| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: ufs: core: Validate connected lane counts
The connected lane count is used by TX equalization code to index arrays
sized by UFS_MAX_LANES. Reject zero and out-of-range RX or TX lane counts
before they can be propagated. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: ufs: core: Validate string descriptors
The string descriptor length includes a two-byte header while the UTF-16
payload starts after it. utf16s_to_utf8s() expects a count of UTF-16 code
units, not bytes. Passing the payload byte count can make it read beyond
the descriptor buffer.
Validate that the payload has an even byte count, pass a code-unit count to
the converter, and allocate sufficient UTF-8 output space.
The raw string buffer starts after the descriptor header but its size is
bLength. Copying bLength bytes from that pointer can read beyond the
response buffer.
Allocate a zeroed bLength-sized buffer and copy only the UTF-16
payload. This preserves the raw buffer size consumed by the RPMB device-ID
ABI while avoiding the overread. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pinctrl: mediatek: free EINT resources on unbind
mtk_eint_do_init() creates an IRQ domain, populates it with a mapping for
every EINT line and installs a chained handler on the parent interrupt,
but none of these are ever released. This was harmless while the drivers
were built-in, but now that they can be built as modules and
unbound/rmmod'd it leaves behind a dangling IRQ domain, interrupt mappings
whose chip data points at freed memory, and a chained handler that keeps
firing into that freed data.
The plain allocations in mtk_eint_do_init() already use the device-managed
devm_*() helpers, so tear the remaining resources down the same way:
register a devm action that detaches the chained handler, waits for any
in-flight handler to finish, disposes of the per-line mappings and removes
the IRQ domain. This mirrors the device-managed lifecycle adopted for the
GPIO chip and keeps the whole EINT setup self-cleaning on unbind. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
liveupdate: Remember FLB retrieve() status
LUO keeps track of successful retrieve attempts on an FLB. It does so
to avoid multiple retrievals of the same FLB. Multiple retrievals cause
problems because once the FLB is retrieved, the serialized data
structures are likely freed and the FLB is likely in a very different
state from what the code expects.
All this works well when retrieve succeeds. When it fails,
luo_flb_retrieve_one() returns the error immediately, without ever
storing anywhere that a retrieve was attempted or what its error code
was. If the user attempts to retrieve another file registered with the
same FLB, LUO will attempt to call the FLB's retrieve() callback again.
The retry is problematic for much of the same reasons listed above. The
FLB is likely in a very different state than what the retrieve logic
normally expects (e.g. some KHO pages may have already been restored and
freed).
There is no sane way of attempting the retrieve again. Remember the
error retrieve returned and directly return it on a retry.
This is done by changing the retrieved bool to a retrieve_status
integer. A value of 0 means retrieve was never attempted, a positive
value means it succeeded, and a negative value means it failed and the
error code is the value.
This is similar to commit f85b1c6af5bc ("liveupdate: luo_file: remember
retrieve() status") which did the same for LUO files. |
| A security flaw has been discovered in Totolink A3002MU Hh-B20211125.1046. Affected by this vulnerability is the function formWlWds of the file /boafrm/formWlWds. The manipulation of the argument submit-url results in buffer overflow. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7915: fix ext PHY use-after-free on register error path
After mt7915_register_ext_phy() succeeded, a failure of the main PHY
mt7915_init_debugfs() or mt7915_coredump_register() unwound through
free_phy2, which called ieee80211_free_hw() on the ext PHY hw while it
was still registered with mac80211, since mt76_unregister_device() only
unregisters the main hw. Unregister the ext PHY (thermal + phy + hw)
first and skip the redundant free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject >8 byte return values on return-reading trampoline paths
btf_distill_func_proto() builds the function model used for the
fentry/fexit/fmod_ret/fsession trampolines and struct_ops. It has
accepted a 16-byte __int128 return value since the trampoline was
introduced: __get_type_size() returns the integer's type size, and the
return-type check only rejected ret < 0.
But the BPF trampoline preserves only 8 bytes of the return value (RAX on
x86, i.e. R0). For an attach type that reads the target's return value the
second half (RDX / R3) is neither saved nor restored, so a program
attached to a function returning a 16-byte value corrupts the value seen
by the real caller and itself observes only half of it. struct_ops
trampolines have the same limitation.
This affects the attach types that read the target's return value: fexit,
fmod_ret and fsession (plus the _multi variants of fexit and fsession),
and struct_ops. fentry/fentry_multi run before the target returns and are
unaffected.
Reject a >8 byte return value for these attach types in
bpf_check_attach_target() and bpf_check_attach_btf_id_multi(), and for
struct_ops in bpf_struct_ops_desc_init(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm/dsi: Drop dev_pm_opp_set_rate(0)
dev_pm_opp_set_rate(0) removes the vote specified in required-opps but
does not actually park the clock, making it run without the necessary
power backing. Drop the explicit call to it.
Every call site of ops->link_clk_disable() is followed by
pm_runtime_put(), so the power vote will be rescinded if deemed safe.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/742783/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
exfat: fix valid_size extension over a shared writable mapping
When a shared writable mapping has its valid_size extended by a buffered
write or a page fault, exfat zeroes the page-cache gap below the new
valid_size. A store through the mapping can race with this zeroing and be
overwritten.
Fix this by zeroing the gap lazily. Drop ->map_pages so that every first
write fault goes through exfat_page_mkwrite(), which advances valid_size to
cover the faulting page. With fault-around enabled, a store could install a
writable PTE, skip ->page_mkwrite(), and land past valid_size without
advancing it. Extending valid_size one faulting page at a time also leaves
never-written pages in a large mapping alone.
The gap is filled with block granularity, zeroing only the not-uptodate
blocks and preserving blocks that may hold data stored through the mapping.
On the buffered-write path the invalidate lock is held and the gap is
unmapped before zeroing, so a racing store re-faults and, under the inode
lock, completes only after the gap has been zeroed and valid_size covers
it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/erdma: complete object teardown when the destroy command fails
erdma_destroy_qp(), erdma_destroy_cq(), erdma_dereg_mr(), and
erdma_destroy_ah() returned early when erdma_post_cmd_wait() failed,
leaking the queue buffers, MTTs, doorbells and the STAG, QPN, CQN and AHN
identifiers. A command timeout clears ERDMA_CMDQ_STATE_OK_BIT and
permanently disables the command queue, so no retry can succeed; the RDMA
core keeps the object after a failed destructor and forced uverbs cleanup
then nulls the pointers, making the resources unreachable.
Warn on failure but release every software-owned resource and return
success, since during terminal destruction the hardware command result is
only diagnostic. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cpufreq/amd-pstate: handle missing policy in dynamic EPP callbacks
cpufreq_cpu_get() returns NULL when no cpufreq policy is associated with
the requested CPU, for example because the CPU is offline or the policy
has already been torn down. Both amd_pstate_power_supply_notifier() and
amd_pstate_profile_set() acquire a policy via cpufreq_cpu_get() and then
pass that pointer to amd_pstate_get_balanced_epp() and
amd_pstate_set_epp(), which dereference it unconditionally. A racing
CPU hotplug or driver teardown can therefore lead to a NULL pointer
dereference on either of these dynamic EPP paths.
The third cpufreq_cpu_get() caller in this file, amd_pstate_verify(),
already handles the NULL case. Bring the two new callers in line with
that pattern: return NOTIFY_OK from the power-supply notifier (matching
the other "nothing to do" exits) and -ENODEV from amd_pstate_profile_set()
(the usual cpufreq error for a missing CPU policy).
Found by code inspection; not tested on hardware. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cpufreq: amd-pstate-ut: Skip tests when amd-pstate driver is not active
The crash issue may occur when modprobe amd_pstate_ut on intel platform.
amd_pstate_ut: 1 amd_pstate_ut_acpi_cpc_valid success!
amd_pstate_ut: 2 amd_pstate_ut_check_enabled success!
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000080
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 20300 Comm: modprobe
Kdump: loaded Tainted: G O 6.6.0-0010.rc1.ctl4.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: FiberHome R2200 V5/Xeon Boards, BIOS 3.1a 02/24/2020
RIP: 0010:amd_pstate_ut_check_perf+0x141/0x280 [amd_pstate_ut]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
amd_pstate_ut_init+0x1b/0xff0 [amd_pstate_ut]
? __pfx_amd_pstate_ut_init+0x10/0x10 [amd_pstate_ut]
do_one_initcall+0x42/0x2e0
? kmalloc_trace+0x26/0x90
do_init_module+0x60/0x240
__se_sys_init_module+0x185/0x1c0
do_syscall_64+0x62/0x190
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
</TASK>
Add state detection to amd pstate driver to prevent amd_pstate_ut driver
from testing on non-AMD platforms.
(ML: adjust title) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI/sysfs: Add lockdown checks to legacy I/O and memory handlers
Currently, the legacy I/O and memory sysfs handlers do not check
security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS), leaving the legacy_io and
legacy_mem files unprotected when the kernel is locked down.
Commit eb627e17727e ("PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked
down") added the check to pci_write_config(), pci_mmap_resource(), and
pci_write_resource_io() to prevent userspace from programming DMA-capable
hardware that could be used to modify kernel code, but did not cover the
legacy handlers.
As a result, root can still write arbitrary I/O ports and map the legacy
I/O and memory spaces while the kernel is locked down, which is the same
capability the lockdown is meant to remove.
Add the same check to pci_write_legacy_io(), pci_mmap_legacy_mem(), and
pci_mmap_legacy_io().
These generic handlers cover both architectures that define HAVE_PCI_LEGACY
(such as Alpha and PowerPC).
[bhelgaas: add Link] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: cancel reset and rc work on device unregister
Both drivers cancelled dump_work on unregister but left reset_work and
rc_work to be flushed only by destroy_workqueue() in mt76_free_device(),
which runs after the hw is unregistered and the hardware stopped. A
reset_work that fires in that window calls ieee80211_restart_hw() and
re-arms mac_work on an unregistered hw, and rc_work touches station state
being torn down. Cancel both up front, alongside dump_work. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7996: bound TLV walk in mt7996_mcu_get_chip_config
The response TLV loop advanced by tlv->len without a minimum, so a
theoretical firmware response containing a zero-length TLV could spin
forever, hanging the CPU during device probe.
The u32 payload was also read without bounds checking.
Reject a short fixed field, stop on a TLV whose length underruns the
header or overruns the skb. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: fix RXDMAD_C buffer recycling race
The RXDMAD_C buffers come from the RRO data queues' page pools, which are
bound to a different NAPI, so the direct page-pool recycle used here could
race the owning NAPI; take the non-direct path as is already done for WED
RX queues. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: fix RX data queuing of RRO 3.0
For RRO 3.0, RX data released from a RRO data queue should be put to
the indicator queue. The frames are processed and completed in the
context of the indicator queue NAPI, which only polls skbs queued on
the MT_RXQ_RRO_IND list; frames queued under the data queue id are
left sitting on that list until the data queue NAPI happens to run,
stalling and reordering RX data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt76x02: do not WARN on invalid rx descriptor length
The MPDU length in the rx descriptor comes from the hardware. In
monitor mode with the fcsfail filter enabled, the hardware passes up
corrupted frames, and a corrupted frame can report a length larger
than the received buffer. The bounds check correctly discards such
frames, but its WARN_ON_ONCE wrapper means any over-the-air garbage
frame taints the kernel, and panics it on the first such frame when
panic_on_warn is set.
Drop the WARN and discard the frame silently, matching what
commit c2d4c8723dbf ("mt76x2: remove some harmless WARN_ONs in tx
status and rx path") did for the neighboring rx and tx status paths.
Observed immediately on rx with an MT7612U in fcsfail monitor mode
on a busy channel. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iomap: release the folio batch on iomap callback failures
A sashiko review of an unrelated patch points out that the folio
batch mechanism used for iomap zero range fails to release the batch
in a couple error scenarios. If either calls to ->iomap_end() or
->iomap_begin() fail, the direct return paths bypass the batch
cleanup.
The ->iomap_end() case is not a practical issue at the moment
because there is no user of the mechanism that returns an error from
this path. The ->iomap_begin() case is theoretically possible
because XFS can invoke the fill helper and error out at various
points thereafter. This subtly complicates things because XFS does
not transfer iomap_flags to the iomap data structure in the error
path.
To deal with both of these issues, first make sure to invoke the
cleanup helper in the error path for either fs callback. Second,
update the helper to clear the flag unconditionally and release the
batch so long as it is populated. This more clearly delineates the
purpose of the flag to control the I/O path and not necessarily the
status of the fbatch, so add a comment around this as well. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i3c: dw: avoid shift-out-of-bounds when DAA assigns no devices
On an empty bus ENTDAA assigns nothing, so cmd->rx_len (the count
of addresses left unassigned) equals master->maxdevs.
The GENMASK() index master->maxdevs - cmd->rx_len - 1 then becomes -1,
which trips up UBSAN. This happens every time on boot on a Gigabyte/AMD
server:
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in drivers/i3c/master/dw-i3c-master.c:905:12
shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int'
CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 963 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 7.0.11-200.fc44.x86_64 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: Giga Computing E163-Z34-AAH1-000/MZ33-DC1-000, BIOS R32_F45 04/01/2026
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x2b
__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0xd7/0x1ab
dw_i3c_master_daa.cold+0x1b/0x96 [dw_i3c_master]
i3c_master_do_daa_ext.part.0+0x3e/0xf0 [i3c]
Skip the mask when no new device was assigned. |
