| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In Eclipse Ditto versions 3.0.0 to 3.9.6, the Things service fetches WoT (Web of Things) ThingModels over HTTP from URLs supplied by API users in the definition field of a Thing or Feature, without validating the target host, and follows HTTP redirects without re-validating the redirect target and without a hop limit. An authenticated user who is permitted to create a Thing, or who holds WRITE permission on an existing Thing, can thereby cause the Things service to issue arbitrary HTTP GET requests from inside the deployment's network — including to cloud instance-metadata endpoints and other internal services — and can use the differing error responses returned to the caller to enumerate internal services. Versions 2.4.0 to 2.5.x contain the same code, but are only affected where the operator explicitly enabled the WoT integration feature toggle, which is disabled by default in those versions. |
| Net::DNS versions before 1.57 for Perl allow memory exhaustion via unbounded recursion in sig_data when re-encoding a message with a misplaced TSIG record.
sig_data signs a message by re-encoding it, and removes TSIG records only from the additional section. A TSIG decoded into the answer or authority section survives that step and is signed again, so encoding re-enters sig_data with no termination condition. Decoding does not reject such a message: a TSIG that is not the last record on the wire raises "misplaced or corrupt TSIG", but the error is caught, reported as a warning, and the record is left in the packet. RFC 8945 section 5.2 requires the message to be dropped.
The recursion is reached only when the decoded TSIG carries an empty MAC, since a MAC recovered from the wire short-circuits the signing step. It is reached only from code that re-encodes a message it decoded, such as a forwarder or a proxy. A decoded message that is never re-encoded is unaffected. Message direction does not matter: a query reaches the same path as a response.
Each cycle re-encodes the whole message, so fewer than 100 bytes on the wire exhaust available memory and terminate the process. |
| llama.cpp b5693 and before is vulnerable to Uncontrolled Recursion in common/json-schema-to-grammar.cpp, resulting in a denial of service. |
| Uncontrolled Recursion (CWE-674) in Elasticsearch can lead to denial of service via Serialized Data with Nested Payloads (CAPEC-230). An authenticated user holding only read privileges on a single index can submit one specially crafted search request whose deeply nested structure is processed without a depth limit, exhausting the thread stack and terminating the affected node. |
| Elasticsearch does not apply its configurable input length restriction to a user-supplied pattern accepted by an intervals query. Compiling a deeply nested pattern drives unbounded recursion that exhausts the thread stack and raises a fatal error, terminating the Elasticsearch node process and causing a denial of service for that node. An authenticated user holding only read-only privileges on a single searchable index can trigger the condition with one small search request. |
| A flaw in Elasticsearch allows an authenticated user with the privileges required to invoke the simulate pipeline API endpoint (https://www.elastic.co/docs/api/doc/elasticsearch/operation/operation-ingest-simulate) to submit a request that causes a self-referential data structure to be created. When a specific internal component later processes that structure, the operation recurses without bound and raises a fatal error that is not handled by the surrounding execution path, terminating the affected node process and resulting in a denial of service. |
| A flaw in Elasticsearch allows a low-privileged authenticated user to submit a single request containing a crafted user-supplied input. A specific internal component validates the input using a recursive routine and applies no bound to the length of the value being validated, so the validation causes the thread to exhaust its stack. The resulting fatal error is not handled by the surrounding execution paths and terminates the affected node process, producing a denial of service. |
| Uncontrolled Recursion (CWE-674) in the Elasticsearch wildcard matching helper can lead to a denial of service via Excessive Allocation (CAPEC-130). The matcher used to resolve wildcard patterns against names is implemented recursively and had no bound on recursion depth or on the total number of match operations performed. A search request containing a wildcard pattern with a large number of wildcard groups, evaluated against a sufficiently long name, exhausts the thread stack. Elasticsearch treats a stack overflow as an unrecoverable condition and shuts the node down, so the request terminates the affected node rather than failing gracefully. |
| The BLOCKED access control list items that are evaluated to deny access on the the proxy protocol port can be bypassed completely when connecting over TCP or TLS and sending the query twice on connection that is kept open. |
| Uncontrolled Recursion (CWE-674) in Elasticsearch can lead to denial of service via Input Data Manipulation (CAPEC-153). An authenticated user holding only low-privileged index creation permissions can submit a single request containing a specially crafted, malformed custom analysis definition that is resolved recursively without a cycle or depth check, exhausting the thread stack and terminating the affected node. |
| An attacker that has valid credentials can send crafted compressed data that causes the affected process to exhaust its stack and crash. The affected process is terminated, which can cause degradation or denial of service for IMAP. Update to non-vulnerable version. No publicly available exploits are known. |
| A denial-of-service (DoS) vulnerability exists in google.protobuf.json_format.ParseDict() in Python, where the max_recursion_depth limit can be bypassed when parsing nested google.protobuf.Any messages.
Due to missing recursion depth accounting inside the internal Any-handling logic, an attacker can supply deeply nested Any structures that bypass the intended recursion limit, eventually exhausting Python’s recursion stack and causing a RecursionError. |
| NLTK before 3.10.3 contains an uncontrolled recursion vulnerability in nltk.featstruct.FeatStructReader that allows unauthenticated attackers to cause a denial of service by supplying deeply nested feature-structure input. Attackers can craft trivial payloads with nested brackets that exceed Python's recursion limit and raise an unhandled RecursionError, crashing applications that parse user-supplied feature structures or feature grammars. |
| A flaw has been found in BareBones BBEdit up to 15.5.5. Impacted is an unknown function of the component Java Language Module. This manipulation causes uncontrolled recursion. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. Upgrading to version 16.0 is recommended to address this issue. You should upgrade the affected component. |
| Uncontrolled Recursion vulnerability in Samsung Open Source rlottie allows Serialized Data with Nested Payloads.
This issue affects rlottie: before 8de0d9e6ca80ffef654965505981727b9fa06a51. |
| Uncontrolled Recursion vulnerability in ash-project ash_oban allows a user who can drive a trigger's on_error action to fail on the final attempt to exhaust worker CPU and memory, denying service.
The generated worker's atomic handle_error/4 runs the trigger's on_error action on a job's final attempt inside a rescue that, when the action itself raises, calls handle_error/4 again with the same job. The job's attempt still equals max_attempts, so it re-enters the same clause and re-runs the failing action, with no exit. Any deterministic on_error failure (a data-layer outage, a misconfigured action, or a record the action rejects) loops forever; because the recursive call is not in tail position, each iteration retains a formatted stacktrace and the process heap grows without bound while the failing statement is re-issued against the data layer until the runtime kills the worker.
This issue affects ash_oban: from 0.8.0-rc.1 before 0.8.14. |
| Net::DNS versions through 1.55 for Perl allow Denial of Service via deep DNS compression pointer chains.
Net::DNS::DomainName::decode follows RFC 1035 compression pointers by recursing into itself with no depth limit. It is possible to construct a name which saturates the call stack (at least with larger TCP responses), leading to a potential Denial of Service.
The guard `$link < $offset` prevents forward and circular chains, but still allows arbitrarily long backward chains. The per-offset cache (`$cache`) is populated at the start of each call and short-circuits only re-traverses of the same offset - the initial descent through a fresh chain still recurses at full depth.
A crafted packet can chain two-byte compression pointers so that each one points two bytes earlier than the previous, producing a chain length of `offset / 2`. For the 14-bit pointer field (max offset 16383) this gives up to ~8191 recursive frames. For a TCP DNS message the limit is the 16-bit length field (~32767 frames). Perl's default C stack handles only a few thousand frames; beyond that the process receives SIGSEGV or similar, which is a denial-of-service for any application parsing untrusted DNS data.
The vulnerability is triggered by `Net::DNS::Packet->new(\$wire)` i.e. any point where the library decodes a DNS message from the network. |
| The guard checker in Rocq Prover treats a parameter of a nested mutual fixpoint as uniform without examining calls between the different bodies of that fixpoint. find_uniform_parameters in kernel/inductive.ml inspects only self-recursive calls, so when no body calls itself the function concludes that every parameter is uniform. A parameter that grows through a cross-call from one body to another therefore keeps the subterm specification it inherited from the enclosing fixpoint, and a recursive call guarded by that specification is accepted although the argument is not structurally smaller. A non-terminating definition is admitted as structurally decreasing, which yields a term whose value equals its own successor and so a proof of False, from which any proposition follows. The proof requires no axioms, plugins or unsafe flags and Print Assumptions reports it as closed under the global context. Introduced in Coq 8.20 and fixed in Rocq 9.2.0. |
| The guard checker in Rocq Prover does not recheck the recursive tree representation of an inductive type parameter after that parameter has been changed by transport. A fixpoint may apply a rewrite along an equality between types to its recursive argument, which the guard checker accepts because the inductive type is preserved, while the recursive tree recorded for the parameter is altered. A second fixpoint that calls the first inherits the altered recursive tree without verification, so a call that is not structurally decreasing is accepted as terminating. The resulting non-terminating definition proves that a natural number equals its own successor and therefore False, from which any proposition follows. The demonstration uses two axioms that follow from univalence and are consistent with the calculus of inductive constructions, so the contradiction comes from the guard check rather than from the assumptions. A fix is proposed but not merged. |
| The guard checker in Rocq Prover does not follow recursive calls made through a fixpoint's own arguments. A fixpoint may pass itself as a higher-order argument to a second fixpoint, which then applies it to a value that is not a subterm of the structural argument. Passing the recursive function to a plain definition is rejected because the checker unfolds the definition and observes the call, but passing it to a fixpoint is accepted because higher-order recursive calls through fixpoint arguments are not tracked. This admits a type that is definitionally equal to its own negation, so self-application produces False in purely definitional code, without tactics, axioms, plugins or unsafe flags, and Print Assumptions reports the result as closed under the global context. Fixed in Rocq 9.2.0. |
