| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| An issue was discovered in MM in Samsung Mobile Processor, Wearable Processor, and Modem Exynos 980, 990, 850, 2100, 1280, 2200, 1330, 1380, 1480, 2400, 1580, W920, W930, W1000, Modem 5123, and Modem 5300. Incorrect handling of 5G NR NAS registration accept messages leads to a Denial of Service. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: iptfs: only publish mode_data after clone setup
iptfs_clone_state() stores x->mode_data before allocating the reorder
window. If that allocation fails, the code frees the cloned state and
returns -ENOMEM, leaving x->mode_data pointing at freed memory.
The xfrm clone unwind later runs destroy_state() through x->mode_data,
so the failed clone path tears down IPTFS state that clone_state()
already freed.
Keep the cloned IPTFS state private until all allocations succeed so
failed clones leave x->mode_data unset. The destroy path already
handles a NULL mode_data pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ip6t_rt: reject oversized addrnr in rt_mt6_check()
Reject rt match rules whose addrnr exceeds IP6T_RT_HOPS.
rt_mt6() expects addrnr to stay within the bounds of rtinfo->addrs[].
Validate addrnr during rule installation so malformed rules are rejected
before the match logic can use an out-of-range value. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_netem: fix out-of-bounds access in packet corruption
In netem_enqueue(), the packet corruption logic uses
get_random_u32_below(skb_headlen(skb)) to select an index for
modifying skb->data. When an AF_PACKET TX_RING sends fully non-linear
packets over an IPIP tunnel, skb_headlen(skb) evaluates to 0.
Passing 0 to get_random_u32_below() takes the variable-ceil slow path
which returns an unconstrained 32-bit random integer. Using this
unconstrained value as an offset into skb->data results in an
out-of-bounds memory access.
Fix this by verifying skb_headlen(skb) is non-zero before attempting
to corrupt the linear data area. Fully non-linear packets will silently
bypass the corruption logic. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
openvswitch: defer tunnel netdev_put to RCU release
ovs_netdev_tunnel_destroy() may run after NETDEV_UNREGISTER already
detached the device. Dropping the netdev reference in destroy can race
with concurrent readers that still observe vport->dev.
Do not release vport->dev in ovs_netdev_tunnel_destroy(). Instead, let
vport_netdev_free() drop the reference from the RCU callback, matching
the non-tunnel destroy path and avoiding additional synchronization
under RTNL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
openvswitch: validate MPLS set/set_masked payload length
validate_set() accepted OVS_KEY_ATTR_MPLS as variable-sized payload for
SET/SET_MASKED actions. In action handling, OVS expects fixed-size
MPLS key data (struct ovs_key_mpls).
Use the already normalized key_len (masked case included) and reject
non-matching MPLS action key sizes.
Reject invalid MPLS action payload lengths early. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv6: flowlabel: defer exclusive option free until RCU teardown
`ip6fl_seq_show()` walks the global flowlabel hash under the seq-file
RCU read-side lock and prints `fl->opt->opt_nflen` when an option block
is present.
Exclusive flowlabels currently free `fl->opt` as soon as `fl->users`
drops to zero in `fl_release()`. However, the surrounding
`struct ip6_flowlabel` remains visible in the global hash table until
later garbage collection removes it and `fl_free_rcu()` finally tears it
down.
A concurrent `/proc/net/ip6_flowlabel` reader can therefore race that
early `kfree()` and dereference freed option state, triggering a crash
in `ip6fl_seq_show()`.
Fix this by keeping `fl->opt` alive until `fl_free_rcu()`. That matches
the lifetime already required for the enclosing flowlabel while readers
can still reach it under RCU. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: avoid OGM aggregation when skb tailroom is insufficient
When OGM aggregation state is toggled at runtime, an existing forwarded
packet may have been allocated with only packet_len bytes, while a later
packet can still be selected for aggregation. Appending in this case can
hit skb_put overflow conditions.
Reject aggregation when the target skb tailroom cannot accommodate the new
packet. The caller then falls back to creating a new forward packet
instead of appending. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: krb5enc - fix async decrypt skipping hash verification
krb5enc_dispatch_decrypt() sets req->base.complete as the skcipher
callback, which is the caller's own completion handler. When the
skcipher completes asynchronously, this signals "done" to the caller
without executing krb5enc_dispatch_decrypt_hash(), completely bypassing
the integrity verification (hash check).
Compare with the encrypt path which correctly uses
krb5enc_encrypt_done as an intermediate callback to chain into the
hash computation on async completion.
Fix by adding krb5enc_decrypt_done as an intermediate callback that
chains into krb5enc_dispatch_decrypt_hash() upon async skcipher
completion, matching the encrypt path's callback pattern.
Also fix EBUSY/EINPROGRESS handling throughout: remove
krb5enc_request_complete() which incorrectly swallowed EINPROGRESS
notifications that must be passed up to callers waiting on backlogged
requests, and add missing EBUSY checks in krb5enc_encrypt_ahash_done
for the dispatch_encrypt return value.
Unset MAY_BACKLOG on the async completion path so the user won't
see back-to-back EINPROGRESS notifications. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_uac1_legacy: validate control request size
f_audio_complete() copies req->length bytes into a 4-byte stack
variable:
u32 data = 0;
memcpy(&data, req->buf, req->length);
req->length is derived from the host-controlled USB request path,
which can lead to a stack out-of-bounds write.
Validate req->actual against the expected payload size for the
supported control selectors and decode only the expected amount
of data.
This avoids copying a host-influenced length into a fixed-size
stack object. |
| Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor vulnerability in Apache Wicket.
This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.0.0 through 8.17.0, from 9.0.0 through 9.22.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.8.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 10.9.0, which fixes the issue. |
| A vulnerability was determined in osrg GoBGP up to 4.3.0. Affected by this vulnerability is the function parseRibEntry of the file pkg/packet/mrt/mrt.go. Executing a manipulation can lead to integer underflow. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. Upgrading to version 4.4.0 addresses this issue. This patch is called 76d911046344a3923cbe573364197aa081944592. It is suggested to upgrade the affected component. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: validate num_aces and harden ACE walk in smb_inherit_dacl()
smb_inherit_dacl() trusts the on-disk num_aces value from the parent
directory's DACL xattr and uses it to size a heap allocation:
aces_base = kmalloc(sizeof(struct smb_ace) * num_aces * 2, ...);
num_aces is a u16 read from le16_to_cpu(parent_pdacl->num_aces)
without checking that it is consistent with the declared pdacl_size.
An authenticated client whose parent directory's security.NTACL is
tampered (e.g. via offline xattr corruption or a concurrent path that
bypasses parse_dacl()) can present num_aces = 65535 with minimal
actual ACE data. This causes a ~8 MB allocation (not kzalloc, so
uninitialized) that the subsequent loop only partially populates, and
may also overflow the three-way size_t multiply on 32-bit kernels.
Additionally, the ACE walk loop uses the weaker
offsetof(struct smb_ace, access_req) minimum size check rather than
the minimum valid on-wire ACE size, and does not reject ACEs whose
declared size is below the minimum.
Reproduced on UML + KASAN + LOCKDEP against the real ksmbd code path.
A legitimate mount.cifs client creates a parent directory over SMB
(ksmbd writes a valid security.NTACL xattr), then the NTACL blob on
the backing filesystem is rewritten to set num_aces = 0xFFFF while
keeping the posix_acl_hash bytes intact so ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr()'s
hash check still passes. A subsequent SMB2 CREATE of a child under
that parent drives smb2_open() into smb_inherit_dacl() (share has
"vfs objects = acl_xattr" set), which fails the page allocator:
WARNING: mm/page_alloc.c:5226 at __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x46c/0x9c0
Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work
__alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x46c/0x9c0
___kmalloc_large_node+0x68/0x130
__kmalloc_large_node_noprof+0x24/0x70
__kmalloc_noprof+0x4c9/0x690
smb_inherit_dacl+0x394/0x2430
smb2_open+0x595d/0xabe0
handle_ksmbd_work+0x3d3/0x1140
With the patch applied the added guard rejects the tampered value
with -EINVAL before any large allocation runs, smb2_open() falls back
to smb2_create_sd_buffer(), and the child is created with a default
SD. No warning, no splat.
Fix by:
1. Validating num_aces against pdacl_size using the same formula
applied in parse_dacl().
2. Replacing the raw kmalloc(sizeof * num_aces * 2) with
kmalloc_array(num_aces * 2, sizeof(...)) for overflow-safe
allocation.
3. Tightening the per-ACE loop guard to require the minimum valid
ACE size (offsetof(smb_ace, sid) + CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE) and
rejecting under-sized ACEs, matching the hardening in
smb_check_perm_dacl() and parse_dacl().
v1 -> v2:
- Replace the synthetic test-module splat in the changelog with a
real-path UML + KASAN reproduction driven through mount.cifs and
SMB2 CREATE; Namjae flagged the kcifs3_test_inherit_dacl_old name
in v1 since it does not exist in ksmbd.
- Drop the commit-hash citation from the code comment per Namjae's
review; keep the parse_dacl() pointer. |
| A security vulnerability has been detected in TRENDnet TEW-821DAP 1.12B01. Impacted is the function auto_update_firmware of the component Firmware Udpate. The manipulation of the argument str leads to buffer overflow. The attack may be initiated remotely. The vendor explains: "That firmware version will only work on our hardware version v1.xR. We have already EOL that product 8 years ago and are no longer selling". This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer. |
| A flaw was found in InstructLab. The `linux_train.py` script hardcodes `trust_remote_code=True` when loading models from HuggingFace. This allows a remote attacker to achieve arbitrary Python code execution by convincing a user to run `ilab train/download/generate` with a specially crafted malicious model from the HuggingFace Hub. This vulnerability can lead to complete system compromise. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: convert inline data to extents when truncate exceeds inline size
Add a check in ext4_setattr() to convert files from inline data storage
to extent-based storage when truncate() grows the file size beyond the
inline capacity. This prevents the filesystem from entering an
inconsistent state where the inline data flag is set but the file size
exceeds what can be stored inline.
Without this fix, the following sequence causes a kernel BUG_ON():
1. Mount filesystem with inode that has inline flag set and small size
2. truncate(file, 50MB) - grows size but inline flag remains set
3. sendfile() attempts to write data
4. ext4_write_inline_data() hits BUG_ON(write_size > inline_capacity)
The crash occurs because ext4_write_inline_data() expects inline storage
to accommodate the write, but the actual inline capacity (~60 bytes for
i_block + ~96 bytes for xattrs) is far smaller than the file size and
write request.
The fix checks if the new size from setattr exceeds the inode's actual
inline capacity (EXT4_I(inode)->i_inline_size) and converts the file to
extent-based storage before proceeding with the size change.
This addresses the root cause by ensuring the inline data flag and file
size remain consistent during truncate operations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: publish jinode after initialization
ext4_inode_attach_jinode() publishes ei->jinode to concurrent users.
It used to set ei->jinode before jbd2_journal_init_jbd_inode(),
allowing a reader to observe a non-NULL jinode with i_vfs_inode
still unset.
The fast commit flush path can then pass this jinode to
jbd2_wait_inode_data(), which dereferences i_vfs_inode->i_mapping and
may crash.
Below is the crash I observe:
```
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000000010beb47f4
PGD 110e51067 P4D 110e51067 PUD 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 4850 Comm: fc_fsync_bench_ Not tainted 6.18.0-00764-g795a690c06a5 #1 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.17.0-2-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:xas_find_marked+0x3d/0x2e0
Code: e0 03 48 83 f8 02 0f 84 f0 01 00 00 48 8b 47 08 48 89 c3 48 39 c6 0f 82 fd 01 00 00 48 85 c9 74 3d 48 83 f9 03 77 63 4c 8b 0f <49> 8b 71 08 48 c7 47 18 00 00 00 00 48 89 f1 83 e1 03 48 83 f9 02
RSP: 0018:ffffbbee806e7bf0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 000000000010beb4 RBX: 000000000010beb4 RCX: 0000000000000003
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000002000300000 RDI: ffffbbee806e7c10
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000002000300000 R09: 000000010beb47ec
R10: ffff9ea494590090 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000002000300000
R13: ffffbbee806e7c90 R14: ffff9ea494513788 R15: ffffbbee806e7c88
FS: 00007fc2f9e3e6c0(0000) GS:ffff9ea6b1444000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000010beb47f4 CR3: 0000000119ac5000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
filemap_get_folios_tag+0x87/0x2a0
__filemap_fdatawait_range+0x5f/0xd0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __schedule+0x3e7/0x10c0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? preempt_count_sub+0x5f/0x80
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? cap_safe_nice+0x37/0x70
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? preempt_count_sub+0x5f/0x80
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors+0x12/0x40
ext4_fc_commit+0x697/0x8b0
? ext4_file_write_iter+0x64b/0x950
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? preempt_count_sub+0x5f/0x80
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? vfs_write+0x356/0x480
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? preempt_count_sub+0x5f/0x80
ext4_sync_file+0xf7/0x370
do_fsync+0x3b/0x80
? syscall_trace_enter+0x108/0x1d0
__x64_sys_fdatasync+0x16/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x62/0x2c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
...
```
Fix this by initializing the jbd2_inode first.
Use smp_wmb() and WRITE_ONCE() to publish ei->jinode after
initialization. Readers use READ_ONCE() to fetch the pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Buffer overflow in drivers/xen/sys-hypervisor.c
The build id returned by HYPERVISOR_xen_version(XENVER_build_id) is
neither NUL terminated nor a string.
The first causes a buffer overflow as sprintf in buildid_show will
read and copy till it finds a NUL.
00000000 f4 91 51 f4 dd 38 9e 9d 65 47 52 eb 10 71 db 50 |..Q..8..eGR..q.P|
00000010 b9 a8 01 42 6f 2e 32 |...Bo.2|
00000017
So use a memcpy instead of sprintf to have the correct value:
00000000 f4 91 51 f4 dd 00 9e 9d 65 47 52 eb 10 71 db 50 |..Q.....eGR..q.P|
00000010 b9 a8 01 42 |...B|
00000014
(the above have a hack to embed a zero inside and check it's
returned correctly).
This is XSA-485 / CVE-2026-31786 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: save ailp before dropping the AIL lock in push callbacks
In xfs_inode_item_push() and xfs_qm_dquot_logitem_push(), the AIL lock
is dropped to perform buffer IO. Once the cluster buffer no longer
protects the log item from reclaim, the log item may be freed by
background reclaim or the dquot shrinker. The subsequent spin_lock()
call dereferences lip->li_ailp, which is a use-after-free.
Fix this by saving the ailp pointer in a local variable while the AIL
lock is held and the log item is guaranteed to be valid. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xen/privcmd: fix double free via VMA splitting
privcmd_vm_ops defines .close (privcmd_close), but neither .may_split
nor .open. When userspace does a partial munmap() on a privcmd mapping,
the kernel splits the VMA via __split_vma(). Since may_split is NULL,
the split is allowed. vm_area_dup() copies vm_private_data (a pages
array allocated in alloc_empty_pages()) into the new VMA without any
fixup, because there is no .open callback.
Both VMAs now point to the same pages array. When the unmapped portion
is closed, privcmd_close() calls:
- xen_unmap_domain_gfn_range()
- xen_free_unpopulated_pages()
- kvfree(pages)
The surviving VMA still holds the dangling pointer. When it is later
destroyed, the same sequence runs again, which leads to a double free.
Fix this issue by adding a .may_split callback denying the VMA split.
This is XSA-487 / CVE-2026-31787 |
