| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vmwgfx: drop dma_buf reference on foreign-fd prime import
ttm_prime_fd_to_handle() returns -ENOSYS when the imported fd's
dma_buf->ops do not match the ttm_object_device's ops, but does so
without releasing the reference acquired by dma_buf_get(). Any
unprivileged renderD client passing a non-vmwgfx prime fd through the
DRM_VMW_GB_SURFACE_REF{,_EXT} path leaks one dma_buf reference per
call and indefinitely pins the foreign exporter's GEM resources.
Funnel the error path through the existing dma_buf_put() so the
reference is always dropped. |
| A maliciously created executable, when executed on the victim's machine, may allow a local low-privileged attacker to inject unauthenticated IPC messages into named pipes, modify pipe permissions or ownership, and potentially impact confidentiality, integrity, and availability. |
| laravel-backup-restore restores database backups made with spatie/laravel-backup. Prior to version 1.9.4, a crafted backup archive can trigger OS command injection during database restore. This issue has been patched in version 1.9.4. |
| A maliciously crafted input, when processed by the Autodesk Installer IPC frame parser, may trigger improper validation of an input-specified position or offset, resulting in an out-of-range substring operation. A malicious actor may leverage this vulnerability to cause the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM service to terminate unexpectedly, resulting in a denial-of-service condition. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erofs: cap LZMA stream pool size
fs/erofs/decompressor_lzma.c sizes the module-global MicroLZMA stream
pool from num_possible_cpus() when the lzma_streams module parameter is
unset, then z_erofs_load_lzma_config() preallocates one image-supplied
dictionary per stream, accepting dictionaries up to 8 MiB. On high-CPU
systems, a small EROFS image can pin hundreds of MiB of vmalloc-backed
decoder state until the erofs module is unloaded.
Impact: An EROFS image mounted by the system can pin up to 8 MiB of
vmalloc memory per LZMA stream, either as intended or unexpectedly.
Bound the default stream count by a new
CONFIG_EROFS_FS_ZIP_LZMA_DEFAULT_MAX_STREAMS option, default 16, so the
worst-case default preallocation is 128 MiB if the number of CPUs is no
less than 16 while preserving the existing per-image dictionary limit.
An explicit lzma_streams module parameter is still honoured as-is, so
administrators who deliberately size the pool are not affected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/hugetlb: fix swap entry corruption when clearing uffd-wp at fork()
copy_hugetlb_page_range() clears the uffd-wp bit of migration and hwpoison
entries with huge_pte_clear_uffd_wp(), which operates on the present-PTE
bit position. Swap entries keep the uffd-wp state elsewhere -- the
migration branch reads and sets it with pte_swp_uffd_wp() and
pte_swp_mkuffd_wp() -- and the present-PTE position falls into the swap
payload. On x86-64 it lands in the inverted swap offset, where a
naturally-aligned hugetlb PFN always has the affected bit set, so the
clear advances the encoded PFN by two pages.
No userfaultfd needs to be involved: the clear is guarded only by the
child VMA not being uffd-wp registered, so a plain fork() with an
in-flight hugetlb migration entry (or a poisoned hugetlb page) corrupts
the entry copied into the child. Instrumenting the clear and forking
after MADV_HWPOISON on a 2MB anon hugetlb page shows:
offset before=120e00
offset after =120e02
The fallout is mostly latent: rmap walks match migration entries by folio
range and remove_migration_pte() rebuilds the PTE from the folio, so a
within-folio PFN skew heals once migration completes. But any path that
re-encodes the corrupted offset -- e.g. hugetlb_change_protection()
rewriting a writable migration entry via
make_readable_migration_entry(swp_offset(entry)) -- propagates it.
Migration entries legitimately carry uffd-wp, so clear it with
pte_swp_clear_uffd_wp(), matching copy_nonpresent_pte() and
move_huge_pte().
A hwpoison entry, on the other hand, never carries the uffd-wp bit: it is
installed fresh by make_hwpoison_entry() (try_to_unmap_one() does not
preserve uffd-wp on the hwpoison path) and hugetlb_change_protection()
leaves hwpoison entries untouched. There was nothing to clear there, only
the corruption, so drop the clear entirely. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mshv: Fix race in mshv_irqfd_deassign
mshv_irqfd_deactivate() and the hlist traversal of pt_irqfds_list
require pt->pt_irqfds_lock to be held, but mshv_irqfd_deassign()
omits it. This races with the EPOLLHUP path in mshv_irqfd_wakeup(),
which does take the lock before calling mshv_irqfd_deactivate().
Additionally, mshv_irqfd_deactivate() uses hlist_del() which poisons
the node pointers rather than resetting them. Since
mshv_irqfd_is_active() relies on hlist_unhashed() (checks pprev ==
NULL), a poisoned node still appears active. If a concurrent path calls
mshv_irqfd_deactivate() again on the same irqfd, the guard fails to
prevent a double hlist_del() on poisoned pointers.
Fix both issues:
- Add the missing spin_lock_irq/spin_unlock_irq around the list
traversal in mshv_irqfd_deassign(), matching mshv_irqfd_release().
- Use hlist_del_init() instead of hlist_del() so the node is properly
marked as unhashed after removal, making the is_active guard reliable. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/tls: Fail tls_sw_splice_read() after a failed async decrypt
When an async decrypt fails, tls_decrypt_done() records the error in
ctx->async_wait.err and calls tls_err_abort(), which stores it in
sk_err. tls_sw_recvmsg() and tls_sw_read_sock() each read
async_wait.err once they hold the reader lock and fail the call: a
record that did not authenticate breaks the connection.
tls_sw_splice_read() has no such check, and sk_err does not stand in
for one. tls_rx_rec_wait() tests sk_err only inside the loop it
skips whenever a record is already parsed, and the first reader to
reach sock_error() clears it, while async_wait.err persists. A
splice therefore keeps delivering records on a connection that
recvmsg() and read_sock() refuse to read.
Read async_wait.err in tls_sw_splice_read() as the other two readers
do. |
| The base directory (spring.cloud.config.server.svn.basedir) used by the Spring Cloud Config Server to clone SVN repositories to is susceptible to time-of-check-time-of-use (TOCTOU) attacks.
Spring Cloud Config 5.0.0 - 5.0.4
Spring Cloud Config 4.3.0 - 4.3.4
Spring Cloud Config 4.0.0 - 4.2.8
Spring Cloud Config 3.1.14 and earlier |
| nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. From version 0.6.0 to before version 0.7.2, non-admin operators (role user) can set allow_private: true on their own managed webhook subscription (POST/PATCH /api/v1/webhook-subscriptions). No admin check exists on this field. At delivery time, allow_private switches the dispatcher to an unguarded HTTP client, bypassing the private/loopback/link-local SSRF guard — letting a low-privilege operator make the server request internal addresses. This issue has been patched in version 0.7.2. |
| nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.7.1, revocation is the only in-band mechanism that isolates a compromised/offboarded host from a Nebula mesh. Because the blocklist never reaches any peer's config.yml, a Blocked host retains full overlay reachability to every peer under its CA (and internal services on the mesh) for up to 30d (agent) / 365d (mobile). An attacker who exfiltrates host.key+host.crt can run stock slackhq/nebula directly, ignore the agent's 403/410 poll responses, and stay connected after the operator revokes the host. Operator-visible state (UI shows blocked, audit log records it) is misleading. This issue has been patched in version 0.7.1. |
| nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. From version 0.3.0 to before version 0.5.0, the nebula-mgmt Web UI host-creation path ignores both the server-wide enrollment_token_ttl security setting and per-network network_config.enrollment_token_ttl overrides. API host creation and token-regeneration paths use the configured TTL resolver, but POST /ui/hosts hardcodes now.Add(24 * time.Hour) for newly minted agent enrollment tokens. In deployments that intentionally reduce enrollment-token lifetime, any authenticated operator who can create a host through the Web UI can still mint a bearer enrollment token valid for about 24 hours. This issue has been patched in version 0.5.0. |
| Missing Authentication for Critical Function vulnerability in Spring Spring Cloud Config allows Webhook requests to Spring Cloud Config Server's /monitor endpoint are not validated.
This issue affects Spring Cloud Config: from 5.0.0 through 5.0.4, from 4.3.0 through 4.3.4, from 4.0.0 through 4.2.8, and through 3.1.14. |
| nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. From version 0.2.0 to before version 0.5.0, when OIDC is enabled, GET /ui/oidc/login is reachable without authentication and is registered outside the Web UI rate-limited auth routes. Every request creates a fresh random OIDC state value and stores it in an in-memory map for 10m. Expired states are swept lazily, but there is no rate limit or maximum live-state cap on the allocation path. An unauthenticated remote client can therefore grow OIDC.states for the full state TTL, bounded by request throughput rather than by configured auth rate limits. This issue has been patched in version 0.5.0. |
| nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.3.8, the web handler renderMobileBundle passes the real *pki.CAResolver directly into mobilebundle.Build. Inside Build, resolver.LoadByID decrypts the CA's ed25519 private key into a *pki.CAManager, but Build never calls CAManager.Wipe() on any return path. As a result, when a mobile-bundle request goes through the web UI and Build returns — especially on error (missing network, invalid prefix, DB error, signing failure) — the plaintext CA private key remains on the Go heap, unwiped, until garbage collection. An attacker able to read process memory (core dump, swap, memory-scraping) can recover the CA signing key, which would allow minting arbitrary host certificates for the mesh. The API handler already does this correctly: it loads the CAManager, defer caMgr.Wipe(), and wraps it in caManagerResolver. Only the web path is affected. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.8. |
| nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.3.8, Operator session tokens are stored in plaintext in the operator_sessions table (the token column is the PRIMARY KEY). The session token is a 32-byte random hex value sent directly in a cookie and valid for 24 hours. Anyone who can read the database (backup, snapshot, file copy, or SQL-level disclosure) obtains every active session token and can hijack operator sessions directly, with no further authentication. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.8. |
| nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.3.7, two related authorization gaps let a host that should no longer be trusted obtain a fresh, valid Nebula certificate, because nebula-mgmt does not re-evaluate revocation/authorization state at certificate issuance time — only at poll time. Firstly, the blocklist is not enforced at sign / re-enroll time. internal/api/enroll.go:128 calls caMgr.Sign(...) without consulting the blocklist. The blocklist is only checked in the poll path (internal/api/updates.go:57, fingerprintInBlocklist). The blocklist is keyed by certificate fingerprint (internal/store/sqlite.go), so a re-enrollment produces a new fingerprint that is not in the blocklist. Secondly, renewal does not re-validate operator / CA status. Auto-renewal at poll time (internal/api/updates.go:285-319, signHostCert) reads host.Name, host.Groups, host.NebulaIPs from the DB and re-signs without checking whether the owning operator is still active or the CA still valid. DisableOperator (internal/store/sqlite_operators.go) revokes sessions and API keys but does not retire the operator's CAs, and pki/signer.go checks only CA cert time-expiry, not operator/CA status. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.7. |
| Flowise before 3.1.4 fails to validate chatflow visibility in the unauthenticated text-to-speech endpoint, allowing attackers to abuse private chatflow TTS credentials. Unauthenticated attackers can generate unlimited text-to-speech audio using stored OpenAI or ElevenLabs API keys by providing a valid chatflow UUID, incurring costs on the chatflow owner's account. |
| Flowise before 3.1.3 contains a sandbox escape vulnerability in the vm2 JavaScript sandbox that allows authenticated users to execute arbitrary code by exploiting moment locale validation bypass. Attackers can craft a fake String object with a match function that bypasses path traversal checks to load and execute malicious JavaScript files stored in the document store outside the sandbox. |
| Applications using AesBytesEncryptor with the two-argument constructor or when passing a null IV generator and CBC as the encryption mode encrypt data with AES/CBC using a null (all-zero) initialization vector.
Spring Security 7.1.0
Spring Security 7.0.0 - 7.0.6
Spring Security 6.5.0 - 6.5.11
Spring Security 6.4.0 - 6.4.18
Spring Security 5.8.0 - 5.8.27
Spring Security 5.7.0 - 5.7.25 |
