| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: dwc: Avoid dwc_pcie_rasdes_debugfs_deinit() NULL dereference when no RAS DES capability
dwc_pcie_rasdes_debugfs_init() returns success when the controller has no
RAS DES capability, leaving pci->debugfs->rasdes_info unset. The common
debugfs teardown path still calls dwc_pcie_rasdes_debugfs_deinit(), which
dereferences rasdes_info unconditionally.
Return early when no RAS DES state was allocated. In that case no RAS DES
mutex was initialized, so there is nothing to destroy.
[mani: reworded subject] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/dasd: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
dasd_release_space() checks the implementation of the is_ese()
discipline function before calling it to determine if a given device is
an ESE DASD.
The current usage of the logical AND operator will lead to a NULL
pointer dereference as the function is called even if the function
pointer is NULL.
Fix this by using the logical OR operator. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: use proper context for logging
The same as the rest of the code, get_ss_info_from_atombios() uses
calc_pll_cs->ctx->logger for logging. But calc_pll_cs->ctx is
initialized only later in calc_pll_max_vco_construct(). Therefore, any
output using DC_LOG_SYNC() leads to a NULL pointer deference in
get_ss_info_from_atombios().
According to Sashiko, the very same problem exists in
dce112_get_pix_clk_dividers() and dcn3_get_pix_clk_dividers() too.
To avoid accessing the NULL context, use clk_src->base.ctx->logger
everywhere. That context in base is initialized earlier in
dce110_clk_src_construct() and dce112_clk_src_construct(). Before
get_ss_info_from_atombios() or Sashiko's get_pix_clk_dividers functions
above are actually called. This is done by redefining DC_LOGGER to
CTX->logger.
Before:
dce110_clk_src_construct() did:
-> sets clk_src->base.ctx = ctx;
-> ss_info_from_atombios_create()
-> get_ss_info_from_atombios() <- uses calc_pll_cs->ctx # BOOM
-> calc_pll_max_vco_construct() <- sets calc_pll_cs->ctx
After:
dce110_clk_src_construct() does:
-> sets clk_src->base.ctx = ctx;
-> ss_info_from_atombios_create()
-> get_ss_info_from_atombios() <- uses clk_src->base.ctx
(cherry picked from commit 6f16fcbb0c46a87e3d9685407e906573d60104b0) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_api: fix TOCTOU NULL deref on a->goto_chain
tcf_action_exec() handles TC_ACT_GOTO_CHAIN by first checking
rcu_access_pointer(a->goto_chain) and then calling
tcf_action_goto_chain_exec(), which does a second, independent
rcu_dereference_bh(a->goto_chain) read and immediately dereferences
chain->filter_chain. A concurrent tcf_action_set_ctrlact() (e.g. the gact
replace path) can clear a->goto_chain between the two reads, so the second
read returns NULL and tcf_action_goto_chain_exec() dereferences NULL.
Fix the race by doing a single rcu_dereference_bh() read of a->goto_chain
in tcf_action_exec(), checking it once for NULL, and passing the resulting
chain pointer into tcf_action_goto_chain_exec(). This turns the split
check/use into a single check/use on one value. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: conntrack: revert ct extension genid infrastructure
This infrastructure is not used anymore after moving ct timeout and
helper to use datapath refcount to track object use.
Revert commit c56716c69ce1 ("netfilter: extensions: introduce extension
genid count") this patch disables all ct extensions (leading to NULL)
for unconfirmed conntracks, when this is only targeted at ct helper and
ct timeout. There is also codebase that dereferences the ct extension
without checking for NULL which could lead to crash. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/rockchip: dw_dp: Fix null-ptr-deref in dw_dp_remove()
Attempting to access driver data in the platform driver ->remove()
callback may lead to a null pointer dereference since there is no
guaranty that the component ->bind() callback invoking
platform_set_drvdata() was executed.
A common scenario is when Rockchip DRM driver didn't manage to run
component_bind_all() because of an (unrelated) error causing early
return from rockchip_drm_bind().
Drop the unnecessary call to platform_get_drvdata() and, instead,
reference the target device structure via platform_device. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erofs: ensure valid f_path for page cache sharing
Previously, backing files for page cache sharing were set up with
f_path left as NULL (only f_inode was valid). It worked, but a recent
mincore fix relies on f_path.mnt and crashes (found by "erofs/028" on
7.2-rc4):
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 675528 Comm: fincore Not tainted 7.2.0-rc4-00002-g[]-dirty #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.16.0-4.al8 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__do_sys_mincore+0xc0/0x2c0
...
Specify valid paths using valid disconnected dentries together with
erofs_ishare_mnt instead of leaving f_path empty, so they are more
like real backing files in a pseudo filesystem and standard
backing_file_open() can be used directly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: cs40l50-vibra - validate custom data from user space
cs40l50_add() copies the custom data of an FF_PERIODIC/FF_CUSTOM effect
straight from the ff_effect the user passed to EVIOCSFF, without
requiring it to hold anything:
work_data.custom_data = memdup_array_user(periodic->custom_data,
periodic->custom_len,
sizeof(s16));
work_data.custom_len = periodic->custom_len;
The driver then reads two words out of that buffer: custom_data[0] as the
waveform bank in cs40l50_effect_bank_set(), and custom_data[1] as the
index within the bank in cs40l50_effect_index_set(). Neither read is
covered by a length check, and custom_len is fully user controlled:
- custom_len == 0 makes memdup_array_user() call memdup_user() with a
length of zero, which returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR rather than an error, so
custom_data[0] dereferences it.
- custom_len == 1 allocates two bytes. A bank of ROM or RAM keeps
effect->type out of the OWT case, and custom_data[1] is then read one
word past the allocation.
The bank value itself is also mishandled. It is masked with
CS40L50_CUSTOM_DATA_MASK (0xffff) but stored in an s16, so a
custom_data[0] of 0x8000 or above wraps to a negative value that passes
the "bank_type >= CS40L50_WVFRM_BANK_NUM" test.
cs40l50_effect_index_set() indexes vib->dsp.banks[] with it before the
switch statement's default case gets a chance to reject it:
base_index = vib->dsp.banks[effect->type].base_index;
max_index = vib->dsp.banks[effect->type].max_index;
Require the two words the driver reads to be present, and hold the masked
bank in a u32 so the existing upper-bound test covers the whole range.
The da7280 haptic driver already range checks custom_len this way. |
| Wazuh is an open-source security platform providing unified XDR and SIEM protection for endpoints and cloud workloads. In versions 4.0.0 through 4.14.6, a malicious or man-in-the-middle enrollment manager can crash a Wazuh agent during enrollment by returning a malformed key response with fewer than four fields, causing a NULL pointer dereference. The w_enrollment_process_agent_key() routine splits the manager-provided key into four space-separated fields but does not verify that all fields are present before passing them to validators. Because OS_StrBreak() leaves missing trailing entries as NULL and OS_IsValidName() calls strlen() on its argument without a NULL check, a response such as OSSEC K:'1' reaches OS_IsValidName(NULL) and terminates the agent process. Since Wazuh permits enrollment against an unverified manager when no CA certificate is configured, an attacker operating a rogue manager or intercepting the enrollment flow can deterministically crash agents, resulting in denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 4.14.7. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: check if dml21_add_phantom_plane() is successful
Verify that the phantom plane was allocated to avoid a later
segfault.
(cherry picked from commit 5adb54abe5a8e82cbff7f8806db30a5f4924329f) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pinctrl: spacemit: fix NULL check in spacemit_pin_set_config
spacemit_pin_set_config() looks up the per-pin descriptor with
spacemit_get_pin() then checks the wrong variable for failure:
const struct spacemit_pin *spin = spacemit_get_pin(pctrl, pin);
...
if (!pin)
return -EINVAL;
reg = spacemit_pin_to_reg(pctrl, spin->pin);
pin is an unsigned int pin id, where 0 (GPIO_0 / gmac0_rxdv on K3) is a
valid pin, so rejecting it here drops the PAD config write for the first
pin of every group. On K3 Pico-ITX the GMAC RGMII group lists pin 0 as
its first entry, so its drive-strength / bias configuration was silently
ignored.
The intended guard is against spacemit_get_pin() returning NULL when the
pin id isn't in the SoC's pin table. Check spin instead, which both
restores PAD setup for pin 0 and prevents a NULL deref on spin->pin. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ccp - Treat zero-length cert chain as query for blob lengths
When handling a PDH export, treat a zero-length userspace cert chain buffer
as a request to query the length of the relevant blobs. Failure to account
for the zero-length buffer trips a BUG_ON() when running with
CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y due to trying to get the physical address of the
ZERO_SIZE_PTR (returned by kzalloc() on the bogus allocation).
kernel BUG at arch/x86/mm/physaddr.c:28 !
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 30 UID: 0 PID: 28580 Comm: syz.2.18 Kdump: loaded
Tainted: G W 6.18.16-smp-DEV #1 NONE
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 12.62.0-0 11/19/2025
RIP: 0010:__phys_addr+0x16a/0x180 arch/x86/mm/physaddr.c:28
RSP: 0018:ffffc9008329fc80 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffffffff8179110a RBX: 0000778000000010 RCX: ffff8884e6992600
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000010 RDI: 0000778000000010
RBP: ffffc9008329fdf0 R08: 0000000000000dc0 R09: 00000000ffffffff
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff126d297 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: 1ffff92010653fc8 R14: 0000000080000010 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS: 0000555556bec9c0(0000) GS:ffff88aa4ce1c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fd3159e7000 CR3: 00000004fbc44000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
[<ffffffff853d3869>] sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export+0x559/0x7a0 drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2308
[<ffffffff853d1fdd>] sev_ioctl+0x2cd/0x480 drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2556
[<ffffffff82549ebc>] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:52 [inline]
[<ffffffff82549ebc>] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:598 [inline]
[<ffffffff82549ebc>] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:584
[<ffffffff8630115f>] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:64 [inline]
[<ffffffff8630115f>] do_syscall_64+0x9f/0xf40 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:98
[<ffffffff81000136>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7fd3158eac39
</TASK>
Thankfully, the bug is benign outside of CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y as getting
the physical address is just arithmetic, and the PSP errors out before
trying to write to the garbage address (which it must, otherwise querying
the blob lengths would clobber memory at pfn=0). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing/mmiotrace: Add NULL check for mmio_trace_array in logging functions
mmio_trace_rw() and mmio_trace_mapping() retrieve mmio_trace_array into
tr and pass it to __trace_mmiotrace_rw() and __trace_mmiotrace_map().
If these functions are invoked while mmio_trace_array is NULL (e.g. before
initialization or after disabled), accessing tr->array_buffer.buffer will
result in a NULL pointer dereference crash.
Fix this by adding an explicit NULL check for tr at the beginning of
__trace_mmiotrace_rw() and __trace_mmiotrace_map(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7996: Fix NULL pointer dereference in mt7996_init_tx_queues()
When MT76_NPU and CONFIG_NET_MEDIATEK_SOC_WED are enabled and
mt76 detects properly the Airoha NPU SoC, mt7996_init_tx_queues() will
dereference a NULL WED pointer.
Fix the issue by always passing the WED pointer from mt7996_dma_init(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
soc: xilinx: Fix race condition in event registration
The zynqmp_power driver registers handlers for suspend and subsystem
restart events using register_event(). However, the work structures
(zynqmp_pm_init_suspend_work and zynqmp_pm_init_restart_work) used by
these handlers were allocated and initialized after the registration
call.
This created a race window where, if the firmware triggered an event
immediately after registration but before allocation, the callback
(suspend_event_callback or subsystem_restart_event_callback) would
dereference a NULL pointer in work_pending(), leading to a crash.
Fix this by allocating and initializing the work structures before
registering the events. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ccp/sev-dev-tsm - bail out early when pdev->bus is NULL
dsm_create() initially checks pdev->bus when computing segment_id:
u8 segment_id = pdev->bus ? pci_domain_nr(pdev->bus) : 0;
But the next two lines unconditionally dereference pdev->bus via
pcie_find_root_port() and especially pci_dev_id(pdev), which expands
to PCI_DEVID(dev->bus->number, dev->devfn). If pdev->bus is in fact
NULL, segment_id is initialised to 0 but the very next statement
crashes the kernel.
smatch flags this:
drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev-tsm.c:253 dsm_create() error: we
previously assumed 'pdev->bus' could be null (see line 251)
Make the NULL handling consistent: if pdev->bus is NULL the device
has no PCI context to work with and SEV TIO setup cannot proceed,
so return -ENODEV before any of the bus-dependent lookups. The
remaining initialisation now runs only on the path where pdev->bus
is known to be valid.
No change for callers where pdev->bus is non-NULL, which is the
only case where dsm_create() did meaningful work before this change. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/amdxdna: Guard management mailbox channel cleanup against NULL pointer
The management mailbox channel cleanup helpers can be called from
error handling paths when mgmt_chann has already been destroyed.
Add NULL checks to xdna_mailbox_free_channel() and
xdna_mailbox_stop_channel() so the cleanup path safely returns instead
of dereferencing a NULL mailbox channel pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mtd: maps: vmu-flash: fix NULL pointer dereference in initialization
The mtd_info contains a struct device, which must be linked to its
parent. Without this, the initialization of the MTD fails with a NULL
pointer dereference. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "PCI/MSI: Unmap MSI-X region on error"
This reverts commit 1a8d4c6ecb4c81261bcdf13556abd4a958eca202.
Commit 1a8d4c6ecb4c ("PCI/MSI: Unmap MSI-X region on error") added an
iounmap(dev->msix_base) on the error path of msix_capability_init() to
release the MSI-X region when msix_setup_interrupts() fails.
When msix_setup_interrupts() fails, the call chain is:
msix_setup_interrupts()
-> __msix_setup_interrupts()
struct pci_dev *dev __free(free_msi_irqs) = __dev;
...
return ret; // __free cleanup fires on error
The __free(free_msi_irqs) cleanup calls pci_free_msi_irqs(), which
already handles the unmap:
void pci_free_msi_irqs(struct pci_dev *dev)
{
pci_msi_teardown_msi_irqs(dev);
if (dev->msix_base) {
iounmap(dev->msix_base); // already unmapped here
dev->msix_base = NULL; // and set to NULL
}
}
So dev->msix_base is unmapped and set to NULL before
msix_setup_interrupts() returns to msix_capability_init(). The
"goto out_unmap" introduced by commit 1a8d4c6ecb4c ("PCI/MSI: Unmap
MSI-X region on error") then calls iounmap() a second time on a NULL
pointer.
This was reproduced on Intel Emerald Rapids (192 CPUs) while
running tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_jump.sh:
WARNING: CPU#44 at iounmap+0x2a/0xe0
RIP: 0010:iounmap+0x2a/0xe0
RDI: 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
msix_capability_init+0x317/0x3f0
__pci_enable_msix_range+0x21d/0x2c0
pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity+0xa9/0x130
nvme_setup_io_queues+0x2a8/0x420 [nvme]
nvme_reset_work+0x151/0x340 [nvme]
...
RDI=0 confirms iounmap() is called with NULL.
Restore the original "goto out_disable" and leave the unmap to the
existing __free(free_msi_irqs) cleanup. |
| A NULL pointer dereference in the AMF NGAP Dispatcher component of free5gc v4.0.1 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via supplying crafted NGAP messages during the initialization of a new RAN connection. |
