| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm cache policy smq: fix missing locks in invalidating cache blocks
In passthrough mode, the policy invalidate_mapping operation is called
simultaneously from multiple workers, thus it should be protected by a
lock. Otherwise, we might end up with data races on the allocated blocks
counter, or even use-after-free issues with internal data structures
when doing concurrent writes.
Note that the existing FIXME in smq_invalidate_mapping() doesn't affect
passthrough mode since migration tasks don't exist there, but would need
attention if supporting fast device shrinking via suspend/resume without
target reloading.
Reproduce steps:
1. Create a cache device consisting of 1024 cache entries
dmsetup create cmeta --table "0 8192 linear /dev/sdc 0"
dmsetup create cdata --table "0 131072 linear /dev/sdc 8192"
dmsetup create corig --table "0 262144 linear /dev/sdc 262144"
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/mapper/cmeta bs=4k count=1 oflag=direct
dmsetup create cache --table "0 262144 cache /dev/mapper/cmeta \
/dev/mapper/cdata /dev/mapper/corig 128 2 metadata2 writethrough smq 0"
2. Populate the cache, and record the number of cached blocks
fio --name=populate --filename=/dev/mapper/cache --rw=randwrite --bs=4k \
--size=64m --direct=1
nr_cached=$(dmsetup status cache | awk '{split($7, a, "/"); print a[1]}')
3. Reload the cache into passthrough mode
dmsetup suspend cache
dmsetup reload cache --table "0 262144 cache /dev/mapper/cmeta \
/dev/mapper/cdata /dev/mapper/corig 128 2 metadata2 passthrough smq 0"
dmsetup resume cache
4. Write to the passthrough cache. By setting multiple jobs with I/O
size equal to the cache block size, cache blocks are invalidated
concurrently from different workers.
fio --filename=/dev/mapper/cache --name=test --rw=randwrite --bs=64k \
--direct=1 --numjobs=2 --randrepeat=0 --size=64m
5. Check if demoted matches cached block count. These numbers should
match but may differ due to the data race.
nr_demoted=$(dmsetup status cache | awk '{print $12}')
echo "$nr_cached, $nr_demoted" |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/fcntl: fix SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order in fasync signaling
A SOFTIRQ-safe to SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order deadlock can occur in
send_sigio() and send_sigurg() when a process group receives a signal.
When FASYNC is configured for a process group (PIDTYPE_PGID), both
functions use read_lock(&tasklist_lock) to traverse the task list.
However, they are frequently called from softirq context:
- send_sigio() via input_inject_event -> kill_fasync
- send_sigurg() via tcp_check_urg -> sk_send_sigurg (NET_RX_SOFTIRQ)
The deadlock is caused by the rwlock writer fairness mechanism:
1. CPU 0 (process context) holds read_lock(&tasklist_lock) in do_wait().
2. CPU 1 (process context) attempts write_lock(&tasklist_lock) in
fork() or exit() and spins, which blocks all new readers.
3. CPU 0 is interrupted by a softirq (e.g., TCP URG packet reception).
4. The softirq calls send_sigurg() and attempts to acquire
read_lock(&tasklist_lock), deadlocking because CPU 1 is waiting.
Since PID hashing and do_each_pid_task() traversals are already
RCU-protected, the read_lock on tasklist_lock is no longer strictly
required for safe traversal. Fix this by replacing tasklist_lock with
rcu_read_lock(), aligning the process group signaling path with the
single-PID path. This also mitigates a potential remote denial of
service vector via TCP URG packets.
Lockdep splat:
=====================================================
WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected
[...]
Chain exists of:
&dev->event_lock --> &f_owner->lock --> tasklist_lock
Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(tasklist_lock);
local_irq_disable();
lock(&dev->event_lock);
lock(&f_owner->lock);
<Interrupt>
lock(&dev->event_lock);
*** DEADLOCK *** |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/amd: move wait_on_sem() out of spinlock
With iommu.strict=1, the existing completion wait path can cause soft
lockups under stressed environment, as wait_on_sem() busy-waits under the
spinlock with interrupts disabled.
Move the completion wait in iommu_completion_wait() out of the spinlock.
wait_on_sem() only polls the hardware-updated cmd_sem and does not require
iommu->lock, so holding the lock during the busy wait unnecessarily
increases contention and extends the time with interrupts disabled. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: Fix locking usage for tcon fields
We used to use the cifs_tcp_ses_lock to protect a lot of objects
that are not just the server, ses or tcon lists. We later introduced
srv_lock, ses_lock and tc_lock to protect fields within the
corresponding structs. This was done to provide a more granular
protection and avoid unnecessary serialization.
There were still a couple of uses of cifs_tcp_ses_lock to provide
tcon fields. In this patch, I've replaced them with tc_lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: Fix pci_slot_trylock() error handling
Commit a4e772898f8b ("PCI: Add missing bridge lock to pci_bus_lock()")
delegates the bridge device's pci_dev_trylock() to pci_bus_trylock() in
pci_slot_trylock(), but it forgets to remove the corresponding
pci_dev_unlock() when pci_bus_trylock() fails.
Before a4e772898f8b, the code did:
if (!pci_dev_trylock(dev)) /* <- lock bridge device */
goto unlock;
if (dev->subordinate) {
if (!pci_bus_trylock(dev->subordinate)) {
pci_dev_unlock(dev); /* <- unlock bridge device */
goto unlock;
}
}
After a4e772898f8b the bridge-device lock is no longer taken, but the
pci_dev_unlock(dev) on the failure path was left in place, leading to the
bug.
This yields one of two errors:
1. A warning that the lock is being unlocked when no one holds it.
2. An incorrect unlock of a lock that belongs to another thread.
Fix it by removing the now-redundant pci_dev_unlock(dev) on the failure
path.
[Same patch later posted by Keith at
https://patch.msgid.link/20260116184150.3013258-1-kbusch@meta.com] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: kaweth: remove TX queue manipulation in kaweth_set_rx_mode
kaweth_set_rx_mode(), the ndo_set_rx_mode callback, calls
netif_stop_queue() and netif_wake_queue(). These are TX queue flow
control functions unrelated to RX multicast configuration.
The premature netif_wake_queue() can re-enable TX while tx_urb is still
in-flight, leading to a double usb_submit_urb() on the same URB:
kaweth_start_xmit() {
netif_stop_queue();
usb_submit_urb(kaweth->tx_urb);
}
kaweth_set_rx_mode() {
netif_stop_queue();
netif_wake_queue(); // wakes TX queue before URB is done
}
kaweth_start_xmit() {
netif_stop_queue();
usb_submit_urb(kaweth->tx_urb); // URB submitted while active
}
This triggers the WARN in usb_submit_urb():
"URB submitted while active"
This is a similar class of bug fixed in rtl8150 by
- commit 958baf5eaee3 ("net: usb: Remove disruptive netif_wake_queue in rtl8150_set_multicast").
Also kaweth_set_rx_mode() is already functionally broken, the
real set_rx_mode action is performed by kaweth_async_set_rx_mode(),
which in turn is not a no-op only at ndo_open() time. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: uinput - fix circular locking dependency with ff-core
A lockdep circular locking dependency warning can be triggered
reproducibly when using a force-feedback gamepad with uinput (for
example, playing ELDEN RING under Wine with a Flydigi Vader 5
controller):
ff->mutex -> udev->mutex -> input_mutex -> dev->mutex -> ff->mutex
The cycle is caused by four lock acquisition paths:
1. ff upload: input_ff_upload() holds ff->mutex and calls
uinput_dev_upload_effect() -> uinput_request_submit() ->
uinput_request_send(), which acquires udev->mutex.
2. device create: uinput_ioctl_handler() holds udev->mutex and calls
uinput_create_device() -> input_register_device(), which acquires
input_mutex.
3. device register: input_register_device() holds input_mutex and
calls kbd_connect() -> input_register_handle(), which acquires
dev->mutex.
4. evdev release: evdev_release() calls input_flush_device() under
dev->mutex, which calls input_ff_flush() acquiring ff->mutex.
Fix this by introducing a new state_lock spinlock to protect
udev->state and udev->dev access in uinput_request_send() instead of
acquiring udev->mutex. The function only needs to atomically check
device state and queue an input event into the ring buffer via
uinput_dev_event() -- both operations are safe under a spinlock
(ktime_get_ts64() and wake_up_interruptible() do not sleep). This
breaks the ff->mutex -> udev->mutex link since a spinlock is a leaf in
the lock ordering and cannot form cycles with mutexes.
To keep state transitions visible to uinput_request_send(), protect
writes to udev->state in uinput_create_device() and
uinput_destroy_device() with the same state_lock spinlock.
Additionally, move init_completion(&request->done) from
uinput_request_send() to uinput_request_submit() before
uinput_request_reserve_slot(). Once the slot is allocated,
uinput_flush_requests() may call complete() on it at any time from
the destroy path, so the completion must be initialised before the
request becomes visible.
Lock ordering after the fix:
ff->mutex -> state_lock (spinlock, leaf)
udev->mutex -> state_lock (spinlock, leaf)
udev->mutex -> input_mutex -> dev->mutex -> ff->mutex (no back-edge) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: fix possible deadlock between unlink and dio_end_io_write
ocfs2_unlink takes orphan dir inode_lock first and then ip_alloc_sem,
while in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write, it acquires these locks in reverse order.
This creates an ABBA lock ordering violation on lock classes
ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE] and
ocfs2_file_ip_alloc_sem_key.
Lock Chain #0 (orphan dir inode_lock -> ip_alloc_sem):
ocfs2_unlink
ocfs2_prepare_orphan_dir
ocfs2_lookup_lock_orphan_dir
inode_lock(orphan_dir_inode) <- lock A
__ocfs2_prepare_orphan_dir
ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert
ocfs2_extend_dir
ocfs2_expand_inline_dir
down_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem) <- Lock B
Lock Chain #1 (ip_alloc_sem -> orphan dir inode_lock):
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
down_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem) <- Lock B
ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan()
inode_lock(orphan_dir_inode) <- Lock A
Deadlock Scenario:
CPU0 (unlink) CPU1 (dio_end_io_write)
------ ------
inode_lock(orphan_dir_inode)
down_write(ip_alloc_sem)
down_write(ip_alloc_sem)
inode_lock(orphan_dir_inode)
Since ip_alloc_sem is to protect allocation changes, which is unrelated
with operations in ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan. So move
ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan out of ip_alloc_sem to fix the deadlock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (pmbus/core) Protect regulator operations with mutex
The regulator operations pmbus_regulator_get_voltage(),
pmbus_regulator_set_voltage(), and pmbus_regulator_list_voltage()
access PMBus registers and shared data but were not protected by
the update_lock mutex. This could lead to race conditions.
However, adding mutex protection directly to these functions causes
a deadlock because pmbus_regulator_notify() (which calls
regulator_notifier_call_chain()) is often called with the mutex
already held (e.g., from pmbus_fault_handler()). If a regulator
callback then calls one of the now-protected voltage functions,
it will attempt to acquire the same mutex.
Rework pmbus_regulator_notify() to utilize a worker function to
send notifications outside of the mutex protection. Events are
stored as atomics in a per-page bitmask and processed by the worker.
Initialize the worker and its associated data during regulator
registration, and ensure it is cancelled on device removal using
devm_add_action_or_reset().
While at it, remove the unnecessary include of linux/of.h. |
| libIEC61850 is an open-source implementation of IEC 61850 client and server protocols including MMS, GOOSE, Sampled Values, and R-Session. From 1.6.1 until 1.6.2, a successful MMS ObtainFile operation closes MmsObtainFileTask::fileHandle but leaves the stale non-NULL value in a task marked MMS_FILE_UPLOAD_STATE_NOT_USED. If a later ObtainFile request reuses that task and destination creation fails, MMS_FILE_UPLOAD_STATE_SEND_OBTAIN_FILE_ERROR_DESTINATION cleanup closes the stale FILE object again. Servers with the MMS file service and ObtainFile enabled can therefore be crashed remotely by the success-then-failure request sequence. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.2. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: avoid deadlock on fallback while reinjecting
Jakub reported an MPTCP deadlock at fallback time:
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.18.0-rc7-virtme #1 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
mptcp_connect/20858 is trying to acquire lock:
ff1100001da18b60 (&msk->fallback_lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at: __mptcp_try_fallback+0xd8/0x280
but task is already holding lock:
ff1100001da18b60 (&msk->fallback_lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at: __mptcp_retrans+0x352/0xaa0
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(&msk->fallback_lock);
lock(&msk->fallback_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
May be due to missing lock nesting notation
3 locks held by mptcp_connect/20858:
#0: ff1100001da18290 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_sendmsg+0x114/0x1bc0
#1: ff1100001db40fd0 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __mptcp_retrans+0x2cb/0xaa0
#2: ff1100001da18b60 (&msk->fallback_lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at: __mptcp_retrans+0x352/0xaa0
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 20858 Comm: mptcp_connect Not tainted 6.18.0-rc7-virtme #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xa0
print_deadlock_bug.cold+0xc0/0xcd
validate_chain+0x2ff/0x5f0
__lock_acquire+0x34c/0x740
lock_acquire.part.0+0xbc/0x260
_raw_spin_lock_bh+0x38/0x50
__mptcp_try_fallback+0xd8/0x280
mptcp_sendmsg_frag+0x16c2/0x3050
__mptcp_retrans+0x421/0xaa0
mptcp_release_cb+0x5aa/0xa70
release_sock+0xab/0x1d0
mptcp_sendmsg+0xd5b/0x1bc0
sock_write_iter+0x281/0x4d0
new_sync_write+0x3c5/0x6f0
vfs_write+0x65e/0xbb0
ksys_write+0x17e/0x200
do_syscall_64+0xbb/0xfd0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7fa5627cbc5e
Code: 4d 89 d8 e8 14 bd 00 00 4c 8b 5d f8 41 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 11 c9 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 8b 45 10 0f 05 <c9> c3 83 e2 39 83 fa 08 75 e7 e8 13 ff ff ff 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa
RSP: 002b:00007fff1fe14700 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 00007fa5627cbc5e
RDX: 0000000000001f9c RSI: 00007fff1fe16984 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00007fff1fe14710 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fff1fe16920
R13: 0000000000002000 R14: 0000000000001f9c R15: 0000000000001f9c
The packet scheduler could attempt a reinjection after receiving an
MP_FAIL and before the infinite map has been transmitted, causing a
deadlock since MPTCP needs to do the reinjection atomically from WRT
fallback.
Address the issue explicitly avoiding the reinjection in the critical
scenario. Note that this is the only fallback critical section that
could potentially send packets and hit the double-lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm: dm-crypt: Do not partially accept write BIOs with zoned targets
Read and write operations issued to a dm-crypt target may be split
according to the dm-crypt internal limits defined by the max_read_size
and max_write_size module parameters (default is 128 KB). The intent is
to improve processing time of large BIOs by splitting them into smaller
operations that can be parallelized on different CPUs.
For zoned dm-crypt targets, this BIO splitting is still done but without
the parallel execution to ensure that the issuing order of write
operations to the underlying devices remains sequential. However, the
splitting itself causes other problems:
1) Since dm-crypt relies on the block layer zone write plugging to
handle zone append emulation using regular write operations, the
reminder of a split write BIO will always be plugged into the target
zone write plugged. Once the on-going write BIO finishes, this
reminder BIO is unplugged and issued from the zone write plug work.
If this reminder BIO itself needs to be split, the reminder will be
re-issued and plugged again, but that causes a call to a
blk_queue_enter(), which may block if a queue freeze operation was
initiated. This results in a deadlock as DM submission still holds
BIOs that the queue freeze side is waiting for.
2) dm-crypt relies on the emulation done by the block layer using
regular write operations for processing zone append operations. This
still requires to properly return the written sector as the BIO
sector of the original BIO. However, this can be done correctly only
and only if there is a single clone BIO used for processing the
original zone append operation issued by the user. If the size of a
zone append operation is larger than dm-crypt max_write_size, then
the orginal BIO will be split and processed as a chain of regular
write operations. Such chaining result in an incorrect written sector
being returned to the zone append issuer using the original BIO
sector. This in turn results in file system data corruptions using
xfs or btrfs.
Fix this by modifying get_max_request_size() to always return the size
of the BIO to avoid it being split with dm_accpet_partial_bio() in
crypt_map(). get_max_request_size() is renamed to
get_max_request_sectors() to clarify the unit of the value returned
and its interface is changed to take a struct dm_target pointer and a
pointer to the struct bio being processed. In addition to this change,
to ensure that crypt_alloc_buffer() works correctly, set the dm-crypt
device max_hw_sectors limit to be at most
BIO_MAX_VECS << PAGE_SECTORS_SHIFT (1 MB with a 4KB page architecture).
This forces DM core to split write BIOs before passing them to
crypt_map(), and thus guaranteeing that dm-crypt can always accept an
entire write BIO without needing to split it.
This change does not have any effect on the read path of dm-crypt. Read
operations can still be split and the BIO fragments processed in
parallel. There is also no impact on the performance of the write path
given that all zone write BIOs were already processed inline instead of
in parallel.
This change also does not affect in any way regular dm-crypt block
devices. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: make fallback action and fallback decision atomic
Syzkaller reported the following splat:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7704 at net/mptcp/protocol.h:1223 __mptcp_do_fallback net/mptcp/protocol.h:1223 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7704 at net/mptcp/protocol.h:1223 mptcp_do_fallback net/mptcp/protocol.h:1244 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7704 at net/mptcp/protocol.h:1223 check_fully_established net/mptcp/options.c:982 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7704 at net/mptcp/protocol.h:1223 mptcp_incoming_options+0x21a8/0x2510 net/mptcp/options.c:1153
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 7704 Comm: syz.3.1419 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3-gbd5ce2324dba #20 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__mptcp_do_fallback net/mptcp/protocol.h:1223 [inline]
RIP: 0010:mptcp_do_fallback net/mptcp/protocol.h:1244 [inline]
RIP: 0010:check_fully_established net/mptcp/options.c:982 [inline]
RIP: 0010:mptcp_incoming_options+0x21a8/0x2510 net/mptcp/options.c:1153
Code: 24 18 e8 bb 2a 00 fd e9 1b df ff ff e8 b1 21 0f 00 e8 ec 5f c4 fc 44 0f b7 ac 24 b0 00 00 00 e9 54 f1 ff ff e8 d9 5f c4 fc 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 b8 f4 ff ff e8 8b 2a 00 fd e9 8d e6 ff ff e8 81 2a 00
RSP: 0018:ffff8880a3f08448 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8880180a8000 RCX: ffffffff84afcf45
RDX: ffff888090223700 RSI: ffffffff84afdaa7 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff888017955780 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff8880180a8910 R14: ffff8880a3e9d058 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00005555791b8500(0000) GS:ffff88811c495000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000110c2800b7 CR3: 0000000058e44000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
tcp_reset+0x26f/0x2b0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:4432
tcp_validate_incoming+0x1057/0x1b60 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5975
tcp_rcv_established+0x5b5/0x21f0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6166
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x5dc/0xa70 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1925
tcp_v4_rcv+0x3473/0x44a0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2363
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xba/0x480 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x2f1/0x500 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:317 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:311 [inline]
ip_local_deliver+0x1be/0x560 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254
dst_input include/net/dst.h:469 [inline]
ip_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:447 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:317 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:311 [inline]
ip_rcv+0x514/0x810 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:567
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x197/0x1e0 net/core/dev.c:5975
__netif_receive_skb+0x1f/0x120 net/core/dev.c:6088
process_backlog+0x301/0x1360 net/core/dev.c:6440
__napi_poll.constprop.0+0xba/0x550 net/core/dev.c:7453
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:7517 [inline]
net_rx_action+0xb44/0x1010 net/core/dev.c:7644
handle_softirqs+0x1d0/0x770 kernel/softirq.c:579
do_softirq+0x3f/0x90 kernel/softirq.c:480
</IRQ>
<TASK>
__local_bh_enable_ip+0xed/0x110 kernel/softirq.c:407
local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline]
inet_csk_listen_stop+0x2c5/0x1070 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1524
mptcp_check_listen_stop.part.0+0x1cc/0x220 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2985
mptcp_check_listen_stop net/mptcp/mib.h:118 [inline]
__mptcp_close+0x9b9/0xbd0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3000
mptcp_close+0x2f/0x140 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3066
inet_release+0xed/0x200 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:435
inet6_release+0x4f/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:487
__sock_release+0xb3/0x270 net/socket.c:649
sock_close+0x1c/0x30 net/socket.c:1439
__fput+0x402/0xb70 fs/file_table.c:465
task_work_run+0x150/0x240 kernel/task_work.c:227
resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xd4
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
__legitimize_mnt(): check for MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT should be under mount_lock
... or we risk stealing final mntput from sync umount - raising mnt_count
after umount(2) has verified that victim is not busy, but before it
has set MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT; in that case __legitimize_mnt() doesn't see
that it's safe to quietly undo mnt_count increment and leaves dropping
the reference to caller, where it'll be a full-blown mntput().
Check under mount_lock is needed; leaving the current one done before
taking that makes no sense - it's nowhere near common enough to bother
with. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "smb: client: fix TCP timers deadlock after rmmod"
This reverts commit e9f2517a3e18a54a3943c098d2226b245d488801.
Commit e9f2517a3e18 ("smb: client: fix TCP timers deadlock after
rmmod") is intended to fix a null-ptr-deref in LOCKDEP, which is
mentioned as CVE-2024-54680, but is actually did not fix anything;
The issue can be reproduced on top of it. [0]
Also, it reverted the change by commit ef7134c7fc48 ("smb: client:
Fix use-after-free of network namespace.") and introduced a real
issue by reviving the kernel TCP socket.
When a reconnect happens for a CIFS connection, the socket state
transitions to FIN_WAIT_1. Then, inet_csk_clear_xmit_timers_sync()
in tcp_close() stops all timers for the socket.
If an incoming FIN packet is lost, the socket will stay at FIN_WAIT_1
forever, and such sockets could be leaked up to net.ipv4.tcp_max_orphans.
Usually, FIN can be retransmitted by the peer, but if the peer aborts
the connection, the issue comes into reality.
I warned about this privately by pointing out the exact report [1],
but the bogus fix was finally merged.
So, we should not stop the timers to finally kill the connection on
our side in that case, meaning we must not use a kernel socket for
TCP whose sk->sk_net_refcnt is 0.
The kernel socket does not have a reference to its netns to make it
possible to tear down netns without cleaning up every resource in it.
For example, tunnel devices use a UDP socket internally, but we can
destroy netns without removing such devices and let it complete
during exit. Otherwise, netns would be leaked when the last application
died.
However, this is problematic for TCP sockets because TCP has timers to
close the connection gracefully even after the socket is close()d. The
lifetime of the socket and its netns is different from the lifetime of
the underlying connection.
If the socket user does not maintain the netns lifetime, the timer could
be fired after the socket is close()d and its netns is freed up, resulting
in use-after-free.
Actually, we have seen so many similar issues and converted such sockets
to have a reference to netns.
That's why I converted the CIFS client socket to have a reference to
netns (sk->sk_net_refcnt == 1), which is somehow mentioned as out-of-scope
of CIFS and technically wrong in e9f2517a3e18, but **is in-scope and right
fix**.
Regarding the LOCKDEP issue, we can prevent the module unload by
bumping the module refcount when switching the LOCKDDEP key in
sock_lock_init_class_and_name(). [2]
For a while, let's revert the bogus fix.
Note that now we can use sk_net_refcnt_upgrade() for the socket
conversion, but I'll do so later separately to make backport easy. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: mpi3mr: Fix corrupt config pages PHY state is switched in sysfs
The driver, through the SAS transport, exposes a sysfs interface to
enable/disable PHYs in a controller/expander setup. When multiple PHYs
are disabled and enabled in rapid succession, the persistent and current
config pages related to SAS IO unit/SAS Expander pages could get
corrupted.
Use separate memory for each config request. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: Ignore frags from uninitialized peer in dp.
When max virtual ap interfaces are configured in all the bands with
ACS and hostapd restart is done every 60s, a crash is observed at
random times.
In this certain scenario, a fragmented packet is received for
self peer, for which rx_tid and rx_frags are not initialized in
datapath. While handling this fragment, crash is observed as the
rx_frag list is uninitialised and when we walk in
ath11k_dp_rx_h_sort_frags, skb null leads to exception.
To address this, before processing received fragments we check
dp_setup_done flag is set to ensure that peer has completed its
dp peer setup for fragment queue, else ignore processing the
fragments.
Call trace:
ath11k_dp_process_rx_err+0x550/0x1084 [ath11k]
ath11k_dp_service_srng+0x70/0x370 [ath11k]
0xffffffc009693a04
__napi_poll+0x30/0xa4
net_rx_action+0x118/0x270
__do_softirq+0x10c/0x244
irq_exit+0x64/0xb4
__handle_domain_irq+0x88/0xac
gic_handle_irq+0x74/0xbc
el1_irq+0xf0/0x1c0
arch_cpu_idle+0x10/0x18
do_idle+0x104/0x248
cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x64
rest_init+0xd0/0xdc
arch_call_rest_init+0xc/0x14
start_kernel+0x480/0x4b8
Code: f9400281 f94066a2 91405021 b94a0023 (f9406401)
Tested-on: IPQ8074 hw2.0 AHB WLAN.HK.2.7.0.1-01744-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/rdmavt: add lock to call to rvt_error_qp to prevent a race condition
The documentation of the function rvt_error_qp says both r_lock and s_lock
need to be held when calling that function. It also asserts using lockdep
that both of those locks are held. However, the commit I referenced in
Fixes accidentally makes the call to rvt_error_qp in rvt_ruc_loopback no
longer covered by r_lock. This results in the lockdep assertion failing
and also possibly in a race condition. |
| JIT miscompilation in the JavaScript Engine: JIT component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 158, Firefox ESR 115.43, Firefox ESR 153.5, Thunderbird 158, and Thunderbird 153.5. |
| While investigating bug 60718, it was noticed that some calls to application listeners in Apache Tomcat 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.0.M17, 8.5.0 to 8.5.11, 8.0.0.RC1 to 8.0.41, and 7.0.0 to 7.0.75 did not use the appropriate facade object. When running an untrusted application under a SecurityManager, it was therefore possible for that untrusted application to retain a reference to the request or response object and thereby access and/or modify information associated with another web application. |
