| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Langflow exec_globals Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Langflow. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.
The specific flaw exists within the handling of the exec_globals parameter provided to the validate endpoint. The issue results from the inclusion of a resource from an untrusted control sphere. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of root. Was ZDI-CAN-27325. |
| Mailpit is an email testing tool and API for developers. Prior to version 1.30.0, the mailpit dump --http <base-url> <out-dir> sub-command downloads every message from a remote Mailpit instance and writes each one as <id>.eml inside the user-supplied output directory. The message ID field is taken verbatim from the JSON response of the remote server and concatenated into the output path with path.Join, which silently normalizes `..` segments. A malicious HTTP server impersonating Mailpit can therefore make mailpit dump write attacker-controlled bytes to any path the running user can write, fully outside the intended output directory. Version 1.30.0 contains a patch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: mt6359: fix unchecked return value in mt6358_read_imp
In mt6358_read_imp(), the variable val_v is passed to regmap_read()
but the return value is not checked. If the read fails, val_v remains
uninitialized and its random stack content is subsequently reported
as a measurement result.
Initialize val_v to zero to ensure a predictable value is reported
in case of bus failure and to prevent potential stack data leakage.
This also satisfies static analyzers that might otherwise flag the
variable as used uninitialized. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: ISO: Fix data-race on iso_pi fields in hci_get_route calls
iso_connect_bis(), iso_connect_cis(), iso_listen_bis(), and
iso_conn_big_sync() call hci_get_route() using iso_pi(sk)->dst,
iso_pi(sk)->src, and iso_pi(sk)->src_type without holding lock_sock().
These fields may be modified concurrently by connect() or setsockopt()
on the same socket, resulting in data-races reported by KCSAN.
Fix this by snapshotting the required fields under lock_sock() before
calling hci_get_route().
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in memcmp+0x45/0xb0
race at unknown origin, with read to 0xffff8880122135cf of 1 bytes
by task 333 on cpu 1:
memcmp+0x45/0xb0
hci_get_route+0x27e/0x490
iso_connect_cis+0x4c/0xa10
iso_sock_connect+0x60e/0xb30
__sys_connect_file+0xbd/0xe0
__sys_connect+0xe0/0x110
__x64_sys_connect+0x40/0x50
x64_sys_call+0xcad/0x1c60
do_syscall_64+0x133/0x590
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: exthdrs: refresh nh pointer after ipv6_hop_jumbo()
ipv6_hop_jumbo() calls pskb_trim_rcsum(), which can change skb pointers.
Let's recompute nh pointer to make sure any change won't mess things up. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915: Fix potential UAF in TTM object purge
TLDR: The bo->ttm object might be changed by calling ttm_bo_validate(),
move casting it to an i915_tt object later to actually get the right
pointer.
A user reported hitting the following bug under heavy use on DG2:
[26620.095550] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xa56b6b6b6b6b6b8b: 0000 1 SMP NOPTI
[26620.095556] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 631 Comm: Xorg Not tainted 6.18.8 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
[26620.095558] Hardware name: ASRock B850M Steel Legend WiFi/B850M Steel Legend WiFi, BIOS 3.50 09/18/2025
[26620.095559] RIP: 0010:i915_ttm_purge+0x84/0x100 [i915]
[26620.095604] Code: 00 00 00 48 8d 54 24 10 48 89 e6 48 89 fb e8 83 aa ae ff 85 c0 75 6f 48 83 bb a8 01 00 00 00 74 2c 48 8b 45 78 48 85 c0 74 23 <48> 8b 78 20 48 c7 c2 ff ff ff ff 31 f6 e8 7a 73 e3 e0 48 8b 7d 78
[26620.095605] RSP: 0018:ffffc90005fd7430 EFLAGS: 00010282
[26620.095607] RAX: a56b6b6b6b6b6b6b RBX: ffff8881f46c3dc0 RCX: 0000000000000000
[26620.095608] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
[26620.095609] RBP: ffff888289610f00 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff88823b022000
[26620.095609] R10: ffff888103029b28 R11: ffff8881fc7f3800 R12: ffff88810b6150d0
[26620.095609] R13: ffff888289610f00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8881f46c3dc0
[26620.095610] FS: 00007f1004d86900(0000) GS:ffff88901c858000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[26620.095611] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[26620.095611] CR2: 00007f0fdf489000 CR3: 000000035b0c1000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
[26620.095612] PKRU: 55555554
[26620.095612] Call Trace:
[26620.095615] <TASK>
[26620.095615] i915_ttm_move+0x2b9/0x420 [i915]
[26620.095642] ? ttm_tt_init+0x65/0x80 [ttm]
[26620.095644] ? i915_ttm_tt_create+0xc6/0x150 [i915]
[26620.095667] ttm_bo_handle_move_mem+0xb6/0x160 [ttm]
[26620.095669] ttm_bo_evict+0x100/0x150 [ttm]
[26620.095671] ? preempt_count_add+0x64/0xa0
[26620.095673] ? _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x30
[26620.095675] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xd/0x30
[26620.095675] ? i915_gem_object_evictable+0xb7/0xd0 [i915]
[26620.095704] ttm_bo_evict_cb+0x6e/0xd0 [ttm]
[26620.095705] ttm_lru_walk_for_evict+0xa6/0x200 [ttm]
[26620.095708] ttm_bo_alloc_resource+0x185/0x4f0 [ttm]
[26620.095709] ? init_object+0x62/0xd0
[26620.095712] ttm_bo_validate+0x7a/0x180 [ttm]
[26620.095713] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x16/0x30
[26620.095714] __i915_ttm_get_pages+0xb0/0x170 [i915]
[26620.095737] i915_ttm_get_pages+0x9f/0x150 [i915]
[26620.095759] ? i915_gem_do_execbuffer+0xedc/0x2b40 [i915]
[26620.095786] ? alloc_debug_processing+0xd0/0x100
[26620.095787] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x16/0x30
[26620.095788] ? i915_vma_instance+0xa0/0x4e0 [i915]
[26620.095822] __i915_gem_object_get_pages+0x2f/0x40 [i915]
[26620.095848] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x706/0x980 [i915]
[26620.095875] ? i915_gem_do_execbuffer+0xedc/0x2b40 [i915]
[26620.095904] eb_validate_vmas+0x170/0xa00 [i915]
[26620.095930] i915_gem_do_execbuffer+0x1201/0x2b40 [i915]
[26620.095953] ? alloc_debug_processing+0xd0/0x100
[26620.095954] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x16/0x30
[26620.095955] ? i915_gem_execbuffer2_ioctl+0xc9/0x240 [i915]
[26620.095977] ? __wake_up_sync_key+0x32/0x50
[26620.095979] ? i915_gem_execbuffer2_ioctl+0xc9/0x240 [i915]
[26620.096001] ? __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x67/0xc0
[26620.096003] i915_gem_execbuffer2_ioctl+0x11a/0x240 [i915]
Results from decode_stacktrace.sh pointed to dereference of a file pointer
field of a i915 TTM page vector container associated with an object being
purged on eviction. That path is taken when the object is marked as no
longer needed.
Code analysis revealed a possibility of the i915 TTM page vector container
being replaced with a new instance inside a function that purges content
of the object, should it be still busy. That function is called,
indirectly via a more general function that changes the object's placement
and caching policy,
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: Fix use-after-free in llcp_sock_release()
llcp_sock_release() unconditionally unlinks the socket from the local
sockets list. However, if the socket is still in connecting state, it
is on the connecting list.
Fix this by checking the socket state and unlinking from the correct list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tunnels: load network headers after skb_cow() in iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmp[v6]()
Sashiko found that iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmp() and
iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmpv6() were caching ip_hdr() and ipv6_hdr()
before an skb_cow() call which can reallocate skb->head.
Fix this possible UAF by initializing the local variables
after the skb_cow() call.
Remove skb_reset_network_header() calls which were not needed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: sockmap: fix tail fragment offset in bpf_msg_push_data
When bpf_msg_push_data() inserts data in the middle of a scatterlist
entry, it splits the original entry into a left fragment and a right
fragment.
The right fragment offset is page-local, but the code advances it with
`start`, which is the message-global insertion point. For inserts into a
non-first SG entry, this over-advances the offset and leaves the split
layout inconsistent.
Advance the right fragment offset by the fragment-local delta,
`start - offset`, which matches the length removed from the front of the
original entry. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix possible crash on l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp
If dcid is received for an already-assigned destination CID the spec
requires that both channels to be discarded, but calling l2cap_chan_del
may invalidate the tmp cursor created by list_for_each_entry_safe and
in fact it is the wrong procedure as the chan->dcid may be assigned
previously it really needs to be disconnected.
Calling l2cap_chan_clone directly may still lead to l2cap_chan_del so
instead schedule l2cap_chan_timeout with delay 0 to close the channel
asynchronously. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ip6: vti: Use ip6_tnl.net in vti6_changelink().
ip netns add ns1
ip netns add ns2
ip -n ns1 link add vti6_test type vti6 remote ::1 local ::2 key 7
ip -n ns1 link set vti6_test netns ns2
ip -n ns2 link set vti6_test type vti6 remote ::3 local ::4 key 9
ip netns del ns2
ip netns del ns1
[ 132.495484] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 132.497609] kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:12376!
Commit 61220ab34948 ("vti6: Enable namespace changing") dropped
NETIF_F_NETNS_LOCAL from vti6 devices. A vti6 tunnel can then
move through IFLA_NET_NS_FD. After the move dev_net(dev) points
at the new netns while t->net stays at the creation netns.
vti6_changelink() and vti6_update() still use dev_net(dev) and
dev_net(t->dev). They unlink from one per netns hash and relink
into another. The creation netns is left with a stale entry.
cleanup_net() of that netns later walks freed memory.
Reachable from an unprivileged user namespace (unshare --user
--map-root-user --net). Cross tenant scope on container hosts. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: add hook transactions for device deletions
Restore the flag that indicates that the hook is going away, ie.
NFT_HOOK_REMOVE, but add a new transaction object to track deletion
of hooks without altering the basechain/flowtable hook_list during
the preparation phase.
The existing approach that moves the hook from the basechain/flowtable
hook_list to transaction hook_list breaks netlink dump path readers
of this RCU-protected list.
It should be possible use an array for nft_trans_hook to store the
deleted hooks to compact the representation but I am not expecting
many hook object, specially now that wildcard support for devices
is in place.
Note that the nft_trans_chain_hooks() list contains a list of struct
nft_trans_hook objects for DELCHAIN and DELFLOWTABLE commands, while
this list stores struct nft_hook objects for NEWCHAIN and NEWFLOWTABLE.
Note that new commands can be updated to use nft_trans_hook for
consistency.
This patch also adapts the event notification path to deal with the list
of hook transactions. |
| Meshtastic is an open source mesh networking solution. Prior to version 2.7.21.1370b23, the Meshtastic GitHub repository's main_matrix.yml workflow is triggered by pull_request_target and multiple jobs check out the attacker's fork code and execute it with access to repository secrets and elevated GITHUB_TOKEN permissions. No approval gate exists. Pull requests from external users with author_association: "NONE" triggered the CI workflow automatically. The workflow directly executes attacker-controlled files from the fork checkout. This issue could have resulted in supply chain compromise, self-hosted runner compromise, and/or repository takeover for the repo. This issue is separate from GHSA-6mwm-v2vv-pp96, which addressed a command injection via github.head_ref in the setup job of the same workflow. That fix correctly moved to environment variables. However, the more critical fork checkout vulnerability across the check, build, and build-debian-src jobs was not addressed. Version 2.7.21.1370b23 contains a patch for thie issue. |
| A security vulnerability has been detected in Sipeed PicoClaw up to 0.2.9. Affected is the function NewContextBuilder of the file pkg/agent/context.go. Such manipulation leads to inclusion of functionality from untrusted control sphere. The attack needs to be performed locally. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The reported GitHub issue was closed automatically with the label "not planned" by a bot. |
| Microsoft Streaming Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability |
| Windows Kernel-Mode Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7996: Clear wcid pointer in mt7996_mac_sta_deinit_link()
Clear WCID pointer removing the sta link in mt7996_mac_sta_deinit_link
routine. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mac802154: llsec: add skb_cow_data() before in-place crypto
llsec_do_encrypt_unauth(), llsec_do_encrypt_auth(),
llsec_do_decrypt_unauth(), and llsec_do_decrypt_auth() all perform
in-place cryptographic transformations on skb data. They build a
scatterlist with sg_init_one() pointing into the skb's linear data area
and then pass the same scatterlist as both src and dst to the crypto API
(e.g. crypto_skcipher_encrypt/decrypt, crypto_aead_encrypt/decrypt).
On the RX path, __ieee802154_rx_handle_packet() clones the received skb
before handing it to each subscriber via ieee802154_subif_frame(). The
cloned skb shares the same underlying data buffer via reference
counting. When llsec_do_decrypt() subsequently modifies this shared
buffer in place, it corrupts data that other clones -- potentially
belonging to other sockets or subsystems -- still reference.
On the TX path, similar data sharing can occur when an skb's head has
been cloned (skb_cloned() returns true).
The fix is to call skb_cow_data() before performing any in-place crypto
operation. skb_cow_data() ensures that the skb's data area is not
shared: if the skb head is cloned or the data spans multiple fragments,
it copies the data into a private buffer that can be safely modified in
place. This is the same pattern used by:
- ESP (net/ipv4/esp4.c, net/ipv6/esp6.c)
- MACsec (drivers/net/macsec.c)
- WireGuard (drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c)
- TIPC (net/tipc/crypto.c)
Without this guard, in-place crypto on shared skb data leads to:
- Silent data corruption of other skb clones
- Use-after-free when the crypto API scatterwalk writes through a
page that has already been freed by another clone's kfree_skb()
- Kernel crashes under concurrent 802.15.4 traffic with security
enabled (KASAN/KMSAN reports slab-use-after-free)
Found by 0sec (https://0sec.ai) using automated source analysis. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
keys: Pin request_key_auth payload in instantiate paths
A: request_key() B: KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV
================ =========================
create auth key
store rka in auth key
wait for helper
get auth key
load rka from auth key
copy user payload
sleep on #PF
helper completed
detach and free rka
destroy auth key
wake up
use rka->target_key
**USE-AFTER-FREE**
Give request_key_auth payloads a refcount. Take a payload reference while
authkey->sem stabilizes the payload and revocation state. Hold that
reference across the instantiate and reject paths. Drop the auth key
owning reference from revoke and destroy.
[jarkko: Replaced the first two paragraphs of text with an actual
concurrency scenario.] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to do sanity check on f2fs_get_node_folio_ra()
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/file.c:845!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5336 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:f2fs_do_truncate_blocks+0x1115/0x1140 fs/f2fs/file.c:845
Code: fc fc 90 0f 0b e8 8b 9d 9a fd 90 0f 0b e8 83 9d 9a fd 48 89 df 48 c7 c6 60 d1 1a 8c e8 54 f1 fc fc 90 0f 0b e8 6c 9d 9a fd 90 <0f> 0b e8 64 9d 9a fd 90 0f 0b 90 e9 93 fd ff ff e8 56 9d 9a fd 90
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000e4474c0 EFLAGS: 00010283
RAX: ffffffff842b1d34 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000100000
RDX: ffffc9000f03a000 RSI: 0000000000035503 RDI: 0000000000035504
RBP: ffffc9000e447608 R08: ffff8880123b0000 R09: 0000000000000002
R10: 00000000fffffffe R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 1ffff92001c88ea0 R15: 00000000ffff039c
FS: 00007f7e02ee36c0(0000) GS:ffff88808c887000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ff0305c4000 CR3: 0000000012d4c000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
f2fs_truncate_blocks+0x10a/0x300 fs/f2fs/file.c:882
f2fs_truncate+0x471/0x7c0 fs/f2fs/file.c:940
f2fs_evict_inode+0xa3f/0x1ac0 fs/f2fs/inode.c:907
evict+0x61e/0xb10 fs/inode.c:841
f2fs_fill_super+0x5f43/0x78f0 fs/f2fs/super.c:5224
get_tree_bdev_flags+0x431/0x4f0 fs/super.c:1694
vfs_get_tree+0x92/0x2a0 fs/super.c:1754
fc_mount fs/namespace.c:1193 [inline]
do_new_mount_fc fs/namespace.c:3758 [inline]
do_new_mount+0x341/0xd30 fs/namespace.c:3834
do_mount fs/namespace.c:4167 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4383 [inline]
__se_sys_mount+0x31d/0x420 fs/namespace.c:4360
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x15f/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
count = ADDRS_PER_PAGE(dn.node_folio, inode);
count -= dn.ofs_in_node;
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, count < 0);
The fuzz test will trigger above bug_on in f2fs.
The root cause should be: in the corrupted inode, there is a direct node
which has the same ino and nid in its footer, so in f2fs_do_truncate_blocks(),
after f2fs_get_dnode_of_data() finds such dnode:
1) ADDRS_PER_PAGE(dn.node_folio, inode) will return 923
2) once dn.ofs_in_node points to addr[923, 1017]
Then it will trigger the system panic.
Let's introduce NODE_TYPE_NON_IXNODE to indicate current node should
not be an inode or xattr node, and then use it in below path to detect
inconsistent node chain in inode mapping table:
- f2fs_do_truncate_blocks
- f2fs_get_dnode_of_data
- f2fs_get_node_folio_ra
- __get_node_folio
- f2fs_sanity_check_node_footer
- case NODE_TYPE_NON_IXNODE -> check whether it is inode|xnode |
