| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| An authenticated user with permission to query a SQL data source can bypass the fix for CVE-2026-33375 by injecting the timeGroup macro through a WHERE clause, which Grafana's regex-based macro parsing does not reject. Evaluating the injected macro causes uncontrolled memory consumption that can terminate the Grafana server process, resulting in a denial of service. The Microsoft SQL Server, PostgreSQL, and MySQL data sources are affected. |
| Only self-managed Grafana instances with Auth Proxy authentication and identity caching enabled (sync_ttl greater than zero) are affected. The Auth Proxy cache key concatenated the username and forwarded identity attributes without a delimiter, so distinct identities could collide on one key. An authenticated user who shapes their own attributes to collide with a higher-privileged user's, while that user's cache entry is live, is authenticated as that user, up to Administrator (authentication bypass by spoofing). |
| When SAML IdP-initiated login is enabled in Grafana Enterprise, the SAML library skips validation of the InResponseTo field on all SAML responses, including SP-initiated logins. This removes anti-replay protection, allowing an attacker who obtains a valid signed SAML assertion to replay it and gain a session as the victim user. Only instances with the allow_idp_initiated SAML setting enabled are affected; this setting is off by default and Grafana OSS is not affected. |
| A user with organization administrator permissions can delete dashboard snapshots belonging to other organizations on the same Grafana instance, and can recover a snapshot's secret delete key using only its public share key (broken access control). |
| This vulnerability only affects Grafana stacks configured with multiple organizations; single-organization deployments are not impacted. In a multi-organization stack, a user who is an Org Admin of a single organization can call GET /api/access-control/users/permissions/search?actionPrefix=dashboards: and receive permission data belonging to other organizations. The disclosed data is limited to dashboard and folder identifiers (UIDs) and per-user permission/scope mappings (which user holds which access on which dashboard). Dashboard contents, panels, query results, datasource credentials, secrets, and personal data are not exposed. This is a limited cross-organization information disclosure affecting multi-org deployments only. |
| An authenticated attacker with Editor access or alert.instances.external:write can submit an external Alertmanager alert containing a controlled generatorURL. The attacker is authorized to create the alert, but not to execute script in another user's Grafana session.
Grafana renders alert.generatorURL directly as the Alert Details See source LinkButton href without URL-scheme sanitization or a safe-protocol allowlist. The click interceptor's :// heuristic can be bypassed by placing :// inside a JavaScript comment. When a user with read access clicks See source, the browser executes attacker-controlled JavaScript in the Grafana origin with the clicking user's permissions. |
| A cross-tenant isolation vulnerability was found in Grafana’s Correlations feature affecting legacy correlation records. Due to a backward compatibility condition allowing org_id = 0 records to be returned across organizations, a user with datasource management privileges could read and permanently delete legacy correlation data belonging to another organization. This issue affects correlations created prior to Grafana 10.2 and is fixed in >=11.6.11, >=12.0.9, >=12.1.6, and >=12.2.4.
Thanks to Gyu-hyeok Lee (g2h) for reporting this vulnerability. |
| An authenticated user with permission to create or edit alert rules can bypass datasource query authorization by marking an alert rule query as a server-side expression while referencing a real datasource UID (incorrect authorization). This can expose data accessible through Grafana's configured datasource credentials to users who lack permission to query that datasource. |
| Red Hat CNA-LR concluded that this CVE is not valid. |
| A caller-supplied X-Grafana-URL request header controls the destination of mcp-grafana's outbound requests, and the grafana_api_request tool lets the caller also choose the HTTP method, path, and body. Because the destination is not restricted to the configured Grafana instance, a caller can direct requests at internal, loopback, and link-local network services (including metadata endpoints) and read the responses, resulting in server-side request forgery. The fix for CVE-2026-15583 prevented the configured service-account token from being sent to unintended destinations but did not restrict the destinations themselves. |
| A confused-deputy flaw in Grafana MCP Server allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to exfiltrate the server's environment-configured Grafana service-account token by supplying a crafted X-Grafana-URL request header. This also enables SSRF against arbitrary internal services, including cloud metadata endpoints. |
| The alertmanager templates test endpoint (/api/alertmanager/grafana/config/api/v1/templates/test) can execute templates with no memory limits. Mass-executing templates in a short period causes OOM and crashes the Grafana service. The endpoint requires very low privileges and is exploitable with anonymous access enabled. |
| Note: The CVE and blog post don't exist because we determined this is actually a cloud-only issue.
Access Controls are “Broken” when a user can access resources they are not authorized to access. An attacker can bypass any access control mechanisms in a web application, and gain unauthorized access to resources that are not available with their permissions.
Broken access control can allow attackers to:
Access resources only accessible to certain users, thus allowing unauthorized access to data
Perform operations on behalf of other users, leading to account takeovers in the worst cases
Attempt privilege escalation
Attempt to take over an account |
| The public dashboard deletion endpoint does not enforce organization isolation, allowing an Org Admin in one organization to delete public dashboards belonging to a different organization by supplying the target dashboard's identifiers. |
| Several Grafana API endpoints, some of them unauthenticated, do not limit the size of the request body before processing it. An attacker can send very large payloads that force excessive memory allocation, potentially exhausting memory and causing a denial of service. |
| An unauthenticated attacker can repeatedly call Grafana's OAuth login route with unique values, causing unbounded memory growth that can eventually exhaust memory and crash the Grafana instance (denial of service). |
| A user with Editor permissions can craft a dashboard whose table (TableNG) panel contains a malicious field name that executes as a script in the browser of any user who views the dashboard (stored cross-site scripting). |
| A user with Viewer permissions can use specially crafted requests to the Tempo and Loki data source plugins to reach unintended backend endpoints. Depending on the backend configuration this can expose data source credentials, leak internal responses, or trigger administrative actions on the configured backend. |
| We have released version 5.24.0 of the Grafana Operator. This patch includes a MEDIUM severity security fix for a path traversal/privilege escalation vulnerability in the Grafana Operator.
### Summary
The Grafana Operator supports loading dashboards & library panels using the jsonnet data templating language. The jsonnet expression is evaluated in the context of the operator manager pod.
### Impact
It is possible for a malicious user who can create Dashboard or LibraryPanel resources for a Grafana instance to obtain the Kubernetes service account token of the Grafana Operator manager.
### Affected versions
All Grafana Operator versions <= 5.23
### Solutions and mitigations
All installations should be upgraded as soon as possible.
As a workaround, the following ValidatingAdmissionPolicy prevent the creation or modification of jsonnet based resources:
apiVersion: admissionregistration.k8s.io/v1
kind: ValidatingAdmissionPolicy
metadata:
name: "prevent-jsonnet-dashboards"
spec:
failurePolicy: Fail
matchConstraints:
resourceRules:
- apiGroups: ["grafana.integreatly.org"]
apiVersions: ["v1beta1"]
operations: ["CREATE", "UPDATE"]
resources: ["grafanadashboards", "grafanalibrarypanels"]
validations:
- expression: "!has(object.spec.jsonnetLib)"
---
apiVersion: admissionregistration.k8s.io/v1
kind: ValidatingAdmissionPolicyBinding
metadata:
name: "prevent-jsonnet-dashboards-clusterwide"
spec:
policyName: "prevent-jsonnet-dashboards"
validationActions: [Deny]
### Acknowledgement
We would like to thank Artem Cherezov for responsibly disclosing the vulnerability. |
| A user with Viewer permissions can use a path traversal in the Loki data source plugin to reach administrative Loki endpoints and read sensitive backend configuration and internal service information. |
