TCP subflow to shrink the
TCP-level rcv wnd regardless of the current netns setting. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: pull headers in qdisc_pkt_len_segs_init()
Most ndo_start_xmit() methods expects headers of gso packets
to be already in skb->head.
net/core/tso.c users are particularly at risk, because tso_build_hdr()
does a memcpy(hdr, skb->data, hdr_len);
qdisc_pkt_len_segs_init() already does a dissection of gso packets.
Use pskb_may_pull() instead of skb_header_pointer() to make
sure drivers do not have to reimplement this.
Some malicious packets could be fed, detect them so that we can
drop them sooner with a new SKB_DROP_REASON_SKB_BAD_GSO drop_reason. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: Fix slab-out-of-bounds access in auth message processing
If a (potentially corrupted) message of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH_REPLY
contains a positive value in its result field, it is treated as an
error code by ceph_handle_auth_reply() and returned to
handle_auth_reply(). Thereafter, an attempt is made to send the
preallocated message of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH, where the returned value is
interpreted as the size of the front segment to send. If the result
value in the message is greater than the size of the memory buffer
allocated for the front segment, an out-of-bounds access occurs, and
the content of the memory region beyond this buffer is sent out.
This patch fixes the issue by treating only negative values in the
result field as errors. Positive values are therefore treated as success
in the same way as a zero value. Additionally, a BUG_ON is added to
__send_prepared_auth_request() comparing the len parameter to
front_alloc_len to prevent sending the message if it exceeds the bounds
of the allocation and to make it easier to catch any logic flaws leading
to this. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: rpl: reserve mac_len headroom when recompressed SRH grows
ipv6_rpl_srh_rcv() decompresses an RFC 6554 Source Routing Header, swaps
the next segment into ipv6_hdr->daddr, recompresses, then pulls the old
header and pushes the new one plus the IPv6 header back. The
recompressed header can be larger than the received one when the swap
reduces the common-prefix length the segments share with daddr (CmprI=0,
CmprE>0, seg[0][0] != daddr[0] gives the maximum +8 bytes).
pskb_expand_head() was gated on segments_left == 0, so on earlier
segments the push consumed unchecked headroom. Once skb_push() leaves
fewer than skb->mac_len bytes in front of data,
skb_mac_header_rebuild()'s call to:
skb_set_mac_header(skb, -skb->mac_len);
will store (data - head) - mac_len into the u16 mac_header field, which
wraps to ~65530, and the following memmove() writes mac_len bytes ~64KiB
past skb->head.
A single AF_INET6/SOCK_RAW/IPV6_HDRINCL packet over lo with a two
segment type-3 SRH (CmprI=0, CmprE=15) reaches headroom 8 after one
pass; KASAN reports a 14-byte OOB write in ipv6_rthdr_rcv.
Fix this by expanding the head whenever the remaining room is less than
the push size plus mac_len, and request that much extra so the rebuilt
MAC header fits afterwards. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conntrack_h323: fix OOB read in decode_choice()
In decode_choice(), the boundary check before get_len() uses the
variable `len`, which is still 0 from its initialization at the top of
the function:
unsigned int type, ext, len = 0;
...
if (ext || (son->attr & OPEN)) {
BYTE_ALIGN(bs);
if (nf_h323_error_boundary(bs, len, 0)) /* len is 0 here */
return H323_ERROR_BOUND;
len = get_len(bs); /* OOB read */
When the bitstream is exactly consumed (bs->cur == bs->end), the check
nf_h323_error_boundary(bs, 0, 0) evaluates to (bs->cur + 0 > bs->end),
which is false. The subsequent get_len() call then dereferences
*bs->cur++, reading 1 byte past the end of the buffer. If that byte
has bit 7 set, get_len() reads a second byte as well.
This can be triggered remotely by sending a crafted Q.931 SETUP message
with a User-User Information Element containing exactly 2 bytes of
PER-encoded data ({0x08, 0x00}) to port 1720 through a firewall with
the nf_conntrack_h323 helper active. The decoder fully consumes the
PER buffer before reaching this code path, resulting in a 1-2 byte
heap-buffer-overflow read confirmed by AddressSanitizer.
Fix this by checking for 2 bytes (the maximum that get_len() may read)
instead of the uninitialized `len`. This matches the pattern used at
every other get_len() call site in the same file, where the caller
checks for 2 bytes of available data before calling get_len(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: fix freemap adjustments when adding xattrs to leaf blocks
xfs/592 and xfs/794 both trip this assertion in the leaf block freemap
adjustment code after ~20 minutes of running on my test VMs:
ASSERT(ichdr->firstused >= ichdr->count * sizeof(xfs_attr_leaf_entry_t)
+ xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_size(leaf));
Upon enabling quite a lot more debugging code, I narrowed this down to
fsstress trying to set a local extended attribute with namelen=3 and
valuelen=71. This results in an entry size of 80 bytes.
At the start of xfs_attr3_leaf_add_work, the freemap looks like this:
i 0 base 448 size 0 rhs 448 count 46
i 1 base 388 size 132 rhs 448 count 46
i 2 base 2120 size 4 rhs 448 count 46
firstused = 520
where "rhs" is the first byte past the end of the leaf entry array.
This is inconsistent -- the entries array ends at byte 448, but
freemap[1] says there's free space starting at byte 388!
By the end of the function, the freemap is in worse shape:
i 0 base 456 size 0 rhs 456 count 47
i 1 base 388 size 52 rhs 456 count 47
i 2 base 2120 size 4 rhs 456 count 47
firstused = 440
Important note: 388 is not aligned with the entries array element size
of 8 bytes.
Based on the incorrect freemap, the name area starts at byte 440, which
is below the end of the entries array! That's why the assertion
triggers and the filesystem shuts down.
How did we end up here? First, recall from the previous patch that the
freemap array in an xattr leaf block is not intended to be a
comprehensive map of all free space in the leaf block. In other words,
it's perfectly legal to have a leaf block with:
* 376 bytes in use by the entries array
* freemap[0] has [base = 376, size = 8]
* freemap[1] has [base = 388, size = 1500]
* the space between 376 and 388 is free, but the freemap stopped
tracking that some time ago
If we add one xattr, the entries array grows to 384 bytes, and
freemap[0] becomes [base = 384, size = 0]. So far, so good. But if we
add a second xattr, the entries array grows to 392 bytes, and freemap[0]
gets pushed up to [base = 392, size = 0]. This is bad, because
freemap[1] hasn't been updated, and now the entries array and the free
space claim the same space.
The fix here is to adjust all freemap entries so that none of them
collide with the entries array. Note that this fix relies on commit
2a2b5932db6758 ("xfs: fix attr leaf header freemap.size underflow") and
the previous patch that resets zero length freemap entries to have
base = 0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/arm-cmn: Reject unsupported hardware configurations
So far we've been fairly lax about accepting both unknown CMN models
(at least with a warning), and unknown revisions of those which we
do know, as although things do frequently change between releases,
typically enough remains the same to be somewhat useful for at least
some basic bringup checks. However, we also make assumptions of the
maximum supported sizes and numbers of things in various places, and
there's no guarantee that something new might not be bigger and lead
to nasty array overflows. Make sure we only try to run on things that
actually match our assumptions and so will not risk memory corruption.
We have at least always failed on completely unknown node types, so
update that error message for clarity and consistency too. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xsk: tighten UMEM headroom validation to account for tailroom and min frame
The current headroom validation in xdp_umem_reg() could leave us with
insufficient space dedicated to even receive minimum-sized ethernet
frame. Furthermore if multi-buffer would come to play then
skb_shared_info stored at the end of XSK frame would be corrupted.
HW typically works with 128-aligned sizes so let us provide this value
as bare minimum.
Multi-buffer setting is known later in the configuration process so
besides accounting for 128 bytes, let us also take care of tailroom space
upfront. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vt: discard stale unicode buffer on alt screen exit after resize
When enter_alt_screen() saves vc_uni_lines into vc_saved_uni_lines and
sets vc_uni_lines to NULL, a subsequent console resize via vc_do_resize()
skips reallocating the unicode buffer because vc_uni_lines is NULL.
However, vc_saved_uni_lines still points to the old buffer allocated for
the original dimensions.
When leave_alt_screen() later restores vc_saved_uni_lines, the buffer
dimensions no longer match vc_rows/vc_cols. Any operation that iterates
over the unicode buffer using the current dimensions (e.g. csi_J clearing
the screen) will access memory out of bounds, causing a kernel oops:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0x0000002000000020
RIP: 0010:csi_J+0x133/0x2d0
The faulting address 0x0000002000000020 is two adjacent u32 space
characters (0x20) interpreted as a pointer, read from the row data area
past the end of the 25-entry pointer array in a buffer allocated for
80x25 but accessed with 240x67 dimensions.
Fix this by checking whether the console dimensions changed while in the
alternate screen. If they did, free the stale saved buffer instead of
restoring it. The unicode screen will be lazily rebuilt via
vc_uniscr_check() when next needed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: proc: size address buffers for %pISpc output
The AF_RXRPC procfs helpers format local and remote socket addresses into
fixed 50-byte stack buffers with "%pISpc".
That is too small for the longest current-tree IPv6-with-port form the
formatter can produce. In lib/vsprintf.c, the compressed IPv6 path uses a
dotted-quad tail not only for v4mapped addresses, but also for ISATAP
addresses via ipv6_addr_is_isatap().
As a result, a case such as
[ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:0:5efe:255.255.255.255]:65535
is possible with the current formatter. That is 50 visible characters, so
51 bytes including the trailing NUL, which does not fit in the existing
char[50] buffers used by net/rxrpc/proc.c.
Size the buffers from the formatter's maximum textual form and switch the
call sites to scnprintf().
Changes since v1:
- correct the changelog to cite the actual maximum current-tree case
explicitly
- frame the proof around the ISATAP formatting path instead of the earlier
mapped-v4 example |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: replace hardcoded hdr2_len with offsetof() in smb2_calc_max_out_buf_len()
After this commit (e2b76ab8b5c9 "ksmbd: add support for read compound"),
response buffer management was changed to use dynamic iov array.
In the new design, smb2_calc_max_out_buf_len() expects the second
argument (hdr2_len) to be the offset of ->Buffer field in the
response structure, not a hardcoded magic number.
Fix the remaining call sites to use the correct offsetof() value. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: fix heap overflow in NFSv4.0 LOCK replay cache
The NFSv4.0 replay cache uses a fixed 112-byte inline buffer
(rp_ibuf[NFSD4_REPLAY_ISIZE]) to store encoded operation responses.
This size was calculated based on OPEN responses and does not account
for LOCK denied responses, which include the conflicting lock owner as
a variable-length field up to 1024 bytes (NFS4_OPAQUE_LIMIT).
When a LOCK operation is denied due to a conflict with an existing lock
that has a large owner, nfsd4_encode_operation() copies the full encoded
response into the undersized replay buffer via read_bytes_from_xdr_buf()
with no bounds check. This results in a slab-out-of-bounds write of up
to 944 bytes past the end of the buffer, corrupting adjacent heap memory.
This can be triggered remotely by an unauthenticated attacker with two
cooperating NFSv4.0 clients: one sets a lock with a large owner string,
then the other requests a conflicting lock to provoke the denial.
We could fix this by increasing NFSD4_REPLAY_ISIZE to allow for a full
opaque, but that would increase the size of every stateowner, when most
lockowners are not that large.
Instead, fix this by checking the encoded response length against
NFSD4_REPLAY_ISIZE before copying into the replay buffer. If the
response is too large, set rp_buflen to 0 to skip caching the replay
payload. The status is still cached, and the client already received the
correct response on the original request. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: bpf: prevent buffer overflow in hid_hw_request
right now the returned value is considered to be always valid. However,
when playing with HID-BPF, the return value can be arbitrary big,
because it's the return value of dispatch_hid_bpf_raw_requests(), which
calls the struct_ops and we have no guarantees that the value makes
sense. |
