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Search Results (3 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-84304 | 1 Grpc | 1 Grpc-go | 2026-09-02 | N/A |
| gRPC-Go is the Go language implementation of gRPC. Prior to 1.83.1, internal/transport/transport.go stores each fragmented HTTP/2 DATA frame as a separate recvMsg in recvBuffer, so millions of one-byte frames can consume disproportionate heap memory even when payload bytes remain within connection and stream flow-control windows. An unauthenticated remote attacker can use concurrent multiplexed streams to exhaust process memory and cause a runtime panic or out-of-memory termination. Receive-buffer compaction is enabled by default and can be controlled temporarily with GRPC_GO_EXPERIMENTAL_ENABLE_RECEIVE_BUFFER_COMPACTION. This issue is fixed in version 1.83.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-84303 | 1 Grpc | 1 Grpc-go | 2026-09-02 | N/A |
| gRPC-Go is the Go language implementation of gRPC. Prior to 1.83.1, the xDS RBAC HTTP filter in internal/xds/httpfilter/rbac/rbac.go does not lowercase header matcher names in normalizeHeaderMatcher even though incoming metadata keys are lowercase. A DENY policy using a mixed-case name such as X-Role or User-Agent therefore does not match and fails open, allowing requests that should be rejected. The same case mismatch permits :Scheme or Grpc-Status to evade gRFC A41 validation and prevents Host from being rewritten to :authority. This issue is fixed in version 1.83.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-33186 | 1 Grpc | 2 Grpc, Grpc-go | 2026-08-31 | 9.1 Critical |
| gRPC-Go is the Go language implementation of gRPC. Versions prior to 1.79.3 have an authorization bypass resulting from improper input validation of the HTTP/2 `:path` pseudo-header. The gRPC-Go server was too lenient in its routing logic, accepting requests where the `:path` omitted the mandatory leading slash (e.g., `Service/Method` instead of `/Service/Method`). While the server successfully routed these requests to the correct handler, authorization interceptors (including the official `grpc/authz` package) evaluated the raw, non-canonical path string. Consequently, "deny" rules defined using canonical paths (starting with `/`) failed to match the incoming request, allowing it to bypass the policy if a fallback "allow" rule was present. This affects gRPC-Go servers that use path-based authorization interceptors, such as the official RBAC implementation in `google.golang.org/grpc/authz` or custom interceptors relying on `info.FullMethod` or `grpc.Method(ctx)`; AND that have a security policy contains specific "deny" rules for canonical paths but allows other requests by default (a fallback "allow" rule). The vulnerability is exploitable by an attacker who can send raw HTTP/2 frames with malformed `:path` headers directly to the gRPC server. The fix in version 1.79.3 ensures that any request with a `:path` that does not start with a leading slash is immediately rejected with a `codes.Unimplemented` error, preventing it from reaching authorization interceptors or handlers with a non-canonical path string. While upgrading is the most secure and recommended path, users can mitigate the vulnerability using one of the following methods: Use a validating interceptor (recommended mitigation); infrastructure-level normalization; and/or policy hardening. | ||||
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