| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: pm: kernel: drop pending ADD_ADDR when removing ID0
The in-kernel MPTCP path manager can leave a stale ADD_ADDR announcement
entry alive when removing the id 0 endpoint. This happens because the id 0
removal path does not tear down pending announcements, unlike the non-zero
id path.
When the PM later reselects id 0 after adding another signal endpoint, it
finds the stale anno_list entry and hits WARN_ON_ONCE(mptcp_pm_is_kernel())
in mptcp_pm_announced_alloc().
Root cause: asymmetry between removal paths.
- Non-zero id path: mptcp_nl_remove_subflow_and_signal_addr() calls
mptcp_pm_remove_announced() to clean up.
- Id 0 path: mptcp_nl_remove_id_zero_address() skips cleanup entirely.
Fix by making the id 0 path symmetric: call mptcp_pm_announced_remove()
and decrement add_addr_signaled before queuing the RM_ADDR.
Subtle detail: signal endpoints are stored in anno_list with port 0, but
msk_local carries the connection's local port. In other words, entries
linked to ID0 paths should have port == 0. A follow-up patch will ensure
that. mptcp_pm_announced_remove() uses use_port=true for comparison. So
clear the port before the lookup. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: syncookies: remember the request backup flag
Instead of using an uninitialised bit when copying the info in
subflow_ulp_clone().
To fix this, no need to extend the join_entry structure: backup is
coming from struct mptcp_subflow_request_sock, only one bit. Do the same
here by using one bit for both. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt_en: Propagate TPA buffer allocation failures in bnxt_queue_mem_alloc()
bnxt_alloc_one_tpa_info_data() returns -ENOMEM as soon as one allocation
fails. This leaves the remaining rxr->rx_tpa[] entries zeroed.
bnxt_queue_mem_alloc() discards that return value, so the partially
initialized ring is installed by bnxt_queue_start().
Since the agg_id is picked by the hardware and bnxt_alloc_agg_idx maps
it to a SW index in rxr->rx_tpa[], it is possible that an uninitialized
slot can be chosen which would hand a zero DMA address to the device.
Fix this by checking the return value of bnxt_alloc_one_tpa_info_data
and unwinding, freeing the ring buffers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt_en: Don't free the live ring's TPA state on queue restart failure
bnxt_queue_mem_alloc() shallow copies the live RX ring into the clone:
memcpy(clone, rxr, sizeof(*rxr));
the code currently clears pointers that the clone owns (such as
rx_agg_bmap), but rx_tpa and rx_tpa_idx_map are left pointing at memory
of the live ring that was cloned.
If an allocation failure happens later and the err_free_tpa_info label
is taken, the live ring's memory can be freed while still in use.
Fix this by initializing the clone's pointers to NULL to prevent live
ring state from being freed inadvertently. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: verisilicon: rockchip: reject AV1 frames exceeding the tile capacity
rockchip_vpu981_av1_dec_set_tile_info() indexes the tile group entry
array by tile1 * tile_cols + tile0, reading up to tile_cols * tile_rows
entries, lays out one descriptor per tile in the AV1_MAX_TILES tile_info
buffer, and programs the real tile_cols / tile_rows into the hardware.
The tile group entry control is a dynamic array sized to the number of
entries userspace submitted, independent of tile_cols / tile_rows, so a
frame that claims more tiles than entries reads past the array. A frame
that claims more than AV1_MAX_TILES tiles also leaves the hardware
programmed for more tiles than the descriptor buffer holds.
Reject both in prepare_run(): tile_cols * tile_rows must not exceed the
submitted entry count or AV1_MAX_TILES. The entry count is read via
v4l2_ctrl_find() (ctrl->elems). This mirrors the bound the mediatek AV1
decoder already enforces. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: verisilicon: rockchip: guard VPU981 AV1 divisor and tile buffer
rockchip_vpu981_av1_dec_set_tile_info() divides context_update_tile_id by
tile_info->tile_cols and writes one descriptor per tile into the tile_info
DMA buffer, which holds AV1_MAX_TILES entries; tile_cols and tile_rows
come from the bitstream. Guard the division against a zero tile_cols by
initialising the context-update values to zero and computing them only
when tile_cols is non-zero, and stop the descriptor writes once the
tile_info buffer is full. The tile geometry written to the hardware
registers is left unmodified; the per-dimension and total tile bounds are
enforced by the control validation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: mediatek: vcodec: bound AV1 tile-start copy to the array capacity
vdec_av1_slice_setup_tile() copies tile_cols + 1 / tile_rows + 1 entries
into mi_col_starts[] / mi_row_starts[] from the bitstream tile_info. Bound
the copy to the array capacity. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (gpio-fan) Fix use-after-free in alarm work
fan_alarm_irq_handler() queues fan_data->alarm_work, but nothing
cancels it. fan_alarm_notify() dereferences fan_data and its hwmon
device. On unbind, devres frees the interrupt, which only waits for
the handler itself, and then releases the hwmon device and fan_data,
so a pending fan_alarm_notify() can run after those frees.
Replace INIT_WORK() with devm_work_autocancel(), registered before
devm_request_irq(). The devres cleanup then frees the interrupt
first, so no new work can be queued, and cancels the work while
fan_data and the hwmon device are still alive.
This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
afs: Clear stale peer app data after address list changes
afs_fs_probe_fileserver() fetches the current endpoint state under
server->fs_lock, but leaves old_alist as NULL. Consequently,
afs_set_peer_appdata() treats every address list replacement as initial
setup and only binds the new peers; it never unbinds peers removed from
the old list.
An address refresh can therefore proceed as follows. CPU 0 replaces
server S's list and drops Pold without clearing Pold->app_data. The
server destroyer then clears only S's current peers and lets S reach its
RCU callback. After the callback frees S, CPU 1 handles a callback
through an RxRPC connection that still pins Pold, reads Pold->app_data,
and calls afs_use_server() on the freed object.
KASAN reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in afs_find_server+0x3c/0xa0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881013e1af0 by task krxrpcio/7001/74
Call Trace:
afs_find_server+0x3c/0xa0
afs_rx_new_call+0x15c/0x390
rxrpc_new_incoming_call+0x97c/0x1730
rxrpc_input_packet.constprop.0+0xd03/0xec0
rxrpc_io_thread+0x967/0x1640
Allocated by task 93:
afs_lookup_server+0x1a7/0x14c0
afs_alloc_server_list+0x43f/0xb60
afs_create_volume+0x923/0x1490
afs_get_tree+0x1c6/0x10a0
Freed by task 0:
kfree+0x131/0x3c0
rcu_core+0x50a/0x1850
Last potentially related work creation:
__call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x71/0xa10
afs_put_server+0x213/0x2b0
Preserve old->addresses for the peer app-data update so that removed
peers are cleared before the endpoint state is replaced. Also advance
both cursors when the old and new lists share a peer; activating the
old/new comparison without this would otherwise loop forever on the
shared entry. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mac802154: fix use-after-free of sdata via queued RX frames
The RX softirq producer ieee802154_subif_frame() queues received beacon
and MAC-command frames onto local->rx_beacon_list / rx_mac_cmd_list and
schedules a process-context worker, storing a raw mac_pkt->sdata (and
skb->dev == sdata->dev) with neither a reference nor any locking:
- the lists have no lock: the softirq producer list_add_tail()s while the
mac_wq worker list_del()s, so sibling interfaces on the same phy corrupt
the list;
- the workers dereference the interface after it may have been freed.
mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker() touches mac_pkt->sdata directly, and
mac802154_rx_beacon_worker() -> mac802154_process_beacon() dereferences
skb->dev (== sdata->dev). Removing an interface frees its sdata
(netdev_priv) while a queued frame still points at it, so a later worker
run is a use-after-free.
Reproduced under KASAN by flooding a victim interface with MAC command
frames and removing it (the beacon path is the same class via skb->dev):
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker+0x463/0x630 [mac802154]
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888002f9ea18 by task kworker/u8:1/31
Workqueue: phy0-mac-cmds mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker [mac802154]
Call Trace:
mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker+0x463/0x630 [mac802154]
process_one_work+0x611/0xe80
worker_thread+0x52e/0xdc0
kthread+0x30c/0x630
ret_from_fork+0x2fd/0x3e0
Fix both lists together:
- add local->rx_lock and take it around every list access: the softirq
producer (plain spin_lock, softirq context) and the workers and flush
(spin_lock_bh, process context);
- pin the interface for the lifetime of a queued frame with
netdev_hold()/netdev_put(), so the worker can safely dereference sdata /
skb->dev even while the interface is being removed;
- dequeue under the lock at the head and loop-drain the whole list in the
workers (they previously processed one frame per run and relied on a
later enqueue to drain the rest);
- drop not-yet-started frames of an interface before it is unregistered,
from ieee802154_if_remove() (after the RCU grace period) and from the
ieee802154_remove_interfaces() loop -- the latter is the whole-phy
teardown path, which does not go through ieee802154_if_remove().
An in-flight worker that already dequeued a frame keeps its own netdev
reference; unregister_netdevice() then waits it out in netdev_run_todo(),
which runs at rtnl_unlock() (rtnl released) and after the interface has
been closed, so it does not pin rtnl. A worker blocked in an association
TX only delays that one interface's unregister (the usual "waiting for %s
to become free"), it does not hold rtnl. netdev_hold() is used for this
reason instead of a cancel_work_sync() under rtnl, which would block on
the worker's unbounded MLME TX wait via ieee802154_sync_queue().
The mac-command worker additionally skips processing for a stopped
interface (ieee802154_sdata_running()), avoiding a needless association
response during teardown. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
inet: frags: invalidate queues before flushing them
fqdir_pre_exit() flushes the skbs from incomplete queues without
changing their completion state. A fragment which found a queue before
high_thresh was cleared can then acquire the queue lock and reuse stale
reassembly metadata. A queue concurrently killed after fqdir->dead is
set can instead become INET_FRAG_COMPLETE|INET_FRAG_HASH_DEAD while
still holding its old skbs; skipping it because it is complete leaves
those references behind until asynchronous fqdir teardown.
For IPv6, stale metadata can make ip6_frag_reasm() use the old
nhoffset with a new skb and access memory out of bounds. The resulting
heap corruption can be leveraged for local privilege escalation when
unprivileged network namespaces are available. Unflushed fragments can
also keep conntrack references alive after the conntrack per-net
cleanup point.
Kill each incomplete queue, then flush every queue still owned by the
dying rhashtable. HASH_DEAD identifies that ownership, while complete
queues without it are already owned by another destroy path and must be
left alone. Releasing a timer reference removed by inet_frag_kill() is
deferred to inet_frag_putn(), after the queue lock is dropped.
KASAN report:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ipv6_frag_rcv (net/ipv6/reassembly.c:289 (discriminator 2) net/ipv6/reassembly.c:229 (discriminator 2) net/ipv6/reassembly.c:391 (discriminator 2))
Write of size 1 at addr ff110001039c6e00 by task poc/771
Call Trace:
? ipv6_frag_rcv (net/ipv6/reassembly.c:289 (discriminator 2) net/ipv6/reassembly.c:229 (discriminator 2) net/ipv6/reassembly.c:391 (discriminator 2))
ipv6_frag_rcv (net/ipv6/reassembly.c:289 (discriminator 2) net/ipv6/reassembly.c:229 (discriminator 2) net/ipv6/reassembly.c:391 (discriminator 2))
ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:479 (discriminator 5))
ip6_input_finish (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:534)
ipv6_rcv (include/net/dst.h:480 (discriminator 3) net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:119 (discriminator 3) net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:109 (discriminator 3) include/linux/netfilter.h:325 (discriminator 3) include/linux/netfilter.h:319 (discriminator 3) net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:351 (discriminator 3))
packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3110 net/packet/af_packet.c:3142)
__x64_sys_sendmmsg (net/socket.c:2883 net/socket.c:2880 net/socket.c:2880)
The buggy address belongs to the object at ff110001039c6b40
which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 704
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 704-byte region [ff110001039c6b40, ff110001039c6e00)
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:423 (discriminator 1))
Read of size 1 at addr ff110001039c6e08 by task poc/771
Call Trace:
? ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:423 (discriminator 1))
ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:423 (discriminator 1))
ip6_input_finish (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:534)
ipv6_rcv (include/net/dst.h:480 (discriminator 3) net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:119 (discriminator 3) net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:109 (discriminator 3) include/linux/netfilter.h:325 (discriminator 3) include/linux/netfilter.h:319 (discriminator 3) net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:351 (discriminator 3))
packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3110 net/packet/af_packet.c:3142)
__x64_sys_sendmmsg (net/socket.c:2883 net/socket.c:2880 net/socket.c:2880)
packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:2959 net/packet/af_packet.c:3053 net/packet/af_packet.c:3142)
__x64_sys_sendmmsg (net/socket.c:2883 net/socket.c:2880 net/socket.c:2880)
The buggy address belongs to the object at ff110001039c6b40
which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 704
The buggy address is located 8 bytes to the right of
allocated 704-byte region [ff110001039c6b40, ff110001039c6e00) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: bound the policy rule dump by the caller's buffer size
mv88e6xxx_get_rxnfc() uses rxnfc->rule_cnt as the write index while
dumping the policy IDR, clobbering the input value before it has been
looked at. That input is the number of entries the caller had room for.
ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL requires no CAP_NET_ADMIN and the ioctl sizes the
buffer from the rule_cnt userspace passes in, so once an admin has
installed policy rules any user can ask for fewer slots than there are
rules and run off the end of the allocation. A rule_cnt of 0 leaves the
buffer pointer NULL and the walk dereferences it.
Count into a local so the caller's limit survives the walk, and stop with
-EMSGSIZE once it is reached. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: bcm_sf2: bound the CFP rule dump by the caller's buffer size
bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_get_all() walks the whole cfp.unique bitmap into
rule_locs[] without consulting nfc->rule_cnt, which is how many entries
the caller had room for. ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL requires no CAP_NET_ADMIN
and the ioctl sizes the buffer from the rule_cnt userspace passes in, so
once an admin has installed CFP rules any user can ask for fewer slots
than there are rules and run off the end of the allocation. A rule_cnt
of 0 leaves the buffer pointer NULL and the walk dereferences it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mlxsw: spectrum_ptp: Fix napi_gro_receive() call from GC workqueue context
Currently mlxsw_sp1_ptp_ht_gc_collect() is run from the PTP
garbage-collection workqueue, rather than the NAPI poll context. For any
unmatched PTP entries carrying an SKB, it calls
mlxsw_sp1_ptp_unmatched_finish() -> mlxsw_sp1_ptp_packet_finish(). For
ingress packets, this calls mlxsw_sp_rx_listener_no_mark_func(). The end
of that function is the following:
skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, skb->dev);
napi_gro_receive(mlxsw_skb_cb(skb)->rx_md_info.napi, skb);
The napi pointer is one that was placed in the SKB control block when the
trapped packet was received in the NAPI context. Later, when the GC reaps
the unmatched entry (up to MLXSW_SP1_PTP_HT_GC_TIMEOUT later), the call to
napi_gro_receive() mutates the NAPI instance's GRO list, which is unsafe
if the poll is running concurrently on another CPU.
In mlxsw_sp1_ptp_ht_gc_collect(), local_bh_disable() is called to prevent
softirq processing, but this only applies to the local CPU. Additionally,
its comment is stale. It states that mlxsw_sp1_ptp_unmatched_finish()
invokes netif_receive_skb(). This has not been accurate since the
referenced commit; this patch makes that comment accurate again.
mlxsw_pci_napi_devs_init() calls netif_threaded_enable() on the NAPI RX
net_device without any conditions. The NAPI instance's poll, which may be
running concurrent to the GC, is running as an independently-scheduled
kthread which may be on a different CPU. The call to local_bh_disable()
does not guard against this.
If a tx-timestamp timeout produces an unmatched entry (which can be easily
reproduced by running ptp4l and waiting for a port to reach the
UNCALIBRATED/SLAVE state) while the owning NAPI thread is in the middle of
a poll on another CPU, both sides mutate the GRO list concurrently, as
shown below:
[39.846] port 1 (swp1): MASTER to UNCALIBRATED on RS_SLAVE
list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev (ffff8d620faf4138), but was ffff8d624150f700. (next=ffff8d620faf4138).
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:29!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 539 Comm: napi/mlxsw_rx-0 Not tainted 6.18.48 #1-NixOS PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: Mellanox Technologies Ltd. MSN2410/VMOD0001, BIOS 4.6.5 09/13/2018
RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0x79/0xb0
RSP: 0018:ffffcdf8c0f27c08 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000075 RBX: ffff8d624150fd00 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8d6315d1e540
RBP: ffff8d620faf4070 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffffdfff
R10: ffffffffa5c60fe0 R11: ffffcdf8c0f27ab8 R12: 0000000000000003
R13: 000000000000003d R14: 00000000000001bc R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8d636f63f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000562689a60c24 CR3: 000000015f224004 CR4: 00000000001726f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
gro_receive_skb+0xee/0x230
mlxsw_sp1_ptp_got_packet+0x61/0x140 [mlxsw_spectrum]
mlxsw_core_skb_receive+0xdf/0x1b0 [mlxsw_core]
mlxsw_pci_napi_poll_cq_rx+0x780/0x9d0 [mlxsw_pci]
__napi_poll+0x31/0x1e0
napi_threaded_poll_loop+0x16b/0x1c0
napi_threaded_poll+0x71/0xa0
kthread+0xfb/0x260
ret_from_fork+0x22d/0x260
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
The machinery that leads to this kernel panic has not been changed between
6.18.48 and mainline.
This patch adds an ingress-delivery helper for the PTP packet_finish()
path that calls netif_receive_skb() instead of napi_gro_receive().
netif_receive_skb(), unlike napi_gro_receive(), can be called from outside
of the NAPI instance's poll context, which can occur at the call site for
this path. RX stats accounting and the skb->dev assignment are still
preserved; the only change is the delivery call itself.
This removes GR
---truncated--- |
| A flaw was found in crun. When the container configuration does not give /dev a dedicated mount, terminal setup can redirect /dev/console onto an attacker-controlled path, including via the read-only-rootfs bind-mount fallback. Affected versions are crun 1.29.1 and earlier. Default configurations that mount a fresh /dev are not exposed. No fixed release is available yet. |
| BusyBox passwd/group tokenize() references a stale endpoint pointer after trimming, causing an out-of-bounds write of heap pointers. |
| BusyBox dpkg read_package_field() steps past a NUL terminator on malformed .deb packages, causing an out-of-bounds heap read. |
| BusyBox httpd treats yescrypt ($y$) password hashes as plaintext during Basic Authentication, inverting the authentication check. |
| BusyBox httpd IP deny rules with invalid CIDR prefix lengths fail open, leaving a parsed IP with a zeroed mask so the rule matches no clients. |
| Horilla is an HR and CRM software. Prior to 2.0.0, approve_validate_attendance_request at /attendance/approve-validate-attendance-request/ changes attendance_validated, is_validate_request_approved, approved_by, and related pending-request state through an HTTP GET before calling attendance.save(), so Django does not require CSRF validation for the action. An unauthenticated attacker can cause a logged-in manager with attendance.change_attendance to make a top-level request that carries the manager's SameSite=Lax session cookie, silently approving attendance with the victim's privileges and attributing the approval to the victim in the audit trail. This issue is fixed in version 2.0.0. |
