| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/srp: fix heap information leak on a truncated SRP_CRED_REQ
srp_recv_done() passes wc->byte_len to srp_process_rsp(). It passes
nothing to srp_process_cred_req() and srp_process_aer_req(), which read
fixed-size fields from the receive buffer without checking that those
fields were received.
The buffer size is max_ti_iu_len, which comes from the login response
and is not validated. A target that advertises 8 and then sends an
8-byte SRP_CRED_REQ makes the initiator read req->tag from beyond the
end of the buffer. req->tag is copied into the SRP_CRED_RSP and sent
back, so those bytes reach the target. SRP_AER_REQ behaves the same way
and also reads req->lun.
The leak is 8 bytes per response. max_ti_iu_len also decides which slab
cache the buffer comes from. With 8 the buffer is a kmalloc-8 object and
the read is entirely outside it:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in srp_recv_done+0x172b/0x1aa0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888104714da8 by task kworker/u8:3/50
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 8-byte region [ffff888104714da0, ffff888104714da8)
Without KASAN the returned bytes are whatever is next in the slab. One
run returned ".strtab".
rsp->data[3] in srp_process_rsp() has the same problem: only
resp_data_len is checked before it is read.
Drop a request that is shorter than the structure being parsed, and
check byte_len before the tsk_mgmt read. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ARM: 9481/2: breakpoint: CFI breakpoints only on demand
This removes the stub hw_breakpoint_cfi_handler() from ARM, making
it not steal breakpoint type 0x03 (ARM_ENTRY_CFI_BREAKPOINT) unless
CFI is actively used in the kernel.
When not instrumenting with CFI, or when a breakpoint is issued in
userspace, we fall through to return 1 from hw_breakpoint_pending()
"unhandled fault" so userspace can make use of this breakpoint.
Tested with LKDTM and this command line:
echo CFI_FORWARD_PROTO > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
still works as expected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ARM: 9483/1: select HAVE_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK
Commit c6e61c06d606 ("ARM: 9463/1: Allow to enable RT") enabled PREEMPT_RT
on ARM but did not select HAVE_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK. This leaves
CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK disabled, so CPU timers expire in hard
IRQ context.
On PREEMPT_RT this makes run_posix_cpu_timers() take the sleeping
sighand->siglock:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at spinlock_rt.c:48
rt_spin_lock from lock_task_sighand
lock_task_sighand from run_posix_cpu_timers
run_posix_cpu_timers from update_process_times
ARM handles TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME on all return-to-user paths, including v7-M.
ARM32 KVM host support was removed by commit 541ad0150ca4 ("arm: Remove
32bit KVM host support"), so the select need not be conditional on KVM.
Select it to defer POSIX CPU timer expiry to task context.
Reproduced with setrlimit(RLIMIT_CPU, ...) and a busy loop. The same path
is used by setitimer(ITIMER_PROF or ITIMER_VIRTUAL) and POSIX CPU timers
created with timer_create(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ARM: 9484/1: enable interrupts when unhandled user faults are triggered
PREEMPT_RT requires interrupts to be enabled when sending signals.
When do_DataAbort()/do_PrefetchAbort() triggers unhandled user faults,
that is `inf->fn()` return a non-zero value, and the interrupts are not
enabled within the hook function, force_sig_fault() will be called
with interrupts disabled.
This can be triggered by user programs executing the bkpt instruction,
with kernel config CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS=n.
Enable interrupts in do_DataAbort()/do_PrefetchAbort() when unhandled
user faults are triggered to fix the issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ARM: 9485/1: mm: acquire mmap write lock around show_pte() for user faults
When CONFIG_DEBUG_USER=y, and cmdline "user_debug=31" is set,
a user fault may trigger show_pte() without any lock.
If another thread in the same process concurrently calls munmap(),
the page table pages may be freed while show_pte() is still traversing
them, causing a use-after-free in show_pte().
If CONFIG_ARM_LPAE=y, this may cause a kernel panic if the pages table
of PMD are freed when show_pte() is running.
Acquire mmap_write_lock() around show_pte() for user faults to fix the
contention.
For user faults, additionally restrict that show_pte() is called only
when the addr is a user-space address (addr < TASK_SIZE). This is because
the lock of tsk->mm only protects the virtual memory of user address space,
furthermore, dumping the page tables of a kernel-space address for user
faults is unnecessary and may have security implications.
Keep everything unchanged for kernel faults, because the kernel is
already in the "oops" state, acquiring a lock may risk a deadlock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: synchronize heartbeat callbacks with o2net teardown
Patch series "ocfs2: harden heartbeat teardown races".
This series fixes two OCFS2 heartbeat/o2net teardown races found by
KASAN.
This patch (of 2):
Heartbeat callbacks stay registered while configfs local-node teardown
enters o2net_stop_listening(). A node-down event can still run through
o2net_disconnect_node() and o2net_set_nn_state() while teardown is
destroying o2net_wq, so the later queue/flush operations can hit a dead
workqueue. KASAN has caught this as a slab-use-after-free in
__queue_work() with the call chain:
KASAN slab-use-after-free in __queue_work+0x56/0xa90
Read of size 4
Call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0
print_report+0xce/0x630
__queue_work+0x56/0xa90
srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
__virt_addr_valid+0x19f/0x330
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
__queue_delayed_work+0x58/0x1e0
queue_delayed_work_on+0xb4/0xc0
o2net_set_nn_state+0x467/0x840
o2net_disconnect_node+0x7b/0xe0
o2net_hb_node_down_cb+0x54/0x60
o2hb_run_event_list+0x236/0x2d0
o2hb_check_slot+0xad4/0xbc0
lock_release+0xc8/0x290
o2hb_check_slot+0x9ea/0xbc0
trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x130
o2hb_do_disk_heartbeat+0x646/0xb30 (fs/ocfs2/cluster/heartbeat.c:1079)
__lock_acquire+0x466/0x2260
lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xea/0x1a0
ktime_get_with_offset+0xe9/0x230
o2hb_thread+0x14e/0x770
kthread+0x1ad/0x1f0
ret_from_fork+0x3c9/0x540
__switch_to+0x2e9/0x730
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Allocated by task stack:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
__kmalloc_noprof+0x292/0x760
__alloc_workqueue+0x736/0xc60
alloc_workqueue_noprof+0xb1/0x110
o2net_start_listening+0xe5/0x430
o2nm_node_local_store+0x184/0x310
configfs_write_iter+0x18a/0x210
vfs_write+0x469/0x810
ksys_write+0xd2/0x170
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task stack:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80
kfree+0x313/0x590
rcu_core+0x4f4/0x1320
handle_softirqs+0x156/0x660
queue_delayed_work_on
o2net_set_nn_state
o2net_disconnect_node
o2net_hb_node_down_cb
o2hb_run_event_list
Keep heartbeat callbacks registered so quorum state still tracks node
state, but stop them from driving o2net reconnect/disconnect work once
local teardown starts. Mark the transport offline before destroying
o2net_wq, wait for any in-flight heartbeat callback to finish, and delay
bring-up replay until the new local node is published through
o2nm_this_node().
The replay also has to stay serialized with heartbeat callback delivery.
Otherwise a live-node snapshot can be copied, a real hb_down callback
can install -ENOTCONN for a peer, and the stale replay can call
o2net_hb_node_up() for that same peer and queue reconnect work even
though heartbeat is already down.
The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order
within that path:
local-node teardown: heartbeat node-down callback:
1. configfs local-off enters 1. o2hb_run_event_list() invokes
o2net_stop_listening(). o2net_hb_node_down_cb().
2. teardown heads for 2. the callback reaches
destroy_workqueue(o2net_wq). o2net_disconnect_node() and
o2net_set_nn_state().
3. teardown destroys and NULLs 3. the callback flushes or queues
o2net_wq. work through o2net_wq. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: o2hb: quiesce negotiate handlers and timeout work
Heartbeat regions publish struct o2hb_region as the private data for the
NEGO_TIMEOUT and NEGO_APPROVE o2net handlers as soon as make_item()
creates the configfs region. The approve handler can call
o2hb_arm_timeout(), so a peer can touch the region timeout work before
dev_store() has finished building the heartbeat runtime, or after teardown
has started to shut that runtime back down.
The final configfs put also has to keep reg alive until the last in-flight
o2net callback drops its handler reference.
o2net_unregister_handler_list() blocks future handler lookups, but it does
not wait for sc_rx_work that already passed o2net_handler_get(). That
drain needs to cover local listener teardown as well, where the o2net
ordered workqueue may already be inside destroy_workqueue().
Fix the lifetime rule in both directions. Initialize the region delayed
works before publishing reg through the o2net handler table, keep new or
stopping regions non-armable with hr_stopping, and quiesce both delayed
works on failed-start and teardown paths even when no heartbeat thread is
left to call o2hb_disarm_timeout(). Then unregister handlers before
tearing down handler-visible region state and make the drain wait for the
active or destroying o2net ordered workqueue before release frees reg.
The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order
within that path:
region lifecycle: late negotiate callback:
1. make_item() registers the 1. o2net_process_message() gets a
region handlers before heartbeat handler for reg.
dev_store() has built a 2. The callback runs after the lookup
runnable heartbeat context. lock is dropped and dereferences reg.
2. A failed start or rmdir 3. An approve or timeout path tries to
stops the heartbeat thread, queue reg's delayed work, or release
quiesces existing work, and races the callback body after handler
drops the final configfs ref. unregister.
3. region_release() must drain 4. The callback or delayed work can
handler-visible o2net rx work outlive reg unless lifecycle code
before freeing reg. keeps the region non-armable and
drains the active-or-destroying
o2net workqueue.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN slab-use-after-free in __run_timers+0x22c/0x5b0
Write of size 8
Call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0
print_report+0xce/0x630
__run_timers+0x22c/0x5b0
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x27/0x60
try_to_wake_up+0x191/0xf70
timer_expire_remote+0xae/0xf0
run_timer_softirq+0x19b/0x1a0
handle_softirqs+0x156/0x660
__irq_exit_rcu+0xc4/0x160
irq_exit_rcu+0xe/0x20
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6c/0x80
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20
Allocated by task stack:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
o2hb_heartbeat_group_make_item+0x3c/0x600 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Clear buf on error in __bpf_get_task_stack
Both bpf_get_task_stack and bpf_get_task_stack_sleepable helpers that
use __bpf_get_task_stack have buf defined as ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM
argument and we should initialize the buf on every return path.
Adding missing buf memset for __bpf_get_task_stack fail paths. This
provides deterministic buffer contents, which is useful when the buffer
is used directly as a map key. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix sleepable check for tracing/lsm prog
When CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION is disabled, a sleepable tracing prog
is allowed to attach to '__x64_'-alike prefix symbols.
It is because the verifier does not verify whether the symbol is a kernel
function or a bpf prog. That said, a sleepable tracing prog is allowed to
attach to a bpf prog target whose name has '__x64_'-alike prefix.
For example, a sleepable fentry prog attaches to a '__x64_sys_nop' XDP
prog, and copies buffer from a user pointer with bpf_copy_from_user()
helper. After attaching the XDP prog to lo interface, the kernel BUG
could be triggered by 'ping -c 1 -W 1 127.0.0.1':
[ 3.460756] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:1324
Fix it by disallowing sleepable prog always when its target
btf is not a kernel's btf. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/sun4i: tcon: Drop TCON TOP device reference
of_find_device_by_node() takes a device reference. Drop it after mux
configuration succeeds. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/sun4i: crtc: Propagate layer initialization error
sun4i_crtc_init() returns plain NULL when layer initialization fails,
while all its other error paths return an error pointer. The only
caller, sun4i_tcon_bind(), checks the result with IS_ERR() and happily
continues with tcon->crtc set to NULL. sun4i_rgb_init() and
sun4i_lvds_init() then dereference it in drm_crtc_mask(), which
oopses.
Return the error pointer instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cpufreq: imx6q: fix devres accumulation across driver rebind
imx6_soc_volt is allocated with devm_kcalloc(cpu_dev, ...), where cpu_dev
is the CPU device from get_cpu_device(0). That device is never unbound, so
its devres list is never released, and imx6q_cpufreq_remove() does not free
the array either. Every probe therefore adds an allocation that stays for
the lifetime of the system.
Allocate against the platform device instead. Its devres is released when
the driver is unbound, which is exactly the lifetime the array wants:
imx6q_set_target() reads it, and nothing may reach that after
cpufreq_unregister_driver().
That makes the array actually go away on unbind, so also clear the
file-scope pointer in remove and on the failed-probe path, rather than
leave it pointing at memory devres is about to release.
Tested by rebinding the driver on qemu's mcimx6ul-evk. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cpufreq: imx6q: fix out-of-bounds write when probed more than once
imx6_soc_volt is allocated fresh on every probe, sized to the number of
ARM OPPs:
imx6_soc_volt = devm_kcalloc(cpu_dev, num, sizeof(*imx6_soc_volt),
GFP_KERNEL);
but it is filled through soc_opp_count, which has static storage and is
never reset. A second bind after an unbind keeps indexing from where the
first one stopped, and writes past the end of the new array.
Unbinding and rebinding the driver on qemu's mcimx6ul-evk, under KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in imx6q_cpufreq_probe+0x3b0/0xa34
Write of size 4 at addr c5e90480 by task binder/73
imx6q_cpufreq_probe from platform_probe+0x88/0xe4
platform_probe from really_probe+0x108/0x384
bind_store from kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1b4/0x28c
The write lands one u32 past the end of the allocation.
soc_opp_count is only read a few lines below the loop that fills it, so it
never needed static storage. Make it a local. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/isert: delay the final Login Response until the session is registered
isert_put_login_tx() puts the final Login Response on the wire before
__transport_register_session(), which iscsi_post_login_handler() reaches
only after iscsi_target_do_login() returns. An initiator that issues a
SCSI command as soon as it sees that response can have it executed against
an se_session whose se_tpg is still NULL, and the ib-comp-wq worker oopses
on the NULL dereference.
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000f: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000078-0x000000000000007f]
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 178 Comm: kworker/0:1H Not tainted 7.2.0-rc5-V2CTL-gf5098b6bae76 #10 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Workqueue: ib-comp-wq ib_cq_poll_work
RIP: 0010:target_submit+0xbe/0x390
Code: fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 89 02 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 64 24 18 49 8d 7c 24 78 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 5a 02 00 00 48 8d 7b 78 4d 8b 6c 24 78 48 b8 00
RSP: 0018:ffff8881058cfa78 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88810c78c6f0 RCX: ffffffff964bb363
RDX: 000000000000000f RSI: 00000000fffffe00 RDI: 0000000000000078
RBP: 1ffff11020b19f52 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1020b19f52
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffff88810596c000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff88810c61b000 R14: ffff88810c6a3400 R15: ffff88810c61b044
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881822b2000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f1f1b83c000 CR3: 000000006fe72001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_bh+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_target_submit+0x10/0x10
? mutex_lock+0x81/0xe0
? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
? iscsit_execute_cmd+0x650/0x850
iscsit_sequence_cmd+0x186/0x3d0
iscsit_process_scsi_cmd+0x87/0x300
isert_recv_done+0x1002/0x2390
? __pfx_isert_recv_done+0x10/0x10
? rxe_poll_cq+0x253/0x3d0
? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x1dc/0xa70
__ib_process_cq+0xe1/0x390
ib_cq_poll_work+0x46/0x150
process_one_work+0x633/0x1030
? assign_work+0x11d/0x370
worker_thread+0x45b/0xd10
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x2c6/0x3b0
? recalc_sigpending+0x15c/0x1e0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x36e/0x5a0
? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10
? __switch_to+0x572/0xdd0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Delay the final Login Response instead. isert_get_rx_pdu() runs from
iscsi_target_rx_thread() after conn->rx_login_comp, completed by
iscsi_post_login_handler() after __transport_register_session(); iscsi-TCP
and cxgbit already take PDUs from that thread, isert alone does not. The
buffers are still posted first, so the initiator's first command does not
meet an empty receive queue and nothing depends on RNR flow control, and
the header and payload live in isert_conn, not in the struct iscsi_login
that iscsi_target_nego_release() frees first.
Over rxe, 400 login cycles per run, the oops appeared in 10 of 20
unpatched runs and in none of 20 runs with this patch. An
initiator that never waits is handled by the next patch.
Not tested: iWARP, discovery sessions over iSER, and real HCAs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/isert: post the full-feature receive buffers after session registration
isert_put_login_tx() posts the full-feature receive buffers before
__transport_register_session() runs, so an initiator that does not wait
for the final Login Response can still have a SCSI command executed
against an se_session whose se_tpg is NULL - the same oops as the
previous patch, at target_submit+0xbe.
Post them from isert_get_rx_pdu(), which the previous patch already uses
to send that response, and post them before that send: the receive queue
is filled at the moment the initiator is told it may use it. Allocating
there keeps the existing property that a memory allocation failure cannot
happen once the final Login Response is on the wire.
The receive queue is already empty between the final Login Request and
isert_post_recvm(); this moves the second point later, from a median of
92 us to 172 us over 1200 logins. Only an initiator that sends before it
has been told to can reach that window, and on IB and RoCE its send is
retried there until the buffers appear - isert_rdma_accept() asks for
rnr_retry_count = 7. iWARP has no RNR flow control, so there the same
send terminates the connection instead.
Measured over rxe, 400 login cycles per run, with an initiator that does
not wait: an instrumented build counted no entries to isert_recv_done()
before the buffers are posted in 10 runs, where that initiator oopsed
8 of 10 unpatched runs and 5 of 10 with only the previous patch.
Not tested: iWARP, discovery sessions over iSER, and real HCAs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/siw: Fix use-after-free in siw_accept()
siw_accept() looks up the QP supplied by userspace. If that QP is
already in RTS, the function jumps to error cleanup before associating
the incoming CEP with it.
The cleanup tests whether qp->cep is non-NULL and assumes the current
call installed the association. However, qp->cep can point to the CEP
of an existing connection. The cleanup then drops a reference from the
incoming cep, not qp->cep. Once the incoming endpoint loses its
remaining references, this can free it before the subsequent cep->qp
store, causing a use-after-free. It also clears the existing QP
association.
Only release the association reference when qp->cep is the incoming
CEP. This preserves an existing association and avoids accessing the
freed endpoint. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
module/dups: Fix use-after-free in kmod_dup_req lifetime handling
The kmod dups code uses RCU to ensure that a kmod_dup_req instance is freed
only after it is no longer referenced. When releasing an instance, the
kmod_dup_request_delete() function removes the kmod_dup_req from the
dup_kmod_reqs list, waits via synchronize_rcu() and finally frees it.
However, this doesn't work correctly because parallel users referencing the
instance in kmod_dup_request_exists_wait() don't enter an RCU read-side
critical section. This can result in a use-after-free.
The kmod_dup_request_exists_wait() function may need to hold a valid
reference to a kmod_dup_req instance across a blocking wait until the
corresponding modprobe command completes. This makes it unsuitable for RCU.
Fix the issue by changing the lifecycle management of kmod_dup_req to use
reference counting. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: hibernate: Restore DAIF state on error
Sashiko AI has reported that if swsusp_mte_save_tags() for some reason
fails we return from swsusp_arch_suspend() with DAIF being masked -
that is not what we'd expect. Restore the saved DAIF state before
returning from the error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Resize MST HDCP per-connector arrays to 32
AMDGPU_DM_MAX_DISPLAY_INDEX is 31. It suggest a maximum number of
32 connectors. But the way it's used is like MAX_DISPLAY_COUNT.
Hence we're off by one with DRM core, which supports a max of 32
connectors.
Rename AMDGPU_DM_MAX_DISPLAY_INDEX to AMDGPU_DM_MAX_DISPLAY_COUNT
to match its actual use, and increase the size to 32 to match the
originally intended size. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
phy: renesas: rcar-gen2: Fix double of_node_put on phy creation failure
for_each_child_of_node_scoped() releases the node reference on scope
exit, so the explicit of_node_put(np) in the devm_phy_create() error
path drops it twice.
Drop the redundant of_node_put() and let the scoped cleanup handle it. |
